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ABSTRACT
This study explores the concept of honour as it enters
into several Shakespearean plays. It presents an historical
definition of honour in the light of which Shakespeare's
treatment of the concept can be seen as a response to the
complex ethical inheritance of the sixteenth century.
Chapter 1 studies the main classical and medieval
traditions of honour and the reception by the Renaissance of
this plurality of ideas. The first section explores honour in
the context of the pagan concept of social virtue and
identifies it as an unstable secular formulation of virtue
which defines the aristocratic public function. The second
section examines the two principal medieval responses to this
secular ethic: the Augustinian denial of the human capacity
for virtue and the scholastic compromise tradition. which
grants man a limited power for well-doing and. in integrating
secular virtue into the structure of creation. provides the
framework for chivalric honour. The third section presents
honour in the Renaissance as an expression of this diverse
classical and Christian heritage. It identifies three
traditions - the chivalric. the humanist and the Calvinist -
that reflect an age of divided ethical allegiances in which
Shakespeare was led to explore honour as a problematic and
ultimately tragic concept.
v
Chapter 4 discusses Shakespeare's treatment of the
chivalric tradition in Henry Y and Troilus and Cressida. It
argues that both plays. though in very different ways.
interrogate that tradition and its claim to incorporate honour
within the system of natural law - Henry Y by exposing its
weakness as an historical model. Trojlus and Cressjda by
showing its connection to an individualistic honour.
Chapter 5 examines honour in Hamlet in the context of
the revenge ethic. It suggests that the protagonist's
contradictory task - the virtuous cause that is a mandate to
exact private vengeance - enacts the self-defeating tensions
in honour. and that this tragic conflict is played out within
a Christian universe which offers the possibility of the
transcendence of honour.
Chapter 6 explores Shakespeare's treatment of the pagan
concept of public service in Juljus Caesar and Corjolanus.
It attempts to show that Shakespeare portrays this concept
as tragically flawed because reliant for social order on an
aristocratic honour which makes individual excellence
inseparable from self-assertion.
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INTRODUCTION
The Oxford English Dictionary offers two main definitions
of the word 'honour': 1) High respect, esteem, or reverence,
accorded to exalted worth or rank; deferential admiration or
approbation; 2) Personal title to high respect or esteem;
honourableness; 'nobleness of mind, scorn of meanness,
magnanimity' (J); a fine sense of and strict allegiance to
what is due or right (also, to what is due according to some
conventional or fashionable standard of conduct). Honour, it
would seem, has a double sense, one internal and one external
to the self. It involves both the way one is seen by others
and the way one sees oneself; both the esteem in which one is
held and the moral (or conventional) principles on which one
bases one's actions. The wording of the two definitions
establishes an integral link between them: high respect
rewards exalted worth which in turn is the title to high
respect. The semantic duality of honour. which one might
designate in the simplest terms as 'virtue' and 'reputation'.
appears with varying emphases in many critical studies of the
concept in the plays of Shakespeare. Alice Shalvi. in her
essay '"Honor" in Trojlus and Cressjda'. sets up a distinction
between the Renaissance concept of honour as virtuous activity
in accordance with the rational principles of moral law and
a rival code of honour which was focussed on reputation to the
detriment of moral dictates.1 According to Shalvi. it is this
1.Alice Shalvi. '"Honor" in Troilus and Cressida'. S!L. V
(1965). 283-302.
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latter 'mistaken conception of honor'. based on pride and the
desire for personal glory. that Shakespeare criticises in
Troilus and Cressida and places in opposition to the 'true
honor' which seeks to implement a rational standard of
virtue.2 Thus. Shalvi posits conflict rather than correlation
between the two meanings of honour.
Although the Trojan debate certainly exhibits the kind of
antithesis between virtue and vainglory on which Shalvi bases
her reading. the play also suggests that the relation between
them is more complex than her simple dichotomy would allow.
In Ulysses's speech to Achilles on the 'strange fellow' he is
reading.3 virtue and reputation are presented as
interdependent:
no man is the lord of anything.
Though in and of him there be much consisting.
Till he communicate his parts to others;
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught.
Till he behold them form'd in the applause
Where th'are extended; who. like an arch.
reverb'rate
The voice again .... ~. 111.3.115-21.
Although Ulysses has his own managerial motives here. he is
nevertheless attempting to persuade plausibly. and his
argument. whatever strategy it serves. carries enough
conviction to make us take it seriously. It claims that there
is a connection between individual virtue and reputation; that
the honourable man who performs virtuous deeds relies on the
2.Ibid .• pp.285.289.
3.All quotations are from The Arden Shakespeare: Troilus and
Creseida. ed. Kenneth Palmer (London and New York: Methuen. 1982).
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social esteem which authenticates them. and hence cannot
possibly aspire to virtue without also aspiring to reputation
and respect. It is thus not sufficient simply to dichotomise
virtue and reputation as a 'true' and a 'mistaken' honour when
the play arguably demonstrates that the tension between the
two is a tension within interdependence.
Martin Dodsworth. in Hamlet Closely Observed. his
book-length study of the role of honour in the play.
identifies honour as an aristocratic concept. bound up with
the exalted rank and social privilege of a superior class. He
places his work within a social context by tracing the tension
that existed in Tudor England between the monarchy and a
nobility whose obsession with status fostered the socially
disruptive tradition of private revenge.4 However. this
important connection between aristocratic psychology and
revenge honour is hampered by a tendency to establish a
simplistic distinction between the moral conduct encouraged by
the state and the nobleman's concern for his status and
reputation. Like Shalvi. Dodsworth sets up an opposition
between 'honour as virtue' and 'honour as precedence'.
perceiving in Hamlet the lesson that the good man 'follows
virtue without respect to rank,.5 Dodsworth does not consider
that the concept of aristocracy involves social obligations as
well as social rewards. and that privilege is the prize of
4.Martin Dodsworth. Hamlet Closely Obs@ryad (London and Dover. New
Hampshire: The Athlone Press. 1985). pp.9-35.
5.Ibid .• p.100.
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public virtue. Nor does he consider that in the 'mole of
nature' speech reputation is conceived of as the natural
complement of virtue; that Hamlet's meditation on the features
which obscure a nation's or an individual's worth presupposes
a fundamental relation between virtue and the external honour
that reflects it:
From our
The pith
and indeed it takes
achievements. though perform'd at height.
and marrow of our attribute.
Ham .. 1.4.20-22.6
To view Hamlet in Dodsworth's terms. as assuming a conflict
between the 'great lord' and the 'honest man,.7 is thus to
ignore the complexities engendered by the play's suggestion
that there is a connection between virtue and status.
Shalvi's and Dodsworth's moral antitheses encourage two
forms of reductiveness: either that the plays make simple
moral statements or that they require anachronistic
condemnations of the unegalitarian concept of class
superiority. This is not to deny that the plays in question
present critiques of honour and hence of aristocracy; it is
rather to recognise that simple moral dualities obscure their
intellectual complexity. Shalvi's and Dodsworth's failure to
respond fully to their dramatic sophistication arises from a
failure adequately to grasp the concept of honour itself. It
is clear. moreover. that their conceptual shortcomings involve
6.All quotations are from The Arden Sbakespeare: Hamlet. ed.
Harold Jenkins (London and New York: Methuen. 1982).
7.Dodsworth. p.105.
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a tendency to confuse concept with tradition. Although both
critics are alert to the strained relation between the two
meanings of honour. they present the concept's intrinsic
duality as the rivalry between two principal sixteenth-century
formulations of honour - between an orthodox and a subversive
tradition or between state authority and aristocratic
self-assertion. In so doing. they oversimplify not only the
concept. but the traditions of honour operative during the
Renaissance; for their antithetical poles of moral orthodoxy
and individual pride represent less the dominant Renaissance
conceptions of honour than the social tensions inevitably
generated by a concept in which public virtue is inseparable
from social stature and the quest for glory.
Both Shalvi and Dodsworth examine honour as the organising
concept of a particular play. There are to date three studies
which explore honour in relation to a broader spectrum of
Shakespearean drama: Norman Council's book. When Honour's At
the Stake, Ideas of Honour in Shakespeare's Plays: Paul
Siegel's article. 'Shakespeare and the Neo-Chivalric Cult of
Honor': and Curtis Brown Watson's book. Shakespeare and the
Renaissance Concept of Honor.8 Like Shalvi and Dodsworth.
these critics situate their considerations of Shakespearean
honour within the context of certain Renaissance traditions
a.Norman Council. When Honour's At the Stake, Ideas of Honour in
Shakespeare's Plays (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd .• 1973):
Paul N. Siegel. 'Shakespeare and the Neo-Chivalric Cult of Honor'.
~, 8 (1964), 39-70: Curtis Brown Watson, Shakespeare and the
Renaissance Concept of Honor (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press. 1960).
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which define the nature and function of honour. Both Council
and Siegel. moreover. present a similar opposition between
a dominant orthodox tradition and what they term 'decadent'
formulations of honour. Council interprets the authoritative
Renaissance position in terms of the Aristotelian conception
of honour as the reward for virtuous conduct on behalf of the
commonwealth - a pagan formulation easily accommodated within
Christian doctrine - and contrasts this ideal of social virtue
with an 'aberrant' tradition which claimed independence from
orthodox morality and saw the honourable man as an autonomous
moral being possessed of an innate sense of rectitude.9
Siegel also identifies a single orthodox tradition. that of
Christian humanism. which conceived of honour as a rational
principle encouraging patriotic endeavour and obedient service
of the monarch. In conflict with this mainstream conception
of honour. Siegel posits a decadent feudal 'neo-chivalric'
tradition. focussed not on public service. but on the quest
for personal glory independently of royal authority and
conventional morality.lO
It would seem that the difference between these two
appraisals of Renaissance traditions of honour is essentially
nominal. in that both assert the dominance of an orthodox
formulation based on social virtue and opposed to the
individual pursuit of honour. Like Shalvi and Dodsworth.
9.See Council. pp.ll-3l.
lO.Siegel. pp.39-47.
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then. Siegel and Council invoke a simple moral dualism to
explain why honour can sometimes manifest itself not in active
virtue. but in disruptive and unacceptable modes of conduct.
Their binary oppositions between public service and private
glory. the state and the individual. similarly mistake the
social conflict engendered by an unstable concept of public
virtue for the competition between two culturally determined
conceptions of honour. one good. the other bad. The result is
a twofold misrepresentation - of the concept itself. and of
its role in the sixteenth century - that produces reductive
readings of Shakespeare. For both scholars. Troilus and
Cressida becomes no more than a straightforward critique of a
false notion of honour.11 Moreover. their polarities provide
little sense of the cultural particularity of individual
plays. For example. Brutus emerges from Council's discussion
of Julius Caesar as the representative not of Roman ideas of
honour. but of Council's own formulation of a decadent
honour.12 Similarly. in Siegel's reading of Coriolanus. the
hero exhibits merely a debased honour. while his mother's
final appeal to patriotism makes her the (unlikely) exponent
of the Christian humanist concept of honour,13 This cultural
confusion. which fails to take account of the way in which the
Roman plays. inspired by a close reading of Plutarch.
dramatise honour within the specific context of the pagan
11.Council. pp.75-88; Siegel. pp.51-56.
12.Council. pp.60-73.
13.Siegel. pp.60-65.
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ethic of social virtue. suggests that Siegel's and Council's
anthithesis between orthodoxy and aberrancy gives an
inadequate sense not only of the unstable connection between
virtue and honour in Shakespeare. but also of the variety of
Renaissance traditions of honour to which Shakespeare
responds. The pagan ethos of the Roman tragedies indicates
an interest in honour as it functions in a purely secular
setting - a sixteenth-century perspective absent from Siegel's
and Council's studies. and which calls into question their
assertions of a unitary orthodoxy based on the fusion of the
classical and Christian legacies of the Renaissance. For if
the sixteenth century inherited a concept of honour which is
more diverse than Siegel's and Council's interpretations would
suggest. that diversity implies the possibility not only of
reconciliation. but also of tension; it suggests that through
the movement of history. the sixteenth century acquired
conflicting attitudes to honour. derived on the one hand from
a man-centred and on the other from a God-centred morality.
All four of the critical works to which we have referred
adopt a synchronic approach to conceptual analysis. examining
honour as it functions within the sixteenth century. They
therefore assume that honour operates within the context of
formulations that are structurally determined. On this level.
they clarify that honour is not an abstract concept with an
existence independent of cultural structures. but a social
concept with an existence affected by social conditions.
Their synchronic method serves to emphasise that a concept
9
like honour has a unique configuration produced by a
particular social complex.
However. the confusion evident in their analyses of the
idea of honour suggests that synchrony is an inadequate tool
with which to elucidate what is in fact an historical concept
if it is divorced from a diachronic perspective. Siegel and
Council themselves imply that the Renaissance concept of
honour. if it is a phenomenon of a particular age. is equally
the product of the linear historical development that bestowed
upon the sixteenth century both pagan humanist and Christian
traditions. However. they do not pursue these implications;
and it is in part their failure to examine the ideological
heritage out of which the Renaissance concept of honour grew
that blinds these critics to the complex part it plays in
Shakespeare's age. This suggests that it is by restoring to
the synchronic entity its relation to its own past that one
fully reveals its originality. At the same time that it joins
culture to sources. historical diachrony disentangles concept
from tradition. for the historical unfolding of an idea
discloses both continuity and change. both its intrinsic
character as well as its progression through a sequence of
roles dictated by particular cultural contexts. I want to
argue that when a firm grasp of the structure of the concept
is coupled with an awareness of the mUltiple traditions of
honour that descended to the Renaissance. we find. not simple
binary oppositions. but a concept of secular virtue beset with
internal tensions operating in a cultural milieu of strained
10
ethical loyalties.
Curtis Brown Watson, in Shakespeare and the Renaissance
Concept of Honor, offers an analysis of the main Western
traditions of honour which presents the cultural particularity
of the sixteenth century as the emanation of its varied
cultural heritage. Watson begins his study with a brief
survey of the concept from Plato through the Middle Ages which
succeeds in identifying honour as an essentially secular
aristocratic ethic functioning naturally in moral systems in
which there is no transcendent standard of morality to
deprecate the individual capacity for virtue and the
importance of social esteem as a criterion of worth.14
Watson's technique thus facilitates the perception of the
fundamental opposition between pagan humanist and Christian
attitudes to honour. Watson presents this conflict as central
to the sixteenth century, which inherited a concept of honour
inspired by pagan humanist ethics at the same time that it
maintained a powerful allegiance to the Christian tradition.IS
However, if Watson's analysis seems exhaustive, it is
coloured throughout by his declared allegiance to the
Burckhardtian thesis that the Renaissance represents a genuine
break with medieval culture, a new era whose secular values
were bolstered by the retrieval of a formal body of pagan
I4.Watson, pp.I9-S0.
IS.Ibid., pp.SO-I62.
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moral philosophy.16 In his determination to differentiate
between the Renaissance and the Middle Ages. Watson tends to
dichotomise the two traditions - classical humanism and
Christianity - on which he bases his distinction and hence to
diminish the complexity of honour's position in the history of
Western thought. Thus. although he offers what is in many
ways a sensitive appraisal of a fundamentally secular
conception of virtue bound up with ideas of class and
individual superiority and their reflection in public
approbation and high rank.17 Watson fails to consider the
problematic role which this aristocratic ethic plays ~
within the plaan formulations in Which it assumes its natural
~. His account reflects no trace of the 'mistaken' notion
of honour which appears in the other works we have considered.
and which. albeit misleadingly. at least posits the
possibility of conceptual conflict and contradiction. For
Watson. there are no tensions at work in classical conceptions
of honour: rather. his reading of the Renaissance requires
that an uncritical pagan veneration of the heroic individual
should come into conflict with the Christian repudiation of
pride.18 In general. Watson is right to stress the difference
between a secular and a spiritual morality: but his rigid
dualism oversimplifies not only the various classical
traditions of honour. but also the Christian heritage of the
16.Ibid .• pp.7-15: 47-54.
17.Ibid .. pp.91-159.
18.Ibid .. pp.l02-135.
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Renaissance. It leads him in particular to minimise the
significance of the scholastic attempt to harmonise a
religious and a secular conception of virtue - a compromise
tradition which holds an important place in sixteenth-century
thought. but which Watson cannot accommodate within his scheme
of polarities. Moreover. he oversimplifies the relation
between honour and Christian ethics by his insistence that
during the Renaissance spiritual and secular imperatives
operated in separate realms; the sixteenth-century nobleman
was simultaneously a good Christian and a wholehearted
subscriber to the code of honour.19 Watson's theory of the
divided loyalties of the Renaissance aristocrat is valid as
far as it goes. However. with the exception of his discussion
of duelling and private revenge.20 he stresses inconsistent
coexistence rather than tension and conflict. and so ends up
by diminishing the impact made on sixteenth-century thought by
a diverse ethical inheritance which afforded rival perceptions
of man's status as a moral being.
When applied to Shakespeare. Watson's uncomplicated
cultural dualism has unfortunate consequences. Shakespearean
drama becomes a straightforward endorsement of aristocratic
values by a dramatist for whom 'a resonant sense of honor is
in every respect excellent and never questionable,.21 This
19.Ibid .• pp.4-7; 102-35.
20.Ibid .. pp.127-35.
21. Ibid .• P .11.
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interpretation is aided by a dubious critical method; rather
than examining a playas a dramatic unity. Watson takes
extracts from numerous plays to illustrate the various
divisions of the concept of honour he has identified. such as
'Valour and Patriotism' and 'Ambition'. Thus. in the section
titled 'Revenge'. Laertes's vow to avenge his father's death
('Conscience and grace. to the profoundest pit! / I dare
damnation.' Ham .• IV.5.132-33) is excised from its dramatic
context and offered as evidence that Shakespeare's tragedies
reflect
the quick sensitivity
Renaissance had acquired
his numerous Renaissance
anger. and the desire
therefore. disparaged.22
to affront which the
from Aristotle through
disciples. Indignation.
for revenge are not.
That Laertes's vow is patently blasphemous suggests not the
dramatist's uncritical and contradictory espousal of an
unchristian aristocratic code of conduct. but his perception
of honour as a radically unstable conception of secular
virtue. and his attempt to give dramatic form to the tension
between the rival cultural legacies of his age.
In entering the critical debate over the role of honour in
Shakespeare's plays. this thesis aims to address the argument
on the social and historical level on which it has
consistently been conducted. It concurs with the previous
participants in the discussion in supposing that mastery of
the concept is the condition of effective dramatic analysis.
22.Ibid .• p.362.
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and that because honour is an historical and therefore
evolving concept. it cannot be defined by finally specifying
necessary and sufficient conditions; its constants are shaped
by and adapted to a particular culture's needs. Yet this
thesis suggests that the history of an ethical concept is
governed by two principles: that a determinate culture is
distinctive. and that its distinctiveness is. in the realm of
ideas. in part a response to past ideas. This thesis will
concern itself with intellectual history. This is not to
imply that a culture cannot be viewed in various other ways -
economic. political. social. linguistic or cultural. But
insofar as this thesis proposes to study a concept. it seems
appropriate to consider it from the point of view of its
content. This perspective requires that the Renaissance's
particular response to the past should be a response to the
conceptual forms that antecedent philosophers have devised for
moral problems. This dual method seeks to avoid the
limitations of the hermeneutic formula of previous studies
which. in restricting itself to the analysis of honour in the
Renaissance. falls prey to a reductive dualism that obscures
both a problematic concept and its controversial presence in
sixteenth-century intellectual life. While acknowledging.
with the benefit of Watson's example. the misapplication to
which its method is liable. this study intends to define
honour through a history of the concept in the light of which.
Shakespeare's exploration of an idea of secular virtue based
on the public function of a superior class can be understood
as an expression of the tensions at work in the sixteenth
15
century's complex ethical heritage.
The first chapter of this thesis accordingly seeks to
re-evaluate the classical and medieval complex of traditions
which shape Renaissance ideas of honour. The opening section
studies the pagan concept of honour in terms of the Homeric.
Platonic. Aristotelian and Stoic formulations of social
virtue. and identifies honour as the problematic relationship
between an aristocratic ethic of heroism and the society which
it functions to preserve. The second section examines the
role which this conception of secular virtue plays in the
Christian universe. specifying two main traditions: the
Augustinian. which denies man's power to do good and
deprecates the value of social esteem on the grounds of man's
fallen nature and his absolute dependence upon God: and the
scholastic. which grants man a limited capacity for well-doing
and. in locating secular virtue within a divinely-instituted
social structure. provides the theoretical framework for
chivalric honour. The third section addresses the complex
reception and transformation by the Renaissance of this
plurality of ideas on the problem of individual excellence.
It focusses on three conflicting Renaissance moral systems
designed to secure an unstable concept of secular virtue
within the Christian metaphysic: humanist secular ethics
underpinned by a purely formal Christianity: the neo-chivalric
tradition. which values honour within a conservative.
hierarchical vision of social order: and the Calvinist divorce
of reason and faith. which calls into question the human
16
capacity for virtue. The last three chapters examine the way
in which this ethical heterogeneity enters into Shakespearean
drama. producing an exploration of the strains inherent in the
chivalric concept of honour in Henry V and Troilus and
Cressida; of the self-defeating tensions in honour within the
context of a Christian universe in the revenge tragedy of
Hamlet; and of the contradictory nature of the pagan ethic of
public service in Julius Caesar and Coriolanus.
There remains the question of what links the simplest and
earliest conception of honour in the lli4d to its
extraordinarily elaborate treatment in the honour plays of
Shakespeare. This thesis does not rest on the claim that
Shakespeare had direct access to the pre-Renaissance
tradition. only that he was. as his plays indicate. intensely
and comprehensively receptive to the intellectual currents of
the Renaissance. which were themselves informed by their
Christian and classical antecedents. This thesis is neither a
study of influence. tracing causal couplings in the historical
progress of ideas. nor an intertextual study. attending to
allusions. quotations and pastiches in Shakespeare's work.
although both of these are legitimate areas of inquiry. What
it attempts to offer is an analysis of the complex and
unstable structure of a key concept in Shakespeare's plays and
in the intellectual life of his period. The chief
consideration governing the choice of texts in the first
chapter cannot therefore be Shakespeare's reading - an area
about which we know much. but which remains riddled with
17
conjecture and hypothesis. Rather. it must be a concern to
select those texts in which the evolution of the idea of
honour is pre-eminently displayed. and which mark and
epitomise the major phases of a process as it was retained or
rediscovered by the most influential texts of the Renaissance.
Yet it must be said that a glance at what we know of
Shakespeare's reading in this area is instructive.23 We can
be reasonably certain that as a grammar school boy in
Stratford Shakespeare read Livy and parts of the Aeneid and
became acquainted with classical moral philosophy through
close study of Cicero's De Officiis.24 Most editors of
Troilus and Cressida agree that Shakespeare also knew the
23.A considerable amount of research has been done on
Shakespeare's reading. Some of the available studies are:
H.R.D. Anders. Shakespeare's Books. A Dissertation on
Shakespeare's Readin& and the Immediate Sources of His Works
(New York: AMS Press. Inc .• 1965); E.A. Armstrong.
Shakespeare's Ima&ination: A Study of the PsycholOiY Of
Association and Inspiration (London: Lindsay Drummond. 1946):
T.W. Baldwin. William Shaksper's Small Latine and Lesse
Greeke. 2 vols. (Urbana. Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press. 1944);
Geoffrey Bullough. Narratiye and pramatic Sourc" of
Shakespeare. 8 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
1957-75); Alfred Hart. Shakespeare and the Homilies and Other
Pieces of Research into the Elizabethan Drama (Melbourne:
Melbourne Univ. Press. 1934); G.K. Hunter. 'Shakespeare's
Reading'. in A New Companion to Shakespeare Studies. eds.
Kenneth Muir and S. Schoenbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press. 1971). 55-66: Richmond Noble. Shakespeare's Biblical
Knowledie and Use of the Book Of Common Prayer is Exemplified
in the Plays Of the First Folio (London: SPCK. 1935); J.A.K.
Thomson. Shakespeare and the Classics (London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd .• 1952): Virgil K. Whitaker. Shakespeare's Use
Of Learnini. An InQuiry into the Growth Of His Mind and Art
(San Marino. Calif.: The Huntington Library. 1953).
24.See Baldwin. II. 573-74. 584-616. and Anders. pp.31-32.
For an account of the role of Livy's Ab Urbe Condita in
Coriolanus. see Anne Barton. 'Livy. Machiavelli. and
Shakespeare's Coriolanus'. SS. 38 (1985). 115-29.
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lliad through Chapman's translation. the first seven books of
which were published in 1598. But it is perhaps from his
extended use of North's Plutarch that Shakespeare learned the
most about the moral ethos of antiquity. Beyond this brief
reading list. evidence for Shakespeare's study of Graeco-Roman
ideas of honour becomes fragmentary and tenuous.
Nevertheless. if one cannot say with any certainty that
Shakespeare read Plato or Aristotle or a sixteenth-century
Aristotelian like Robert Ashley. one can probably safely
assume that Shakespeare knew a good deal more about classical
humanism than we know about his reading. The Elizabethan
penchant for the commonplace book. collections of ethical
maxims by classical authors which were assembled both by
publishers and private readers. testifies to the importance
generally attached to classical morality in Shakespeare's
age.25 It was a central feature of a widespread humanist
tradition. of which Robert Ashley's treatise Of Honour is
a fairly typical expression.26
Shakespeare's familiarity with the tenets of Renaissance
chivalry is marginally easier to gauge. We know that he
encountered the medieval chivalric tradition in Chaucer's
Kniaht's Tale and Troilus and Criseyde. Caxton's The Recuyell
of the Historyes of Troye and Lydgate's Troybogk. It is
clear. moreover. that orthodox theology and cosmology were
25.G.K. Hunter. 'Shakespeare's Reading'. pp.56-57.
26.Both Norman Council (pp.14-17) and Curtis Brown Watson
(p.67) treat it as such.
19
inculcated at school. instilled through compulsory church
attendance and expounded in such homilies as 'An Exhortation
concerning Good Order and Obedience to Rulers and Magistrates'
(1547) and 'An Homily against Disobedience and Wilful
Rebellion' (1574). Numerous scholars have heard echoes of
these homilies. as well as of Elyot's The Governor and
Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiatical Polity. in much of
Shakespeare's work. particularly in Henry V and Troilus and
Cressida.27 Whether or not we can identify Elyot and Hooker
as direct sources. they clearly represent a powerful current
of traditional thought which would have formed part of
Shakespeare's cultural experience. The Elizabethan nostalgia
for chivalry has also been well documented. especially by
Frances Yates and Roy Strong in their studies of state
festivals and court pageantry.28
With regards to the Calvinist dissent from orthodoxy. we
can be certain that Shakespeare knew the Genevan Bible (1560).
which was the standard household bible of the Elizabethan
middle classes and remained in use in some churches. despite
its associations with Calvin. after the authorised Bishop's
27.See. for example. Hart. pp.36-76. and Whitaker. pp.155-58.
171-72. 197-209.
28.Frances A.Yates. 'Elizabethan Chivalry: The Romance of the
Accession Day Tilts'. ~. 20 (1957). 4-25; Ray Strong. Iba
Cult of Elizabeth: Elizabethan Portraiture and Paaeantry
(London: Thames and Hudson. 1977).
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Bible was issued in 1568.29 Shakespeare would probably have
translated passages from it in the third form at Stratford
Grammar School. and scholars searching for biblical references
in the canon have identified numerous allusions to the Genevan
version.30 We also know. of course. that Calvinism had been a
pervasive presence in English spiritual. intellectual and
political life at least since the return of the Marian exiles
in the late 1550's. Their enthusisastic reception of the
doctrines of Geneva penetrated the Church. the universities
and the House of Commons. offering a vigorous challenge to
orthodoxy that exercised a profound influence on many of
Shakespeare's contemporaries. including Sidney and Spenser.31
These traditions of honour thus constitute part of the
moral and intellectual climate in which Shakespeare moved.
the cultural ideas and trends to which he was no doubt at
once consciously attentive and unconsciously receptive. For
the imagination of the great author is perhaps characterised
not simply by intellectual curiosity. but also by its
comprehensiveness. its ability to embody and give form to what
29.See Anders. pp.196-97. and S. Schoenbaum. William
Shakespeare. A Compact Documentary Life (Oxford. London. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press. 1977). p.56.
30.Schoenbaum. p.69; Anders. pp.199-201; Noble. pp.69.86-87.
31.For the influence of Calvinism on English thought. see
Hardin Craig. The Enchanted Glass. The Elizabethan Mind in
Literature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1950). pp.SS-56. M.M.
Knappen. Tudor Puritanism. A Chapter in the History of
Idealism (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1939).
pp.134-48 and S.T. Bindoff. Tudor Eniland. The Pelican History
of England (Penguin. 1950). pp.225-33.
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is important not merely in the author's own life. but in the
life of his period. Because the dramatist's work is an
embodiment of cultural history as well as the product of the
individual consciousness surveying it. what chiefly matters in
approaching the concept of honour in Shakespeare's plays is
not what he may have read. or which sources were available to
him. but the different attitudes to honour operative during
the sixteenth century which made up part of the cultural
fabric of his age.
Honour. of course. is an important concept in many of
Shakespeare's plays. I have confined my selection to those
in which it becomes the central issue. It could be argued
that any consideration of Shakespeare's treatment of honour
should include Othello and Macbeth. for in each play the
hero's concern for honour contributes to his tragic error.
Yet Othello's tragedy is focussed less on honour than on love:
hence the hero's own distinction between the endurable loss
of honour and the insupportable defilement of love:
but. alas. to make me
A fixed figure. for the time of scorn
To point his slow unmoving fingers at oh.
oh.
Yet could I bear that too. well. very well:
But there. where I have garner'd up my heart.
Where either I must live. or bear no life.
The fountain. from the which my current runs.
Or else dries up. to be discarded thence.
Or keep it as a cistern. for foul toads
To knot and gender in! Qtn .• IV.2.54-63.32
32.All quotations are taken from The Arden Shakespeare:
Qthello. ed. M.R. Ridley (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .•
1958) .
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It is the destabilising nature not of honour but of love with
which the play is primarily concerned. In the same way.
Macbeth's tragedy. although in part impelled by Lady Macbeth's
imputation of cowardice. becomes material for an exploration
of the nature of guilt in which honour plays a subsidiary
role. For the sake of uniformity. all quotations from the
plays are taken from The Arden Shakespeare series. though in
the case of as textually difficult a playas Hamlet.
occasional reference is made to other editions. All plays are
dated in accordance with the Oxford chronology.33
Finally. this thesis is perhaps a bit unusual nowadays
in that. although written by a woman. it makes little
reference to the role of women in Shakespearean drama. To
some extent. the relative unimportance of women in the pages
which follow is dictated by the subject matter: women play
a limited part in the study of a concept structured around
public virtue because in the sixteenth century they had little
access to the public sphere. One might cite Queen Elizabeth
as evidence to the contrary. but her own political power
derived not from any real improvement in women's legal status.
but from the accident of royal birth. Yet Elizabeth's genius
at discharging the most demanding of all public functions
testifies to the strain between the general legal inferiority
of women in the Renaissance and their social abilities and
aspirations. This strain is reflected in the plays examined
33.Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor. eds. William Shakespeare:
A Textual Companion (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1987).
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in this thesis. particularly in the characters of Portia and
Volumnia. whose identification with honour demonstrates a
deep-seated discontent with the traditional female role; a
discontent which. in Volumnia's case. finally involves an
entry into the public domain. albeit one rendered ambivalent
by the tensions present in her society. Thus. although a
character like Ophelia. enjoined by brother and father to
defend her chastity. shows us a sixteenth-century conception
of female honour that allows a woman no connection to the
public life except through the private virtues that reinforce
the public stature of her male relations. Shakespeare's
exploration of honour is also attentive to the social and
sexual powers simmering beneath the surface of female
subjection.
24
CHAPTER 1
THE CONCEPT OF HONOUR FROM ANTIQUITY
TO THE RENAISSANCE
.....,.~ ..
The lliAd reflects a society characterised by a morality
of role fulfilment. The central evaluative term of aiathos.
the forerunner of our word ·good'. pertains specifically to
the role of the Homeric chieftain. As A.W.H. Adkins explains.
in order to be aiathos.
one must be brave. skilful. and successful in
war and in peace: and one must possess the wealth
and (in peace) the leisure which are at once the
necessary conditions for the development of these
skills and the natural reward of their successful
employment.1
The Homeric chieftain is aiathos if he demonstrates the
qualities necessary to sustain his function: the courage.
cunning. wealth and leisure which enable him to fight. rule
and plot successfully.2 Accordingly. when Nestor counsels
Agamemnon not to take Briseis from Achilles - 'Neither do
thou. mighty [aiathos] though thou art. seek to take from him
the girl' - he assumes that Agamemnon. in his role as
commander-in-chief of the Greek forces. is aiathos and will
remain so whether or not he offends the honour of his
co-equal.3 This powerful commendatory term attaches to the
aristocracy because it is their role which is thought to
contribute most to the community's stability and well-being in
1.Adkins. Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values.
p.33.
2.See Alasdair MacIntyre. A Short History of Ethics (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1966). p.6.
3.The Iliad. trans. A.T. Murray. 2 vols. (London: William
Heinemann Ltd .. 1924). I.i.27S. This passage is frequently
cited as a telling example of a morality of role fulfilment.
See. for example. Adkins. Merit and Responsibility. p.37. and
MacIntyre. A Short History of Ethics. p.a.
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war and in peace.4
If the nobleman executes his social function. he possesses
~. a cognate of aiathos usually translated as 'virtue' or
'excellence'. Honour. in the form of the respect of one's
peers and the material equivalence of respect. or honours. is
the reward the Homeric chieftain claims for success in
discharging his social role. It is. moreover. an
indispensable adjunct of ~: a nobleman's worth is
equivalent to the honour in which he is held. for the opinion
of his co-equals provides the only effective measure of his
success or failure in performing his appointed function.S On
this basis. we can understand the distress of Achilles in the
ll1ad and that of Ajax as recounted in the Odyssey: the denial
of the material rewards of valour constitutes a denial of
honour due. and without honour. a man has no value.6
The Iliad reveals honour's integral relation both to
aristocracy and to a social conception of virtue. for it is
the preserve of a ruling class whose excellence resides in the
successful maintenance of the social unit. Yet in evaluating
conduct in terms of excellence. an evaluation that is
4.Adkins. Merit and Responsibility. pp.34-6.
S.See Lionel Pearson. Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece
(Stanford. Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press. 1962). p.SO.
6.The Iliad. I.i.188-24S. 292-303. 345-412; ix.307-429;
The Odyssey. trans. A.T. Murray. 2 vols. (London: William
Heinemann Ltd .• 1919). I.xi.S41-567. See Pearson.p.50. and
MacIntyre. After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (London:
Duckworth. 1981). p.12S.
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necessarily relative. 'always implicitly the claim to excel
over others'.? honour differentiates not only between a power
elite and their social inferiors. but also between individual
members of the superior class. On this level. honour has a
fundamental link with competitive self-assertion as well as
with aristocratic pride. This is particularly the case in the
lliad. where the nobleman excels as warrior and ruler through
an indomitable exercise of will. Yet even within the social
order depicted in the Homeric epics. in which this form of
successful self-promotion plays an essential stabilising role.
the tensions at work in an honour culture make themselves
felt. The conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles illuminates
the ease with which a situation of mutual respect among
co-equals can disintegrate into the unbridled self-assertion
of the 'superior' and the chafed pride of the hero diminished
by his supremacy: both Agamemnon and Achilles claim to be 'the
best of the Achaeans,.8 As the growth of the ~ rendered
the competitive qualities of the Homeric hero increasingly
anti-social. moral philosophy sought to integrate the
aristocratic function more securely into the new social order
through a redefinition of public virtue.
In the Republic. Plato divides his ideal city into three
classes which correspond with his theory of the tripartite
7.Julian Pitt-Rivers. 'Honour and Social Status'. in Honour
and Shame. The Values of Mediterranean Society. ed.
J.G. Peristiany (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press.
1966). p.23.
8.The Iliad. I.i.91.244.
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soul.9 Just as the soul has its appetitive. highspirited and
rational parts. so men fall into three distinct groups
according to which part of the soul is dominant. Plato
assigns reason. the ruling element of man. to the Guardians.
the ruling philosophical elite. highspiritedness to the
Auxiliaries. the warrior class whose function is to defend the
state. and appetite to the merchant and peasant classes.1D
Plato's perfect state is essentially an aristocracy of
intellect and courage. and it is in delineating the public
function of the Auxiliaries that Plato attempts to redefine
aristocratic virtue.
Plato associates the highspirited part of the soul with
self-assertion and the pursuit of honour. or ~. the word
which denotes both social esteem and material honours. II He
thus recognises an integral link between aristocratic virtue
9.For the theory of the tripartite soul. see the Republic. in
The Dialoiues of Plato. trans. B. Jowett. 4 vols. (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press. 1953). II. IV.428bff. For discussions of
Plato's theory of the tripartite soul. see Helen F. North.
'Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and
Latin Literature'. in The Classical Tradition; Literary and
Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan. ed. Luitpold
Wallach (Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. 1966). pp.171-73:
R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley. Plato's Republjc. A Phjlosophjcal
Commentary (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd ..
1964). pp.127-33: Eduard Zeller. Outljnes of the History of
Greek Philosophy. trans. L.R. Palmer (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul. 1931. rpt. 1969).pp.136-44: I.M. Crombie.
An Examjnatjon of Plato's Doctrines. 2 vols. (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1962). 1.99: and MacIntyre. A Short
Hjstory of Ethjcs. pp.39-40.
10.Republic. IV. 428bff. 436a-445e. See also Adkins. ~
and Responsjbjljty. p.294.
11.Republic. III.375aff, VIII.547c-550b.
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and a self-assertive spirit. Socrates insists that a man
cannot undertake military service if he is not high-spirited
because an ambitious. striving spirit implies the possession
of an exceptional strength of will. itself the condition of
the ability to face the dangers of battle.12 At the same
time. however. Plato understands this aggressive impulse to be
dangerously allied to the Homeric inheritance. particularly to
its expression in the success-centred ethics of the Sophists.
which taught that happiness is achieved through unlimited
self-assertion disguised by a veneer of conventional conduct.
On this level. the aiathos pursues reputation and public
honours for the power and profit they afford. and the
nobleman's social prominence becomes a licence for
unrestrained self-seeking.13
In formulating his ideal city. Plato does not seek to
eradicate the self-assertive will. but to make it obedient to
the rational principle. This synthesis of spirit and reason
exhibits itself as the virtue of courage and is achieved
through a moral training which teaches the Auxiliary what
reason dictates should or should not be feared.14 This
education produces in the Auxiliary the love of the morally
12.Ibid .• III.375a-c.
13.See Adeimantus's argument in Republic. II.362e-365d10. See
also VIII.548c5-6.
14.Ibid .. III.375e-412b. I am indebted for my discussion
of Plato's treatment of the Auxiliary class to Cross and
Woozley. pp.96-107. and to Terence Irwin. Plato's Moral
Theory (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1977). pp.202-203.
30
honourable (~). which manifests itself in deeds that
sacrifice selfish interests for the common good. The word
kalQn. usually translated as 'the noble' or 'the honourable'.
denotes the actions of the aiathos. It contains the
implication of the favourable response of others to the deeds
the nobleman performs: ~ actions are well thought of and
receive the benefit of ~.15 The word ~ became
increasingly prevalent in the classical period.16 and the
development in the moral vocabulary suggests a growing
tendency to distinguish between the aristocratic function and
the respect and public marks of respect earned by fulfilling
that function. In the Republic. at any rate. honour has two
distinct though interrelated meanings. one internal and one
external to the self: it has come to denote a rational
standard of public virtue as well as the social response that
rewards it. The Platonic ~-standard aims at the
satisfaction of rational desire: the self-assertive will is
focussed not on unlimited self-aggrandisement through the
pursuit of reputation and honours. but on an internalised
conception of honour. fidelity to which leads the aaathos to
risk his life on behalf of the city. to aspire to honourable
deeds before social rewards. Yet because deeds of social
virtue can be authenticated only by the response of others.
Plato grants martial heroes the traditional honours of the
1S.K.J. Dover. Greek popular Morality in the Time of
Aristotle (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1974). pp.69-73.
Adkins. Merit and Responsibility. p.180.
Plato and
See also
l6.Dover. p.7l.
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Plato's conception of aristocratic virtue undoubtedly
influenced Aristotle's formulation in the Nicomachean Ethics.
However. it is important to recognise the difference as well
as the continuity between Platonic and Aristotelian notions of
social virtue. For although both thinkers were entirely Greek
in their preoccupation with the ~ as the arena of the good
life. Plato formulated his moral theory in terms of an ideal
state that entailed a repudiation of existing states, while
Aristotle's ethics are firmly grounded in contemporary upper
class Athenian life.18
Early on in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle informs us
that public men, who are 'men of superior refinement and
active disposition'. equate happiness. the ~ of human
life. with honour; that is. with ~.19 Aristotle's public
men are Athenian gentlemen, the men of high rank who dominated
political life in fourth-century Athens.20 Aristotle.
however. does not hesitate to reject their point of view. for
two reasons: first. on the grounds that external honour
depends on 'those who bestow honour rather than on him who
17.Republic. V.468dff.
18.See Alasdair MacIntyre. A Short History of Ethics. p.67.
19.Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. trans. W.D. Ross. in
The Basic Works of Aristotle. ed. Richard McKeon (New York:
Random House. 1941). 1095b22-25.
20.See Adkins. Merit and Responsibility. pp.318-19; 338-43.
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receives it'. while the supreme good in life must be
'something proper to a man and not easily taken from him':
secondly. because. as the object men seek 'in order that they
may be assured of their goodness'. honour is necessarily of
secondary interest to the virtue it commends.2l
In place of the public man's identification of happiness
with ~. Aristotle proposes that the final good for man
consists in activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.
or with the rational faculty that makes us uniquely human.22
Aristotle divides the soul into rational and nonrational
parts.23 The nonrational element includes the faculty of
desire. the realm of passions and impulses which are rational
or irrational insofar as they conform to the dictates of
reason. The moral. as opposed to the intellectual. virtues
are activities that spring from the obedience of desire to
reason.24 Thus. Aristotle perceives an integral link between
moral virtue and passion. The feelings accompanied by
pleasure or pain can resist the rational principle and become
21.Nicomachean Ethics. l095b23-30.
22.I am summarising the essential features of Aristotle's
concept of the Good as they appear in the Nicomachean Ethics.
1097a15-1098b8. It must be stressed. however. that the notion
of public virtue on which I base my account of Aristotle is
transcended at the end of the Ethics by the superior happiness
to be found in a life of philosophical contemplation (iN.
1177a12-1179a33). As this is available to only a few men.
however. the life of public virtue remains a vital. if
secondary. kind of happiness.
23.Nicomachean Ethics. 1102a35-1103a10.
24.Ibid .• 1103b26-1106a12.
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vice or accord with it and become virtue.
What then does reason prescribe? In his account of good
self-love. Aristotle distinguishes between the reprehensible
self-love of men who gratify their appetites and the
irrational element of the soul by assigning to themselves the
greater share of such objects of competition as 'wealth.
honours. and bodily pleasures,.25 and the self-love of the good
man who gratifies the rational element in himself by desiring
what is ~ or honourable. which entails acting so as to
benefit others:
the good man acts for honour's sake. and the more
so the better he is. and acts for his friend's
sake. and sacrifices his own interest.26
Thus. reason enjoins acting for honour's sake - not for ~.
but for kalQn. Indeed. Aristotle sets up an explicit contrast
between the irrational desire for external goods like material
honours and the rational desire to attain the honourable
course by sacrificing such selfish interests. It is clear.
therefore. that although Aristotle rejects the identification
of happiness with ~. which he associates with competitive
self-assertion. his notion of the Good is focussed upon a
conception of honour as virtuous conduct on behalf of others.
It should be stressed. however. that the Aristotelian
kalgn-standard rests not on altruism. but on good self-love:
acts of beneficence derive from the individual's desire to
25.Ibid .. 1168b15-21.
26.Ibid .• 1168a32-34.
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identify himself with the highest good. a state of character
which Aristotle insists must be created by moral training.27
For Aristotle. then. internal honour is a question neither of
self-effacement nor of self-aggrandisement. but of educated
passion; the aaathos asserts himself by aspiring to gain
nobility through the performance of deeds that profit others.
The kalQu-standard forms the basis of Aristotle's
conception of the aristocratic public function. for in
securing internal honour. the a~athos simultaneously secures
the good of the community. The assumption that individual and
collective happiness are inseparable informs Aristotle's
discussions of each of the moral virtues. The liberal man is
characterised as one who uses his wealth to confer benefits
on others. while the magnificent man spends his money on
'proper objects of public-spirited ambition' .28 Aristotle's
me~alopsychos. or great-souled man. performs notable deeds
of public beneficence. such as facing the dangers of battle
without regard for personal safety.29 To offer one's life for
one's country is for Aristotle the highest instance of the
honourable act. In his discussion of the virtue of courage.
he praises the man who faces the noblest of deaths in battle.3D
27.Aristotle deals with education at ~. 1103a14-b26; 11D4b4-
13.
28.Ibid .. 1120a23-b6: 1122b18-25.
29.Ibid .• 1124b6-11.
3D.Ibid .. 1115a29-35.
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The Rhetoric provides a further illustration of Aristotle's
conception of the nobleman's public role. Virtue is there
defined as a 'faculty of beneficence'. The highest virtues
are identified as courage and justice. for these are the most
useful to others. Aristotle characterises the quality of
honourable or ~ actions: those a man performs for his
country with no thought for himself; all actions done for
the sake of others. since they 'are not directed to one's own
profit' .31
Aristotle's conception of honour thus defines a social
elite that is also a moral elite. In denoting the
aristocratic function of military and public service. the
~-standard applies to a propertied class with the wealth
to confer benefits on the city and the leisure to develop
the martial and administrative skills that preserve social
prosperity. Yet it also characterises Athenian gentlemen
as those members of society who. in acquiring virtuous habits
of personality. attain a higher level of being. The
~-standard establishes the moral basis for the social
superiority of a ruling class.
Aristotle insists. in the Nicomachean Ethics, on the
interdependence of the moral and the social. He stresses that
public virtue requires external goods; without wealth, the
liberal man cannot bestow benefits on the ~. and without
31.Rhetoric. trans. W. Rhys Roberts. in The Basic Works
of Aristotle. 1366b2-6; 1366b35-1367a7.
36
power. the brave man cannot perform noble deeds of courage.32
This introduces us to the complex relationship in Aristotelian
ethics between internal and external honour. As we have just
seen. Aristotle differentiates sharply between the honour that
is 'proper to a man' and the honour that is bestowed on a man
by others: between deeds of social virtue and the response
that rewards them. We have come a long way from Homer. The
excellences that sustain the nobleman's public role have
undergone a fundamental re-evaluation. while the Homeric
identification of virtue with respect and public honours has
lost the social context that gave it meaning: a man's moral
worth is now distinct from and superior to the respect in
which he is held. Aristotle's emphasis on volition is of
crucial importance in this distinction. for it identifies the
man by the actions that result from his own will. Aristotle
declares that an act which a man performs through a rational
principle is his own act: it is voluntary and so reveals the
man in his true nature.33 Hence. the act of the rational will
belongs to the agent in the sense that the principle of action
comes from within him.
The interior dimension of Aristotelian ethics endows
intention with a significance that would have been
unintelligible to the Homeric hero. for whom results alone
32.Njcomachean Ethjcs. l099bl-8:1178a28-34.
33.Ibid .• 1168b30-1169a2.
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mattered.34 When Aristotle insists that the best type of man
'acts for honour's sake,.35 he measures the moral status of an
act by the motivation of its agent. There is now a clear
distinction between a deed performed for the sake of glory and
one performed for the sake of its inherent nobility. In his
discussion of courage. Aristotle prizes the man who acts
bravely because it is honourable to do so more highly than the
Homeric warrior. who fought in order to win the respect of his
peers and avoid disgrace.36
Yet it is important to remember that we are dealing in
Aristotle's ethics with a world in which intentions remain
secret until translated into action. Aristotle himself
declares how difficult it is to discern intention and that
virtue must therefore consist in both the will and the deed.3?
The pagan reliance on the external manifestation of the will
immediately implies the presence of others to judge a man's
deeds. Thus. virtue in Aristotelian ethics cannot be other
than social. This is why Aristotle defines the Noble as 'that
which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of
34.See Adkins. Merit and Responsibility. p.35.
35.Nicomachean Ethics. 1168a32-33.
36.Ibid .. 1115b7-24: 1116a15-b2. For discussions of
Aristotle's treatment of the motivation behind courageous
deeds. see H.H. Joachim. Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1951). p.118. and Sir David
Ross. Aristotle (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .. 1949). p.204.
3?Nicomachean Ethics. 11?8a24-b2.
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praise' .38 We have seen that this connection between
honourable deeds and the response of one's fellow men is
contained in the word ~. which refers to both action and
the favourable response to action. Aristotle entirely
understands the integral relation between ~ and ~ when
he calls ~ 'the prize appointed for the noblest deeds,.39
His vision of the moral virtues consistently evokes the
response of others to the actions of the honourable man. The
deeds of the liberal man earn gratitude and esteem:
magnificence acquires prestige: bad self-love is greeted with
reproach: good self-love is approved and praised.40 In
Aristotelian ethics. a man's social self forms an essential
part of what he is as a man. Aristotle's observation that
public men seek honour in order to 'be assured of their
goodness,41 testifies to the logical connection between
self-respect and the respect of one's peers: a connection
examined further in Aristotle's discussion of 'proper pride'.
Aristotle proposes that there is a mean in the desire for
respect: a point. intermediate between the two extremes of
vainglory and poor-spiritedness. at which it is right to want
to be honoured.42 The mean depends on the quality of 'proper
38.Rhetoric. 1366a33-35.
39.Nicomachean Ethics. 1123b20.
40.1bid .• 1120a15-18: 1122b34: 1169a6-8.
41.1bid .. 1095b27-28.
42.Aristotle discusses the mean at ~. 11.6-9.
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pride'. the self-knowledge and self-respect of the honourable
man who 'thinks himself worthy of great things. being worthy
of them'. 43
Now. the great man's pride in his own merit must derive
from a knowledge of his deeds. for it is only through the
performance of deeds that are desirable in and of themselves
that a man's worth is evinced. However. the standard that
determines what is honourable is social law. the rational
principle inculcated through education. so that the rational
will of the nobleman makes its choices purely on the basis of
social values. Indeed. the Aristotelian rational will j£
internalised social law. Hence. the pride that Aristotle's
public man takes in the performance of noble acts and for
which he does not hesitate to claim the honour of his peers
seems to derive ultimately from society. as do the deeds
themselves.
So. do the nobleman's deeds belong to him or to the
community? 'Both'. would seem to be the answer provided by
Aristotle. Yet the relation which Aristotle sets up between
internal and external honour. between the self and society.
clarifies the complex and contradictory nature of social
virtue. The distinction between kalQn and ~. which on one
43.Nicomachean Ethics. 1123bl-3. The theory of proper pride
is offered in !H. IV.3. Aristotle considers that men who seek
external honour with excessive or deficient zeal do not know
themselves: the vain man exaggerates his worth. while the
humble man underestimates his capabilities.
40
level integrates honour into a formulation of virtuous conduct
on behalf of society. on another makes the heroic individual
to some extent independent of the public to which he is at
the same time. by virtue of the social basis of his deeds.
irrevocably tied. This tension in Aristotelian social virtue.
the problematic relationship which it establishes between
aristocratic pride and the society it serves. suggests the
tragic meaning latent in the classical concept of honour.
In 'doing the Good'. the Aristotelian nobleman also fulfils
the function of his class. Here we return to the connection
between a ruling class's social and moral pre-eminence. The
respect the nobleman seeks is one expression of the social
privilege that Aristotle deems an essential part of the
performance of noble deeds; hence ~ is designated the
greatest of external goods.44 As part of a class-bound
concept. ~ is sought not from society in general. but from
one's social equals. Public men desire to be honoured 'among
those who know them' because ~ has value only when
'conferred by good men' .45
IimA. then. is a crucial part of the nobleman's greatness,
rewarding moral superiority with a commensurate social
superiority. On this level. the Nicomachean Ethics reinforces
the integral relation between honour and distinction, and
44.Ibid., 1123b15-21.
45.Ibid., 1095b28: 1124a6.
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testifies to the permanent instability which this relation
generates. We have seen that Aristotle. following Plato.
attempts to control aristocratic self-assertion by defining it
in terms of rational desire and good self-love. But
throughout the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle points to the
continuing prevalence of the competition for eminence. at
times pursued with a determination akin to moral blindness.
Thus Aristotle tells us that public men equate happiness with
~. and characterises the ambitious man as one who does
wrong for the sake of external honour.46 Although the
Aristotelian k&lgn-standard clearly aims to supply a rational
basis for the individual desire for distinction. it is
possible that by yoking social superiority more securely to
moral superiority. it inadvertently provides the moral
justification for competitive individualism.
With the decline of the Greek ~ and the growth of the
large-scale Hellenistic and Roman empires. moral philosophy
becomes less concerned with the individual as part of a
community and more interested in man as a private individual.47
Stoicism reflects this sense of individual separation from the
world. The Stoic doctrine of the universal law of Nature aims
at individual peace of mind through a virtuous life that
46.In EN. 1125bl-25. Aristotle declares that the ambitious man
desires honour (~e) 'more than is right'. and in the
Rhetoric (1368b19). he defines the ambitious man as one who
'does wrong for the sake of honour (1ime)'.
47.See Bertrand Russell. History of Western Philpsophy
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd .• 1961). p.240. and
MacIntyre. A Shprt History of Ethics. p.10D.
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conforms with the rational principle of moral law.48
However. although Stoic doctrine aspires to individual
tranquillity. the concept of natural law makes each human
being an equal citizen of the cosmos and therefore presupposes
that there are moral and social obligations binding the
individual to his fellow men. Individual virtue is thus
linked logically to human community. Epictetus considers that
mankind is naturally disposed to social life and to the
sacrifice of private interests for the common good.49 Marcus
Aurelius similarly interprets the active duty of beneficence
as the end of human life:
as man is formed by nature to acts of
benevolence. when he has done anything benevolent
or in any other way conducive to the common
interest. he has acted conformably to his
constitution. and he gets what is his own.50
For the Stoics. then. virtue consists in the renunciation
of selfish private interests in the performance of deeds that
benefit others. This social standard of virtue lies at the
heart of the public role of the Roman nobility. As a vision
of the aristocratic function. it makes abundantly clear the
48.1 am indebted for my discussion of Stoic ethics to R.D.
Hicks. Stoic and Epicurean (London: Longmans. Green and Co ..
19l0).pp.74-l52; to J.M. Rist. Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press. 1969). pp.l-36: and to A1asdair
MacIntyre. A Short History of Ethics. pp.lOO-109.
49.Arrian's Discourses Of Epictetus. trans. P.E. Matheson. in
The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers. II.x.
SO.The Meditatipns pf Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. trans.
G. Long. in The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers. ed. Whitney
J. Oates (New York: Random House. Inc .• 1957). IX.42.
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Stoics' debt to Aristotle. However. unlike Aristotle. the
Stoics tend to polarise reason and passion. Virtue derives
not from rational desire. but from the conquest of irrational
passions - a category in which the Stoics place nearly all
emotions.51 The Stoic sage aspires to apathia. the absence of
desire and all other vicious emotional impulses. This inner
virtue produces happiness. or immunity from suffering. for the
man who desires nothing can lose nothing; he is independent of
the caprices of circumstance. Stoicism thus associates public
virtue with a curious combination of self-subdual and
self-sufficiency. both quite foreign to Greek ethics.
It is clear. moreover. that Stoicism abandons the link
between morality and the~. Virtue is the only
unconditional good. to be sought soley for its own sake.
Thus. Cicero declares that virtue should be desired 'in and
for itself. apart from any profit or reward,.52 Not
surprisingly. Stoic doctrine has no room for an external good
like public honour which. as the reward for virtue. is at once
an ulterior motive and an unstable object of desire. However.
if Stoicism repudiates honour in its external guise. it gives
a central place to an internal honour denoting the
individual's aspiration to virtue:
If you wish to be a man
who will forbid you?
of honour and trust.
But if you wish to
51.See The Cambridae History of Renaissance Philosophy. ed.
Charles B. Schmitt (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988).
p.364.
52.Cicero. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. trans. H. Rackham
(London: William Heinemann. 1914). II.xiv.45.
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keep what is outside you as well - your paltry
body. and goods. and reputation - I advise you
to begin this moment to make all possible
preparation .... For when you once allow outward
things to dominate what is your own. you had
better become a slave and have done with it.53
This passage from the Discourses of Epictetus exhibits both
the rejection of public honour and the primacy of an honour
conceived of as the essential and independent moral self.
Latin makes a distinction between these two meanings of honour
comparable to that we found in Greek: honestum denotes a man's
fidelity to 'the honourable'. while ~ refers to both
respect and material honours.
Thus. the central ethical relationship defined by the Stoic
conception of honour is not that between a man and the
community. but that between a man and himself. How does one
reconcile this moral autonomy with a standard of virtue which
dictates participation in the public life? For Aristotle.
after all. social morality necessitates the coexistence of
self-respect and earned respect. However. if Stoicism here
seems to be at odds with its ethical roots. its formulation of
honour in fact represents a logical development from
Aristotle. The internalised social values that constituted
the proper pride of the Aristotelian nobleman have become
self-sufficient: if a man can find within himself the
principles that guide the rational will. what need does
he have for social esteem?
Let us
afforded
give
by
to the
constant
soul that peace which is
meditation on wholesome
53.Arrian's Discourses. 11.2.
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instruction. by noble deeds. and a mind intent
upon the desire for only what is honourable. Let
us satisfy our conscience; for reputation let us
strive not at all. Let even a bad name attend us.
provided that we are really well-deserving.54
The Stoic conscience should not be confused with the Christian
conscience. It is not the voice of God within a man. but
a self-applauding faculty. the internalised acclaim of one's
peers. A.D. Nuttall explains this phenomenon:
In Stoic philosophy the heroic ethic of pride. of
glory in the sight of others. is cut off from its
reliance on social esteem and made self-sufficient
in each individual. The rational man is taught to
fill the silence of his own skull with clamorous
self-applause. with a majestically austere
approbation of his own feats. Every man his own
Achilles in his own. private Trojan War.55
What the Homeric nobleman could find only in the respect of
his co-equals. the Stoic sage finds within himself. in the
consciousness of his own integrity and devotion to moral
principle. The implications of moral independence which we
find in Aristotle are thus realised in the figure of the
gloriously self-reliant Stoic hero. paradoxically proud in his
achievement of passionless indifference.56 While retaining
the framework of an active. social conception of virtue.
Stoicism divorces self-respect from the respect of others.
with the result that honour comes to denote the capacity for
good of an autonomous moral being.
54.Seneca. 'On Anger'. in Moral Essays. trans. John W. Basore.
3 vols. (London: William Heinemann Ltd .• 1928). I. III.xli.1.
55.A.D. Nuttall. A New Mimesis, Shakespeare and the
Representation of Reality (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .•
1983). p.105.
56.Ibid .• p.103.
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From this discussion of the concept of honour in antiquity.
it is possible to draw several general conclusions about pagan
morality. In the Graeco-Roman world. man exists and functions
in a predominantly man-centred universe. in which morality
involves a system of right relations between a man and his
fellow men. Human society emerges as the foundation of
natural order. so that virtue logically becomes a social
concept which equilibrates individual and social well-being
and bestows the highest moral value on the conduct that
contributes to society's prosperity.
Honour forms an integral part of such an active. social
conception of virtue. denoting both the deeds of public virtue
that help to preserve the social unit. and the response of
others to such deeds well-performed. Honour. therefore. is
associated throughout antiquity with the aristocracy. the
class with the wealth and leisure that enable it to cultivate
the skills beneficial to society. Yet we have seen that
honour's basis in aristocratic pride. in social and moral
differentiation. renders the relationship between society and
aristocratic virtue intrinsically problematic. vulnerable to
the self-exaltation of the heroic individual upon whom the
social order depends for its survival. Moreover. attempts to
stabilise the honour relationship through the identification
of social virtue with public service achieve at best an
insecure control over heroic individualism and may. through
their suggestions of an autonomous moral superiority. actually
47
encourage it.
• ••••••••••••• ** ••••
With the advent of Christianity. honour assumes a
diminished role within an ethic that calls into question the
human capacity for good. Christian ethics follow logically
and irresistibly from the twin pillars of Christian doctrine.
the Creation and the Fall. In a created universe. man exists
in a relationship of absolute dependence upon God. from whom
he derives both existence and substantiality.57 The central
tenet of Christian metaphysics produces a radical
transformation in the conception of man as a moral being. The
virtuous conduct that for the Greeks was the ne plus ultra.
that which is desirable in and of itself. is now desirable
only in that it leads man to God. the transcendent principle
who is the source of morality. Thus. the moral order that
finds its basis in the natural reason is regulated and defined
by the divine order that encompasses it. Moral error can
therefore no longer be merely an offence against reason that
can be corrected through a renewal of well-doing. In the
Christian universe. a violation of the moral order entails a
violation of the universal. divinely-instituted order. The
magnitude of this transgression precludes the classical belief
in the ability of man to restore harmony through his own
efforts and presupposes instead human reliance on God's
57.See Etienne Gilson. The Spirit of Medieyal Philosophy.
trans. A.H.C. Downes (London: Sheed and Ward. 1936). p.129.
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grace.58
A morally bad act. then. which the Christians call 'sin'.
in fact denotes man's opposition to God. a conception of
natural morality that is a measure of the distance between
classical and Christian ethics. The independence in the order
of existence that man enjoyed in pagan morality becomes the
foundation of sin. the source of man's proud rebellion against
the essential law dictating the creature's absolute dependence
on the Creator. The concept of original sin interprets the
human will primarily as the cause of human mortality and
earthly suffering through its evil aspiration to
self-sufficiency. Deprived by the Fall of the rectitude
of will which he possessed only by virtue of God. and thus
utterly reliant on grace. Christian man can have little of his
pagan predecessor's faith in the efficacy of his own will to
virtue. In the God-centred universe of Christianity. virtue
is transformed from a secular into a religious concept.
involving a man's relationship not to the community. but to
God. This development of a sacred. and the decline of a
secular. conception of morality has a profound and lasting
effect on the concept of honour.
Out of the dual basis of Christian theology develops a dual
conception of human nature: a conception that lies at the
heart of the first great formulation of Christian philosophy.
58. Ibid .. pp.324-41.
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St. Augustine's The City of God. For Augustine. Nature is
inherently good because created by God. As part of God's
creation. man is therefore also essentially good. though
corrupted by his evil will:
the vice that makes them oppose God is their
own hurt. because it corrupts their good
nature. the natures that an evil will has
corrupted. though in so far as they be polluted
they are evil. yet in so far as they are natures
they are good.59
In his created nature. man is able to participate in God's
will through the medium of reason. which is imbued with
natural law through the moral conscience. the divine
illumination within each individual.60 Man's fallen nature.
on the other hand. is dominated by what Augustine terms
'lust': the desire for the temporal goods of money. power
and sexual pleasure that drives man to strive restlessly for
a satisfaction the perpetually eludes him.6l The City of God
presents these two natures as separated by a chasm of sin;
in his fallen state. man is in bondage to the polluted nature
he unleashed in his pride. his will infected. his intellect
darkened. capable of redemption only through the unmerited
grace which God bestows on a few elect by virtue of Christ's
mediatory sacrifice. For the vast majority of men. the
effects of the Fall are inescapable.62
59.St. Augustine. The City of God. trans. John Healey. 2 vols.
(London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd .. 1945). I.xii.3.
60.Ibid .. I.v.12: II.xiv.28.
6l.Ibid .. II.xiv.IS.
62.Ibid .. II.xxi.12.
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This binary conception of Nature shapes the central theme
of The City of God. for Augustine divides mankind into the two
societies developed by man's two natures: the city of man.
inhabited by those men who remain enslaved to the selfish
drives of the unregenerate condition: and the city of God. the
citizens of which pass through the earthly city as pilgrims.
using the temporal goods it has to offer only as a means of
reaching their final. higher destination of union with God:
Two loves therefore have given origin to these two
cities. self-love in contempt of God unto the
earthly. love of God in contempt of one's self to
the heavenly .... For the city of the saints is
above. though it have citizens here upon earth.
wherein it lives as a pilgrim until the time of
the kingdom come.. .63
Not surprisingly. the state in Augustinian doctrine ceases to
be. as it was for the ancients. an essential means of securing
the good life. serving mainly the necessary but negative
function of restraining the enormities attendant upon man's
fallen condition.64
Augustine's rigid separation of man's temporal existence
and his supra-terrestrial end generates a spiritualisation of
morality. Augustinian ethics. based on the metaphysical
foundation of an omniscient. creative deity. refers all human
63.Ibid .. II.xiv.28: xv.1.
64.8ee F.C. Copleston. AQuinas (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
Ltd ..1955). pp.236-38: Ernest Baker. 'Introduction'. The City
of God. xviii: Herbert A. Deane. The Political and Social
Ideas of St_ AUiustine (New York and London: Columbia Univ.
Press. 1963). pp.11-12. 221-24.
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activity to a supernatural absolute that is the sole source of
morality. Because virtue is a good that God creates. and that
man defiled through sin. the performance of virtuous deeds
must ultimately be ascribed to God rather than to the
individual. Moreover. God's infinite knowledge dictates the
interiorization of morality: good and evil are measured not.
as they necessarily were for the Greeks. by the act. but by
the will. which in turn locates the essence of moral order not
in society. but in the prescriptions of the moral conscience.
through which the God of creation legislates for man.65 Thus.
the social relationship that lies at the heart of pagan ethics
is radically diminished in The City of God. both secular
virtue and social response devalued as criteria of the Good.
For if the individual owes his good deeds to God. manifests
his intentions to God. and learns what is good from God. then
his sense of himself as an honourable man within society and
his expectation of public honour as the reward for his deeds
not only lose the meaning they gained from the civic morality
of antiquity. but become expressions of the sacriligious
madness - the self-love. the worldliness - of the city of man.
Yet Augustine denigrates the social relationship only
in its secular guise: transmuted into a spiritual ethic.
it continues to define the primary moral community of
65.For the Christian interiorization of morality. see Gilson.
The Spirit of Medieyal Philosophy. pp.344-57. See also
Peter Abailard. Ethics. or Know Thyself. in Philosophy
in the Mjddle Aaes. eds. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co .• 1973). pp.188-202.
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Christianity: the association between man and God. Honour
becomes focussed on God as the origin of virtue, and good
deeds performed in the earthly city serve the sole function of
glorifying him and extending his truth in this world. Thus
Augustine instructs:
Do not well with an intent that men should see you
do so, and so turn to behold you, who by
yourselves are nothing: but do so that they may
glorify your Father in heaven, unto whom if they
turn they may be such as you are.66
Virtue, then, is social only insofar as it enlarges the
society of believers; a spiritual society the imperatives
of which take absolute precedence over those of any temporal
community.
In this sense, Augustine's celestial city can be seen as
a transfiguration of the classical idea of the state from
a secular into a religious concept:67 the City of God, the true
Jerusalem, where the individual, as part of the communion of
saints, serves the King of heaven:
and then it gathers
the resurrection of
kingdom to reign in
ever.68
all the citizens together in
the body, and gives them a
with their King forever and
The idea of the public, then, retains its force in Augustinian
doctrine, though in a drastically altered form. Within the
social framework of the heavenly city, honour has an equally
crucial, if transformed role to play. Raised from the secular
66.The City of God. I.v.!4.
67.See Deane, pp.11-12.
68.The City of God, II.xv.!.
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to the sacred level. honour denotes the correct relationship
between man and God: it is what the elect. the servants of the
true God. owe to their King. God replaces the aristocracy as
the powerful authority concerned with honour: an honour paid
not by co-equals. but given unreservedly by a finite creature
to an infinite Being. The citizen of the City of God displays
public virtue by honouring God as the transcendent principle
from which all goodness emanates. and is rewarded not with the
respect of men. but with the ultimate honour of beatitude, or
union with God:
The first seeks the glory of men, and the latter
desires God only as the testimony of the
conscience, the greatest glory. That glories in
itself. and this in God. That exalts itself in
self-glory: this says to God: 'My glory and the
lifter up of my head. ,69
It should be added that although St. Augustine does not
equate the City of God with the organised Church, which
contains both the reprobate and the elect, he does nonetheless
envisage the Church as the corporate body ordained by Christ
for the assembling of the elect before the Last Judgement.70
The Church Militant therefore has a closer affinity with the
invisible Church than does any other terrestrial society. It
follows from this that the Church is superior to the State,
an idea that will have profound implications for the political
theory of the medieval Church.
69.Ibid., II.xiv.28.
70.Ibid., II.xx.9.
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The dual conception of Nature that we find in Augustinian
theory remains an essential feature of Christian philosophy.
defining the problematic connection between man's temporal
existence and his spiritual end. Yet although the superiority
of the sacred over the secular persists as an unquestioned
metaphysical truth. by the high Middle Ages. the scholasticism
of Aquinas offers an ethical system altogether more tolerant
of secular affairs due to its conviction that the human reason
helps to assuage the effects of the Fall.71 The Thomist
reconciliation of reason and grace narrows the gap between
man's created and fallen natures and restores some ethical
value to moral conduct in the secular sphere.
Scholasticism. then. generates a conception of honour
significantly different from the otherworldly formulation
developed by Augustine. Aquinas follows his great predecessor
in distinguishing absolutely between man's supra-terrestrial
and earthly ends. Happiness. Aquinas tells us. consists in
the supernatural vision of God. an activity of the intellect
realised only in the next life and unattainable without
grace.72 Yet there is also an imperfect happiness. to be had
in this life. which consists principally in contemplation. and
secondarily in 'the activity of the practical intelligence
71.See Gilson. The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy. pp.140-45.
72.Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles. in BasiC
Writinis of Saint Thomas AQuinas. ed. Anton G. Pegis. 2 vols.
(New York: Random House. 1945). 11.3.37; Summa Theoloiiae.
60 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1964-75).
1a2ae.3.4;3.5.
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governing our deeds and feelings,.73 This latter. subsidiary
form of imperfect earthly happiness is the domain of the
natural reason. the faculty whereby man conducts his active.
civic life in accordance with virtue. the 'perfections by
which the reason is directed towards God and the lower powers
are managed according to the standard of reason,.74 Aquinas.
then. seeks not to deliver man from his mortal existence. but
to define the subordinate position of temporal endeavour
within the total scope of human destiny and to direct it
towards that destiny.75 In the same way. the classical
philosophy that concerns itself with man's imperfect happiness
is not denigrated. but seen as operating in a relationship of
harmonious inequality with the truths of the Christian faith:
philosophy bolsters faith which in turn completes and perfects
philosophical truth.76
Thus. in his account of the imperfect happiness attainable
in this world. Aquinas relies on the ethical system of
Aristotle to determine the nature of virtuous activity in
man's civic life. Aquinas follows Aristotle in defining this
virtue in social terms. Throughout Aquinas's discussion of
moral virtue. well-doing is placed in a natural social
73.Summa Theoloaiae. 1a2ae.3.5.
74.Ibid .• 1a.95.3: Summa Contra Gentiles. in Pegis. II.3.63.
75.See Alasdair MacIntyre. A Short History of Ethics. p.1l7.
76.See Copleston. AQujnas. pp.193-98: Henry Sidgwick. Outlines
of the History of Ethics for Enilish Readers (London:
Macmillan Co. Ltd .. 1931). p.140.
56
context: good deeds are those accounted praiseworthy. evil
actions those deserving reproach.77 Operating in this social
arena. virtue emerges logically as the Aristotelian quality of
beneficence: Aquinas interprets the function of human
excellence as the bestowing of benefits on one's fellow men.
He therefore accepts the Philosopher's judgement that justice
and fortitude are the greatest of the moral virtues because
the most useful to others.78
The Thomist formulation of honour is dictated by this
social construction of virtue. Honour denotes the
relationship between the self and society. As in the
Nicomachean Ethics. it is examined in its internal and
external manifestations: as 'the affection for nobleness'
(honestum) that repudiates selfish interests and encourages
the performance of deeds of social virtue. and as the public
response to such deeds (~) that bears 'positive witness
to a man's virtue' .79 Like Aristotle. Aquinas insists on
the integral relation between honourable deeds and social
response; men desire recognition as a testimony of their worth
because self-respect is logically dependent on the respect of
other good men.80 Yet because it is the interior act of the
will that ultimately determines the nature of action. Aquinas
77. Summa Thep1oaiae. 1a2ae .21.2; 2a2ae .144.1.
78.Ibid .• 2a2ae.131.1; 132.2; 1a2ae.66.4.
79.Ibid .• 2a2ae.145.1; 129.1.
aO.Ibid .• 2a2ae.103.1.
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cites Aristotle's dictum that the man who performs brave deeds
for the sake of external honour is not truly virtuous.81
Thus. honestum takes precedence over ~.
It is in the relationship that Aquinas sets up between the
deed and the response to the deed that the distance separating
Thomist from Aristotelian honour becomes apparent. In the
Nicomachean Ethics. this relationship is a problematic one.
for if Aristotle insists on the primacy of the rational will's
aspiration to the morally beautiful. that will must ultimately
be defined by its social context in a pagan universe where
society is the basis of natural law and where intentions can
be discerned only through action. For Aristotle. then.
internal honour is inseparable from its logical concomitant.
the response of society to the deeds of the honourable man.
In Thomist theory. the situation is quite different. for
the central tenet of Christian ethics - that virtue is not
an end in itself. but a good directed to its source. the
omniscient God of creation - dictates that the moral quality
of action is determined not by the will as internalised social
law. but by the will fixed firmly in God.82 The will. then.
is neither the autonomous agent of honourable deeds nor
inextricably bound to social imperatives. so that the tensions
present in the Aristotelian account of honour cease to operate
81.Ibid .• 2a2ae.131.1.
82.Ibid .• 1a2ae.20.1. See also Copleston. AQuinas. pp.201-
208.
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in Thomist ethics. Moreover. the Christian subordination of
the exterior relationship between the self and society to the
interior relationship between a man and God endows intention
with a far greater significance than it could have claimed in
Aristotelian ethics. Thus. Aquinas acknowledges that insofar
as virtue functions in a social arena. intention can be
discerned only in its external manifestation:
Inner choices can be recognized only through
outward conduct. and if this is honoured. it is as
showing forth inner rightness. Nobility is rooted
in our interior freedom. and is signified by our
exterior conversation.83
Yet if Aquinas here speaks the language of classical ethics.
this formulation of the social relationship is ultimately
transcended by the supernatural order that rules and envelops
it. For Aquinas. then. to do good for the sake of external
honour entails not merely an offence against reason. but
an offence against the author of reason. It is to claim
a tribute for excellence that belongs properly to God. and
to give a perverse primacy to social standards.84 It is,
fundamentally, to assert the existence of a moral order
independent of God. Thus. Aquinas variously glosses the
inordinate desire for social esteem as the sin of vainglory.
ambition and pride.8S
Yet if the supra-terrestrial end on which Thomist
83.Ibid .. 2a2ae.145,1.
84.Ibid .• 2a2ae.131.1: 132.3.
85.Ibid .. 2a2ae.131: 132: SUmma Contra Gentiles. in Pegis.
11.3.63.
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philosophy is constructed radically transforms its
Aristotelian heritage. so does its Aristotelianism distance it
from Augustinian otherworldliness. What we find in Aquinas's
moral theory is a syncretism that accommodates the demands of
man's temporal existence to the overriding claims of his final
end. Aquinas interprets virtue as a divine gift within man.
bestowed upon him in order that he might benefit his fellows.86
This vision of a social relationship presided over by God
postulates a deity intimately concerned with man's social life
and a human reason capable of translating sacred imperatives
into virtuous action in the secular realm. In Aquinas's
formulation. God oversees civic morality. the interior
relationship between God and the rational will directing the
performance of honourable deeds of social virtue. Within this
public context of virtue. a man may properly desire
recognition of his deeds in order to honour God. from whom
they emanate. and to profit his neighbour by his good
example.87 Honour. therefore. is focussed principally on God.
and only secondarily on the individual virtue that. through
the channel of the human reason. mediates between God and
society.
Aquinas's conception of the social relationship
subordinates secular activity to an end outside itself while
integrating that activity within a pattern of divine order.
86.Summa Theolodae. 2a2ae .131.1.
87.Ibid .• 2a2ae.131.1: 132.1.
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Thus. Aquinas distinguishes the virtuous moderation of the
love of public honour from the beatific contempt for it.
and asserts the radical imperfection of temporal honour when
compared to the infinitely superior honour of beatitude.
whereby 'men are raised to the highest position of honor.
because. in a way. they are united to God,.88 At the same
time. however. he is able to define the relationship between
a man and his fellows in the Christian terms that envisage
a social order inextricably linked to God.
This sense of harmonious disparity between man's
supernatural and temporal ends extends as well to Aquinas's
political theory. which stresses the state's positive role in
promoting the good life. rather than its coercive power in
restraining man's evil will.B9 The decline of the
early-Christian otherworldly tradition reflects both Aquinas's
Aristotelianism and the dominant ideology of the medieval
Church. which had itself maintained a dual basis in spiritual
affairs and temporal power since Constantine merged
Christianity with the Roman Empire in 312. This interplay of
sacred and secular affairs had important consequences for
medieval political thought. engendering a doctrine of Church
supremacy which vested power in the Pope. Christ's
representative on earth. from whom it might be deputed to
B8.Summa Contra Gentiles. in Pegis. II.3.63: Summa Theoloaiae.
1a2ae.69.3.
89.Summa Theo1oaiae. 1a.96.4. See also Deane. pp.223-24 and
Copleston. AQuinas. pp.238-39.
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secular authorities.90
The notion of hierarchy lies at the heart of this
theocratic conception of a state descending from God through
the papacy to temporal rulers. The equation of social
stability with the idea of hierarchy that formed the basis
of feudal social life demonstrates the extent to which the
Church. having entered the secular arena. based its political
doctrine on existing social structures.91 The lines of the
Besan90n liturgy - '0 God. who after the Fall didst constitute
in all nature three ranks among men. ,92 - illustrate the
Church's appropriation of the concept of social order founded
on three distinct and graded estates. Yet in borrowing from
feudal culture. the Church transformed a hierarchical system
of social relations into an emanation of the will of God.
Hence. if the Church incorporated secular concepts into its
political theory. in doing so it necessarily generated a
sanctification of secular life - of the State as an instrument
of papal suzerainty. of the social system as an expression of
divine law.93 Thus. the interaction of religion and society
fostered the characteristically medieval world view of
a divinely-regulated social order. of which Aquinas's
90.For an account of the evolution of the medieval Church's
political theory. see Deane. pp.223-34.
91.See MacIntyre. A Short History of Ethics. pp.116-l7.
92.Quoted in Marc Bloch. Feudal Society. trans. L.A. Manyon.
2 vols. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1961). II.319.
93.See Deane, pp.233-34.
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formulation of social virtue can be seen as the conceptual
expression.
In the case of the second estate of the feudal nobility.
the medieval synthesis of the sacred and the secular realms
achieved an integration of secular virtue into the Christian
universe: for it is a cardinal principle of chivalry. the word
which denotes the way of life of the medieval warrior class.
that knighthood constitutes a Christian vocation. The
harmonisation of God and honour found its fullest expression
in the militant piety of the Crusades. when the self-assertive
spirit of aristocratic virtue was enlisted into the service of
Christ and his Church. The interpenetration of noble and
religious traditions generated a conception of knighthood as
an explicitly Christian order. John of Salisbury's
Policraticus (1159) delineates the function of the warrior
class:
To defend the Church. to assail infidelity. to
venerate the priesthood. to protect the poor from
injuries. to pacify the province. to pour out
their blood for their brothers (as the formula of
their oath instructs them). and. if need be. to
lay down their lives.94
This union of Christ and the sword was given symbolic
expression in chivalric rituals such as the arming of the
knight by the clergy and the religious oath of knighthood.
whereby the initiate placed his sword on the altar as
a token that 'he dedicates himself to the service of the
94.John Dickinson. ed. The Statesman's Bpok pf John pf
Salisbury (New York: Russell and Russell. 1963). p.199.
63
altar and vows to God the never-failing obedience of his
sword' .95
The Policraticus bases its christianisation of the
chivalric life on the knight's role as the agent of the Church
or the prince. the lawful authority which reserves the right
to wage war and to confer honour upon its obedient servants.
Thus. John of Salisbury insists that knights 'owe obedience to
the prince and ever-watchful service to the commonwealth.
loyally and according to God,.96 This position. which one
might term the orthodox formulation of chivalry. legitimises
aristocratic virtue. redeems it from the secularity inherent
in an heroic ethic that locates virtue within the individual
will. only insofar as it serves the temporal representative of
divine law.
However. John of Salisbury's version of chivalry had to
contend with a rival chivalric tradition. given expression in
the treatises of chivalry. or textbooks of knighthood. the
classic example of which is generally held to be Ram6n Lull's
95.Ibid .. pp.203-204. See also Bloch. II. 315-16. and R.W.
Southern. The Makini of the Middle Aies (London: Hutchinson
and Co. Ltd .. 1953). pp.112-14.
96.Dickinson. p.198. See also Mervyn James. 'English Politics
and the Concept of Honour 1485-1642'. Past and Present.
Supplement 3 (1978). pp.9-10. I am indebted to James for
my account of the differing approaches of John of Salisbury
and Ram6n Lull. For another study of the Bartolan tradition
which Salisbury represents. see N.A.R. Wright. 'The Tree of
Battles of Honore Bouvet and the Laws of War'. in~.
Literature.and Politics in the Late Middle Aies. edt C.T.
Allmand (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press. 1976). pp.12-31.
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The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry. which Caxton translated
between 1483 and 1485. Lull's treatise also presents chivalry
as a Christian profession. instituted to maintain order and
justice. to defend both Church and temporal lord. Yet for
Lull. this exalted spiritual function depends less on the
knight's role as the servant of a central governing authority
than on the innate moral excellence of the knightly class:
the 'moost loyal. most strange and of most noble courage,.97
Throughout his treatise. Lull celebrates the values of the
noble life: the lineage. social status. traditions of service
and martial virtues that define a unique and self-sufficient
chivalric culture.98 Lull's men of honourable estate are
accordingly governed less by ecclesiastical or monarchical
injunctions. than by 'the corporate authority of the code of
honour and of the order of chivalry itself,.99 a network of
feudal obligations and rules of conduct binding upon all
honourable men. the prince included.
The Book of the Ordre of Chyyalry thus gives expression
to a chivalry that is rooted in class pride and has at best
a tenuous connection with notions of knightly obedience to a
97.The Book of the Ordre of Chyyalry. translated and printed
by William Caxton from a French version of Ram6n Lull's
'Le libre del orde de cauayleria'. ed. A.T.P. Byles. Early
English Text Society. clxviii (London, 1926). p.1S.
98.Ibid .. pp.16-l7,37.47ff .•ll3.
99.James. p.lO. See Lull. p.llS.
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single authorised power in the state.100 Within the bounds of
this autonomous and self-regulating chivalric order.
aristocratic virtue tends to claim a commensurate
self-sufficiency. As the class exalts its martial function.
so the individual knight exalts his own capacity for virtue on
the field of battle. through a form of warfare that focussed
on individual feats of arms. Thus. honour in this chivalric
formulation retains rather than sheds its intrinsically
secular and competitive nature; the medieval knight strives
through his deeds of prowess to evince his greatness and to
show himself superior to his fellow men. As Geoffrey de
Charny expresses it in his treatise of chivalry. the Livre de
Chevalerie (c.1350). 'Qui plus fait. miex vault' .101
On this level. the orthodox chivalric tradition voiced by
John of Salisbury clearly represents an attempt. not unlike
that we perceived earlier in the pagan formulation of public
service. to tame the aristocratic power which. rooted in the
psychology of honour. manifests itself in contention and
100.Lull's self-validating aristocratic ethic emerges from
many historical studies as the dominant chivalric tradition.
See. for example. Maurice Keen. Chivalry (New Haven and
London: Yale Univ. Press. 1984). pp.16-17. 42-43. 51-63.
200-218; Wright. 'The Tree of Battles of Honore Bouvet and
the Laws of War'. in Allmand. pp.19-26: J. Huizinga. Iba
Wanin& of the Middle A&es. trans. F. Hopman (London: Edward
Arnold and Co .• 1924). p.30: and V.G. Kiernan. The Duel in
European History. Honour and the Reiin of Aristocracy (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press. 1988). pp.37-42.
lOl.Quoted by Maurice Keen. Chivalry. p.12. See also Arthur
B. Ferguson. The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance Enaland
(Washington. D.C.: The Folger Shakespeare Library. 1986).
pp.31-32.
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unbridled self-assertion. Thus. John of Salisbury contrasts
the saintliness of the 'duly ordained' knight. who 'follows
not his own will but the deliberate decision of God. the
angels. and men. in accordance with equity and the public
utility' with those knights who serve 'their own private
self-will'. thereby 'so extending the kingdom of man as to
narrow the empire of Christ' .102 Yet the terms in which John
of Salisbury expresses his opposition to knightly excesses
clarifies that the tension between the two chivalric
traditions is at bottom the tension inherent in the medieval
synthesis. which seeks to reconcile what is essentially
a man-centred ethic. based upon the individual pursuit of
distinction. with Christian morality. which forbids the
individual's pride in his own merit and ascribes all honour to
God. The two formulations of chivalry that we have examined
illuminate both the possibility of this fusion of conflicting
forces and the deep-seated incompatibility of God and honour.
We will find that the problematic nature of this chivalric
compromise between Christian ethics and secular virtue forms
the dramatic basis of Shakespeare's exploration of chivalric
honour.
We have thus far identified three main conceptions of
honour: the social virtue of antiquity. which makes the
association between man and society the dominant ethical
relationship; the Augustinian negation of secular virtue and
102.Dickinson. pp.199-200.
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transformation of honour into a spiritual concept; and the
medieval synthetic tradition. which restores some value to
deeds of public virtue performed within the framework of
a divinely-ordained social system. In the next chapter.
we will examine how each of these formulations enters into
Renaissance thought. the first through the humanist tradition.
the second through the theology of Calvin. and the third
through the chivalric revival of the sixteenth century. which
found in the orthodox chivalric tradition a means of
integrating aristocratic virtue into the new nation-state.
********************
The decline of chivalric culture in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries is a commonplace of historical studies
of post-medieval Europe. The development of artillery and
infantry and the consequent growth in the scale of military
operations spelt the end of the dominance of the mounted
knight fighting in the service of his feudal lord and marked
the gradual development of the national standing army.
Nicholas Wright has described these new fighting forces as
'national chivalries,.103 a term which clarifies the continuity
linking the old order of knighthood to the new political and
economic system. The medieval knight. and the cultural values
constructed around his martial function. did not simply
l03.N.A.R. Wright. 'The Tree of Battles of Honore Bouvet and
the Laws of War'. in Allmand. p.31. For another discussion of
chivalry in transition. see Keen. Chivalry. pp.245-48.
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vanish: rather. they changed with the times. and the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries witnessed a blending of chivalric
ideals with the nascent nationalism that characterised
post-feudal Europe. It is this relationship between the
nobility and the monarchy that forms the basis of chivalry
in Tudor England.
The English nationalist drive culminated in the Elizabethan
Settlement. which fundamentally altered the Catholic view of
the relationship between Church and State. while at the same
time preserving the medieval conception of synthesis. of
Church and State as two aspects of the same social order.
This conflation of change and continuity is typical of an age
in which radical political and religious developments were
consolidated by reference to the past. Protestant
historiography sanctified Elizabeth's position as head of
Church and State by reference to the Catholic tradition of
divine imperial power.104 John Foxe's Actes and Monuments
(1563) presents Elizabeth as Constantine. as the restorer of
the original unification of imperial power and the Christian
faith. unfettered by papal suzerainty. lOS This recodification
104.See Frances A. Yates. Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the
Sixteenth Century (London and Boston. Mass.: Routledge and
Kegan Paul. 1975). pp.37-47.
lOs.John Foxe. 'Dedication to Queen Elizabeth'. Actes and
mpnuments pf matters mpst speciall and memorable. happenini
in the Church. with a universall historie pf the same. 3 vols.
(London: Company of Stationers. 1610). I.ix-x. I owe this
point to Yates. Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth
Century. pp.42-43. and to Roy Strong. The Cult of Elizabeth:
Elizabethan Portraiture and Paieantry (London: Thames and
Hudson. 1977). pp.115.128.
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of medieval syncretism to exalt a monarchical hegemony
independent of Rome finds a theological basis in orthodox
cosmology. Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity
(1593) delineates a vast hierarchy of law. descending from the
eternal law of God to the 'positive laws' of earthly rulers.
and perceives in this affinity between spiritual and temporal
government the logical supremacy of the Prince as the head of
Church and State.l06 Thus. the corpus Christianorum becomes
focussed on the figure of the Queen who symbolizes in her
mortal being the timeless and sacrosanct body politic.107
Hooker's hierarchy of laws is but an expression of the
pattern of the natural law by which God regulates' his
creation. It is this benevolent universal order to which
human society aspires to accommodate itself. not only through
civil law. but also through degree. the social stratification
that reflects the divine system. lOB In The Book Named the
Governor. Sir Thomas Elyot gives the classic Tudor statement
of this medieval tradition:
Behold also the order that God hath put
in all His creatures. beginning at
inferior or base. and ascending upward.
that in everything is order. and without
generally
the most
. .. so
order may
106.Richard Hooker. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.
2 vols. (London: J.M. Dent and Sons. Ltd .. 1907). 1.147-232.
l07.See Stephen Greenblatt. Renaissance Self-Fashionina. From
More to Shakespeare (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago
Press. 1980). pp.166-67.
10B.For discussions of Elizabethan cosmology. see E.M.W.
Tillyard. The Elizabethan World Picture (London: Chatto and
Windus. 1943). and John Danby. Shakespeare and the Doctrine
of Nature, A Study of Kina Lear (London: Faber and Faber.
1948). pp.20-31.
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be nothing stable or permanent; and it may not be
called order. except it do contain in it degrees.
high and base. according to the merit or
estimation of the thing that is ordered.109
The enlistment of this aspect of orthodox thought into the
Tudor formulation of the nation-state forms the foundation of
English Renaissance chivalric idealism. Elyot's configuration
of natural hierarchy becomes the theoretical basis for his
endorsement of the aristocratic principle. and this principle
is elucidated not independently of. but in conjunction with.
the natural law of royal sovereignty that mirrors the unity of
God:
For who can deny but that all thing
earth is governed by one God. by
order. by one providence?110
in heaven and
one perpetual
The integral place of the nobility within a national monarchy
expressive of natural law dictates that the aristocratic
function should maintain the ideal. Christian role
characteristic of the chivalric vision.
This state-centred chivalry clearly represents the
realisation of the central tenet of the orthodox Salisbury
tradition: aristocratic obedience to sovereign authority.
The transfiguration of an independent class code into an
instrument of royal jurisdiction was accomplished by a Tudor
social policy which jointly accommodated and eroded
aristocratic might. The Tudors' initial reliance on the
l09.Sir Thomas Elyot. Tb@ Bpok NAmed tb. Goy.rnpr (London:
J.M. Dent and Sons. Ltd .. 1962). 1.1.3-4.
110.1bid .• 1.2.7.
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cooperation of the governing class in establishing their
dynastic power ensured the nobility's continued pre-eminence
in the military and administrative structure of the kingdom.111
Yet this royal maintenance of noble prestige was accompanied
by a systematic focussing of chivalric loyalties on the crown
which effectively undermined aristocratic independence. Henry
VIII's appropriation of the heraldic authority to grant
honourable status facilitated the expansion of the gentry
with men of non-noble origins beholden to the monarch for
their ascent in the social scale.112 Consequently. the
once-autonomous community of honour came increasingly to
revolve around the figure of the king who represented both the
sole object of fealty and the sole source of dignity and
honours.
Buttressed by the presentation of the prince as the
agent of divine law. this royal monopoly of honour generated
a king-centred chivalry which drastically modified class-bound
chivalric attitudes. The nobility naturally grew less
inclined to see itself as a self-regulating group of superior
individuals discharging an innately sacred function when
honour and sanctity were the exclusive properties of the king.
111.For accounts of the Tudor and Stuart aristocracy. see
S.T. Bindoff. Tudor Eniland (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
1950). pp.29-30: Lawrence Stone. The Crisis of the
Aristocracy 1558-1641 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1965).
pp.53-64: Keen. Chivalry. pp.244-47: and James. p.2.
112.See James. pp.18-27: Paul N. Siegel. Shakespearean Traaedy
and the Elizabethan Comprpmise (New York: New York Univ.
Press. 1957). pp.3-24: and Ferguson. The Chivalric Tradition
in Renaissance Enaland. pp.107-108.
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Within the framework of the new 'nationalised' chivalry.
honour was achieved through obedient service of the monarchy.
Individual heroism and class pride were rendered subservient
to lawful authority. and the competitive self-assertiveness of
aristocratic virtue harnessed to public utility.113 The
complexities of state service required of the man of
honourable estate the comprehensive military. administrative
and political duties of government. The warrior caste of
medieval chivalry was thus gradually transformed into a
'literate magistracy' .114 This neo-chivalric conception of
honour assumed two main forms in the Tudor period: the
ceremonial affirmation of Protestant chivalry in the annual
pageants of the Accession Day Tilts and the procession of the
Order of the Garter. and the theoretical formulation of the
function of the governing class.
A central technique in the Elizabethan elaboration of royal
power was the development of a tradition of semi-religious
state festivals that concentrated pre-Reformation allegiances
on the Queen as God's temporal representative. These
celebrations of the nation-state centred on the relation
between the sovereign and her worshipping knights. and it was
chiefly the old chivalric forms that continued to define the
113.Ferguson sees the new political context of the
aristocratic function as the primary distinction between
medieval and Renaissance chivalry. See The Chivalric
Tradition in Renaissance Enaland. pp.34-39: 107-25.
114.James. p.27. See also Ferguson. The Chivalric Tradition
in Renaissance Enaland. p.109.
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ideal role of the nobility within the body politic. Frances
Yates. in her study of the Accession Day Tilts of Elizabeth's
reign. has shown that through the apparatus of chivalry a
complex mythology was constructed around the service of the
Virgin Queen.115 Mock tournaments. and pageantry imbued with
the symbolism of cosmic order and chivalric romance. focussed
patriotic fervour and Protestant zeal on the idealised figure
of the Queen. and reinforced the protective role of the
nobility in the safeguarding of Protestant England. The
procession of the Order of the Garter represented the second
most important annual public appearance of the Queen and her
courtiers. and it was stage-managed with equal care. This
deliberate revival of a fourteenth-century chivalric order
offered. through the spectacle of the QUeen as the sovereign
of a group of Protestant knights dedicated to the defeat of
the dragon of popery. a vision of Protestant state power. as
well as what Roy Strong has described as 'a reinforcement of
medieval hierarchical principles and an affirmation of
chivalrous ideals,.116
The conscious elaboration of a state ceremonial defining
the place and function of the courtier within a divinely-
sanctioned monarchical order expressed the principles
elucidated in contemporary treatises on the governing class.
of which Elyot's The Governor is perhaps the definitive
115.Frances A. Yates. 'Elizabethan Chivalry: The Romance of
the Accession Day Tilts'. ~. 20 (1957). 4-25.
116.Strong. p.165.
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example. We have noted that Elyot's delineation of
aristocracy is essentially neo-chivalric in that it integrates
public virtue into a national hierarchy dictated by natural
law. For Elyot. aristocratic privilege derives from the
universal principle of degree. which structures creation
'according to the merit or estimation of the thing that is
ordered,.117 It is his superior virtue that destines the
governor to assume the burden of public service. as it
entitles him to the wealth and authority that exalt him
above his moral inferiors.11B This combined duty and reward
of public virtue Elyot terms 'honour':
And unto men of such virtue by very equity
appertaineth honour. as their just reward and
duty. which by other men's labours must also be
maintained according to their merits.119
Governors. whom Elyot considers should in the main be chosen
from the 'estate of men which be called worshipful,.120 perform
a public function termed 'benevolence'. or the giving of
benefits - a social virtue which Elyot invests with a
Christian resonance. identifying the love of one's fellows
that motivates and justifies public service as a divine
attribute. ordained by God to foster harmony in human
society.121
117.Elyot. 1.1.4.
11B. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120.Ibid .• 1.3.13.
121.Ibid .• 11.9.122: 111.3.164.
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Elyot's notion of aristocracy reflects the persistence of
medieval political theory. which interpreted the public good
as dependent upon the personal moral stature of the governors.
This idea of good government tends to dissociate honour from
political realism. opposing loyalty and service to
opportunistic pragmatism. Yet the political function of
Elyot's chivalry involves honour in the skilful control of
complex social forces required of the governing class.122
Thus. in elucidating the virtues conducive to public service.
Elyot fuses honour and 'creative statecraft' .123 Public
virtue ceases to consist merely in the maintenance of order
and justice through martial prowess. but comes to comprehend
the humanist ideal of an educated governing class. whose
primary function is to provide the ruler with the good counsel
essential to effective policymaking.124 That this honourable
service requires political acumen Elyot's definition of the
governor's 'industry' makes clear:
It is a quality proceeding of wit and experience.
by the which a man perceiveth quickly. inventeth
freshly. and counselleth speedily. Wherefore they
that be called industrious. do most craftily and
deeply understand in all affairs what is
expedient. and by what means and ways they may
soonest exploit them.125
Within the framework of the national chivalry. Elyot's learned
122.Arthur B. Ferguson. The Indian Summer of Enalish Chivalry
(Durham. N.C.: Duke Univ. Press. 1960). p.119.
123.Ibid. See also p.114.
124.See Elyot. I.iv-xxv: I11.xxviii-xxx. See also Ferguson.
The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance Enaland. and James.
pp.27,61.
125.Elyot. 1.23.82.
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knight is at once pragmatic and honourable.
However. as had been the case in the Middle Ages. there was
great tension during the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods
between the orthodox conception of chivalry and the
aristocratic pride which it sought to absorb into the
nation-state. The habits of aristocratic independence died
hard:126 and there was inevitable conflict between the growing
power of the Crown and Commons and a powerful governing class
indoctrinated in a disruptive code of honour that legitimated
duelling and private revenge.
If we examine the testimony of a nobleman tried and
convicted of exacting private vengeance during the reign of
James I. we can determine more closely the nature of this
surviving chivalric tradition.127 In 1607. Lord Sanquire lost
an eye while practising the foils with his fencing master.
Five years later. the fencing master was murdered by two of
Sanquire's hired ruffians. Sanquire and his accomplices were
then arrested. tried and executed. on the orders of the king.
During his trial. Sanquire made the following confession:
I must confess I
against him. but
revenge: yet in
considered not
ever kept a grudge in my soul
had no purpose to take so high a
the course of my revenge. I
my wrongs upon terms of
126.See Stone. pp.54-55: 199-200. and Kiernan. p.6.
127.For accounts of the sixteenth-century cult of honour. see
Paul N. Siegel. 'Shakespeare and the Neo-Chivalric Cult of
Honor'. ~. 8 (1964). 39-70. and Frederick Robertson
Bryson. The Point of Honor in Sixteenth Century Italy: An
Aspect of the Life of the Gentleman (Chicago: The Univ. of
Chicago Libraries. 1935).
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Christianity. but being trained up in the
courts of princes and in arms. I stood upon the
terms of honour. . . . Another aspersion is laid
on me. that I was an ill-natured fellow. ever
revengeful and delighted in blood. To the first I
confess I was never willing to put up a wrong.
where upon terms of honour I might right myself.
nor never willing to pardon where I had a power to
revenge.128
The repeated phrase 'terms of honour' implies a fully-
formulated code of conduct. This code governs how one
responds to wrongs. It indicates that honour is essentially
a question of individual worth: a man is honoured because his
deeds and social status proclaim him worthy of respect. The
honourable man. then. must be treated in accordance with his
dignity. for contemptuous treatment impugns his claim to pride
and deference. Thus. Sanquire interprets his injury as
a diminishment of the self. and revenge as a restoration of
selfhood. for failure to resent an affront to one's honour.
to 'right' oneself. is tantamount to proof that one is in fact
worthless. too cowardly to retaliate against one's opponent.
Yet Sanquire's action makes it clear that honour can become
a kind of blind passion. an obsession with moral and social
status that will stoop to any method to attain its goal of
self-affirmation. Indeed. it was to Sanquire's means - his
use of assassins to implement a long-nurtured revenge - that
both the prosecutor. Bacon. and the presiding judge drew
attention.129
128.T.B. Howell. ed. A Complete Collection of State Trials and
Proceedinis for Hiih Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors
from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783. with Notes and
Other Illustrations. 21 vols. (London. 1816). II. 746-50.
129.Ibid .• II. 750-54.
78
Private revenge is thus a logical outcome of the psychology
of honour. whose roots in class superiority and individual
distinction encourage a regard for personal dignity that is
predisposed to degenerate into unrestrained self-assertion.
Sanquire's testimony demonstrates that this aristocratic ethic
asserts its independence from Christian morality and. by
implication. from the temporal law of the monarch. By
enlisting honour into the service of a divinely-instituted
monarchy. the neo-chivalric tradition radically destabilises
itself. Sanquire's reference to his training 'in the courts
of princes and in arms' suggests that the cultivation of class
supremacy invariably promotes aristocratic values which are
intrinsically resistant to the idea of submission to an
absolute authority. whether temporal or divine.
Consequently. the royal power which. on the one hand.
fostered distinctions in rank as the basis of moral and social
order was forced. on the other. to penalize and fulminate
against the natural expression of such distinctions in
duelling and private revenge:
he that taketh so unjust a course to revenge his
private wrong. is so farre from getting honor
thereby. as he rather looseth whatsoever honor or
reputation he had before; the combat being a
thing odious and offensive unto God. For it is
said. that he reserveth revenge unto himselfe;
which. they that by combat seeke to wreake
themselves. take upon them to do by their owne
power and strength. against all 1awes divine.
natura11 and positive. in contempt of magistrates.
contrary to the orders and constitutions of all
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weI-founded Conunon-weales.. 130
Lodowick Bryskett. in A Discourse of Ciyill Life. is the voice
of chivalric orthodoxy. condemning private revenge as the
product of a conviction of merit and self-sufficiency ('their
owne power and strength') which offends against the hierarchy
of law: against God and the temporal order that represents
him. Bryskett insists in his treatise that honour derives
solely from the social virtue that engenders public
stability.131 Yet the noble superiority that makes these acts
of social virtue possible has as its logical complement the
acute sensitivity to insult that inevitably comes into
conflict with the structures of law. In short. Renaissance
chivalry inherited from its orthodox medieval model the
instability built into the attempt to harmonise an independent
class code with centralised authority. a formulation of
secular virtue based upon individual greatness with a
metaphysic demanding subservience to the will of an omnipotent
deity. If the neo-chivalric tradition admits the resolution
of God and honour in the figure of the Protestant knight loyal
to his sovereign. that resolution is necessarily fragile and
prone to fragmentation.
The medieval tradition of reconciliation was doubly
transformed in the transition from the feudal to the modern
130.Lodowick Bryskett. A piscourse of Ciyi11 Life. ed. Thomas
E. Wright (Northridge. Calif.: San Fernando Valley State
College. 1970). p.54.
131.Ibid .. pp.60-61: 154-55.
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age. Not only was orthodox chivalry transferred from a class
to a national level: the great Thomist synthesis of classical
philosophy and Christian doctrine was also modified.
Aquinas's insistence on the subordination of philosophy to
theology gave way to Ficino's and Pico's assertions of parity
between them. and this new confidence in the efficacy of the
human reason led to a renewed interest in virtuous activity
within the public realm. Although the humanists made every
attempt to present this rational civic morality as part of a
new 'vigorous ethical Christianity,l32 opposed to the
contemplative tradition. their reliance on purely human powers
exercised in the social arena engendered a predominately
secular ethic to which theology was subordinated.
This failure to synthesize Christian morality with an
essentially classical formulation of social virtue. so
characteristic of Renaissance humanism. is perhaps exhibited
most clearly in humanist approaches to honour. In Petrarch's
Secret. or the Soul's Conflict with Passion (1342). the author
makes a conscious attempt to reconcile pagan morality with
theology. The work takes the form of a dialogue between
Petrarch and St. Augustine on. among other topics. the place
of honour in human life. Augustine initially condemns such
worldly vanities as the desire for public esteem. telling
Petrarch that they encourage him to.
dream
choke
of nobleness. and forget your frailty: they
your faculties with fumes of self-esteem.
132.Hiram Haydn. The Counter-Renaissance (New York: Harcourt.
Brace and World. Inc .• 1950). p.59.
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until you think of nothing else: they lead you to
wax so proud and confident in your own strength
that at length you hate your Creator. So you live
for self-pleasing and imagine that great things
are what you deserve.133
Against this uncompromising stance. Petrarch advocates
separate but complementary roles for the sacred and temporal
realms. for the honour of God and the honour of men:
My principle is that. as concerning the glory
which we may hope for here below. it is right for
us to seek while we are here below. One may
expect to enjoy that other more radiant glory in
heaven. when we shall have there arrived. and when
one will have no more care or wish for the glory
of earth. Therefore. as I think. it is in the
true order that mortal men should first care for
mortal things: and that to things transitory
things eternal should succeed.. 134
This world and the next: pagan ethics answers the needs of man
in relation to society. while the Christian faith provides for
the relation to his Maker that will eventually ensue. This
virtual separation of secular activity and man's supernatural
end abandons the Thomist model of harmonious inequality.
Petrarch gives Augustine the last word on honour. which he
offers as a compromise between secularity and Christian
otherwor1d1iness. But this is a compromise that no true
Augustinian would countenance:
I will never advise you to live without ambition:
but I would always urge you to put virtue before
glory. You know that glory is in a sense the
shadow of virtue. And therefore. just as it is
impossible that your body should not cast a shadow
if the sun is shining. so it is impossible also in
the light of God Himself that virtues should exist
and not make their glory to appear. Whoever,
133.Wi11iam H. Draper. ed., Petrarch's Secret. or the Sgul's
Conflict with Passion (Westport. Conn.: Hyperion Press. Inc ..
1911). p.49.
134.Ibid .• p.176.
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then. would take true glory away must of necessity
take away virtue also; and when that is gone man's
life is left bare. and only resembles that of the
brute beasts that follow headlon~ their appetite.
which to them is their only law.1 5
What Petrarch provides is a classic statement of pagan
social virtue dignified by the endorsement of the Christian
God. It is a deeply uncomfortable compromise that illuminates
the tensions within the dual ethical inheritance of the
Renaissance and within the resolution proffered by the
humanists. Petrarch's final formulation of the status of
honour makes society rather than God the source of morality.
for it envisages the desire for social esteem. not divine
grace. as the force that permits the performance of virtuous
deeds. He clearly understands the nature of the conflict
between pagan and Christian morality, but Petrarch's Secret
exhibits the humanist need for a theology capable of being
integrated into an ethical system based on the right relations
between a man and his fellows. Renaissance moral philosophy
seems to have had little difficulty supplying such a compliant
Christianity. In its various classical guises. humanist
ethics offers a Christian faith that. in its eagerness to
co-operate with pagan morality. is transformed into something
merely formal.
Robert Ashley's treatise Of Honour (1596-1603) represents
a classic instance of Renaissance Aristotelianism. Ashley
135.Ibid .. p.182.
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studies honour in a largely Aristotelian context that he has
no difficulty reconciling with his Christian faith.l36 As
with Petrarch. it is the manner in which he effects this
reconciliation that clarifies the nature of the humanist
ethic. As an Aristotelian who is also a Christian. Ashley has
a close relation to the scholastic tradition. so that it is by
comparing the roles assigned to secular virtue in Of Honour
and in Thomisrn that one can discern what distinguishes
Renaissance humanism from its scholastic counterpart.
Ashley begins. in good scholastic fashion. by acknowledging
man's supernatural end: honour partakes of the divine because
it is what we give to God and what God gives to us when he
grants us salvation.l37 Yet for Ashley honour is also a civic
concept: it is the reward of virtue that is active and social
in this world. through performance of which man is 'likened to
th'image of th'Almighty' .138 This perception of honour
appears to accord with the scholastic Aristotelianism that
envisages secular virtue as a means of realising man's full
potential as a rational being.l39
136.Robert Ashley. Of Honour. ed. Virgil B. Heltzel (San
Marino. Calif.: The Huntington Library. 1947). Ashley bases
his account of honour chiefly on Aristotle. though he includes
reference to Plato's association of honour with 'the angry
part of the mind' (p.40).
137.Ibid .• pp.27-28.
138.Ibid .• p.30.
139.St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theoloiiae. 2a2ae. 3.2: 5.7.
84
It is in the relationship that Ashley establishes between
these two levels of honour that his humanist vision makes
itself felt. Thomist ethics insists on stratification: civic
honour remains a subordinate stage in the Christian's progress
towards the infinitely superior honour of beatitude.140
Ashley. however. draws little distinction between divine and
social honour:
Moreover when he maketh us blessed then are we
also partakers both of his divinitie and of his
honour. Therefore honour of sorte must needs be
some divine thing since that both God so highly
accompteth of yt. and we also by a secrete
instincte of nature so much desire yt. . .. the
same (as great Philosophers affirme) ys the reward
of vertue. For how can vertue stand yf you take
away honour? who wold imbrace yt with so great
labor and paines as yt bringeth with yt yf there
were no prickes of honor to awake and stirr upp
our mindes to the study thereof? Very well sayd
Antisthenes in my op~n~on. being asked what was
the destruccion and overthrowe of a common
weal the. that yt was the want of regard to be had
of honour and of shame. wisely considering that
mens mynds are not easilie of themselves stirred
upp to welldoing except some honorable reward be
proposed for good deeds. . . .141
Here. Ashley makes no real attempt to differentiate between
the honour of God and the honour of men. This blending of the
sacred and the secular results ultimately in a sacralization
of the secular quite distinct from the scholastic compromise:
for in the absence of a system of gradation conferring
absolute value on man's supra-terrestrial end. honour's
relativity is removed. and it becomes simply invested with
divine potency. Indeed. Ashley's opening elucidation of
140.St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles. in Pegis.
II.3.63.
141.Ashley. pp.28-29.
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honour as a sacred quality is presented less as a means of
glorifying God than as a means of dignifying the relationship
between society and individual virtue that is the real subject
of his study.
In short. the basic difference between scholastic and
Renaissance Aristotelianism is that the former subordinates
secular virtue to an end outside itself. whereas the latter
gives prominence to social virtue and justifies that
prominence by the endorsement of the humanist God. If Aquinas
enlists Aristotle to bolster Christian dogma. Ashley enlists
Christianity to bolster his essentially Aristotelian honour.
Society emerges from Of Honour as the dominant value: honour
is a concept of the highest importance because. as the
relationship between a man and the community. it ensures the
existence of individual virtue. which in turn guarantees the
prosperity of the commonwealth. Ashley's formulation of
honour hinges on the Aristotelian conception of social virtue.
Because the function of human virtue is to benefit others. the
greatest honour consists in public-spirited deeds.142 This
concept of virtue makes self-respect dependent on the respect
of other good men:
. . therefore men do wishe to be in honour that
they may seeme to have some good thing in them by
the judgement of good men .... 143
Ashley's chief purpose in composing his treatise is to
142.Ibid .. p.57.
143.Ibid .• p.39.
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discredit the contempt for external honour. an attitude which
he perceives as destructive of a relationship on which the
good of society depends:
For how shold freindshipp be exercised.
liberali tie. equi tie. justice.. . yf you deale
altogether inwardly with yourself and do not
thincke that the goodnes of your mind ought to be
brought to light? Had you rather when your
Countrey wanteth your helpe not to geve help at
all unto yt nor to your freindes. kinsfolkes. and
Countreymen. that thereby you might shunne all
honour. then to proffitt them with some prayse
unto your self?144
Thus. Ashley's primary allegiance is to classical moral
philosophy and to the social relationship on which it is
founded. The Christian references in Of Honour do not finally
disguise the fact that Ashley's eyes. like Petrarch's. are
fixed firmly on this world.
Both the neo-chivalric and humanist confidence in the
compatibility of honour and Christian doctrine originate in
the classical/scholastic conception of human nature: that is
to say. they share the belief that human nature. even if
depraved by original sin. retains some power to do good and
that this capacity for virtue derives from man's ability to
control the lower faculties of will and appetite through the
rational principle. However. there were cultural forces at
work during the Renaissance that challenged the authority of
reason. among the most potent of which was Calvinism.
In propounding his religious doctrine. Calvin saw
144.Ibid .. p.35.
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himself as returning to an Augustinian purity. cleansed of
the pernicious scholastic emphasis on the spiritual efficacy
of human reason. For Calvin. man's pre-Iapsarian condition is
'utterly and completely lost'; his nature. although inherently
good. is corrupted. so 'infected with the contagion of sin'
that 'no good thing remains in his power' .145 Utterly
dependent on God's undeserved grace. fallen man can have no
confidence in the power of his reason to promote good works:
There is no doubt that whatever is praiseworthy in
works is God's grace; there is not a drop that we
ought by rights to ascribe to ourselves .... For
nothing proceeds from a man. however perfect he
be. that is not defiled by some spot.146
Calvin condemns both pagan philosophers. who encouraged man
to believe in his own excellence.147 and the scholastics. who
sought to divide 'the credit for good works between God and
man,.148 Thus. in Calvinist thought. the gap between man's
created and fallen natures. which narrows with Aquinas and
Hooker and virtually ceases to be an issue at all in much
humanist thought. widens again with an Augustinian finality.
Because nature is so thoroughly debased. man can only hope for
God's mercy. and there can be no question of a reconciliation
between the divine and the secular. In England. Calvin's
doctrine exerted a widespread influence. his refusal to
145.John T. McNeill. ed .. Calvin: Institutes of the Christian
Reliiion. trans. Ford Lewis Battles. 2 vols. (Philadelphia.
Pa.: The Westminster Press. 1960). I. II.i.1; I1.i.5; II.ii.l.
146.1bid .• I. III.xv.3.
147.Ibid .• I. II.i.1.
148.Ibid .• I. III.xv.3.
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harmonise Christianity with a secular formulation of virtue
finding expression in the work of his disciple. William
Perkins:
Though liberty of nature remains. yet liberty of
grace. that is. to will well. is lost.
extinguished by the fall of Adam ..149
as well as in Book One of the Faerie Queene:
Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill.
That thorough grace hath gained victory.
If any strength we have. it is to ill.
But all the good is Gods. both power and eke
will. 150
Calvin's view of nature engenders a spiritualisation
of morality comparable to that we noticed in The City of God.
The virtuous 'travel as pilgrims in this world,.151 renouncing
self-love and social identity in favour of the love of God:
when Scripture bids us leave off self-concern. it
not only erases from our minds the yearning to
possess. the desire for power. and the favor of
men. but it also uproots ambition and all craving
for human glory and other more sweet plagues.
Accordingly. the Christian must surely be so
disposed and minded that he feels within himself
it is with God he has to deal throughout his
life .152
As virtue becomes a spiritual concept. so honour assumes an
otherworldly guise. defining the proper relationship between
man and his Creator:
149.William Perkins. Workes. Printed at London by John Legatt.
Printer to the Universitie of Cambridge. 1612. 1.729.
ISO.Edmund Spenser. The Faerie Queene. ed. A.C. Hamilton.
Annotated English Poets Series (London and New York: Longmans.
1977). Lx.I.
l51.Institutes. I. III.vii.3.
lS2.Ibid .• I. III.vii.2.
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Because it acknowledges him as Lord and Father.
the pious mind also deems it meet and right to
observe his authority in all things. reverence his
majesty. take care to advance his glory. and obey
his commandments.153
In the same way. man honours Christ as the King of a spiritual
society. the invisible Church of the elect to which Christian
man aspires to belong:
Thus it is that we may patiently pass through this
life with its misery. hunger. cold. contempt.
reproaches. and other troubles - content with this
one thing: that our King will never leave us
destitute. but will provide for our needs until.
our warfare ended. we are called to triumph. Such
is the nature of his rule. that he shares with us
all that he has received from the Father. Now he
arms and equips us with his power. adorns us with
his beauty and magnificence. enriches us with his
wealth. These benefits. then. give us the most
fruitful occasion to glory. and also provide us
with confidence to struggle fearlessly against the
devil. sin. and death. Finally. clothed with his
righteousness. we can valiantly rise above all the
world's reproaches: and just as he himself freely
lavishes his gifts upon us. so may we. in return.
bring forth fruit to his glory.154
Thus. Calvin effects an Augustinian transference of the
city from earth to heaven. simultaneously transforming honour
into a supernatural principle denoting the beatific
relationship of perfect respect rewarded with perfect
happiness that unites the King of heaven to his subjects.
In his drive for otherworldliness. Calvin does not identify
the invisible Church with the organised Church on earth:
neither does he dissociate the two. but interprets the
temporal Church as a unified society of believers endowed with
153.Ibid .• I. Lii.2.
154.Ibid .. I. II.xv.4.
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the vital spiritual function of preaching the gospel. by faith
in which man may come to partake of the higher Society of
Christ.I55 The conviction that this sacred role of the
visible Church separated it from and raised it above the
State. which should therefore take its principles from the
Church. became one of the reasons for the Puritan opposition
to the Anglican Settlement. Thus. Calvin's theocentric
vision. coupled with his theocratic political theory.
constituted a powerful challenge to the chivalric and humanist
conceptions of secular virtue and society.
This chapter has attempted to define the concept of honour
and to identify the three distinct traditions that descended
to the Renaissance from antiquity and the Middle Ages.
Chivalry in the sixteenth century denotes primarily the
relationship between aristocratic virtue and the the Christian
monarchy: a chivalric relationship that remained as ambivalent
in Tudor and Stuart England as it had been during the Middle
Ages. involving at once the moral role of the nobility in the
protection of a society reflective of natural order and the
conflict between absolute authority. royal and divine. and an
autonomous aristocratic code of honour. Humanism represents
another aspect of the syncretic tradition. focussing on the
fusion of Christian doctrine and pagan moral philosophy. In
this case. the ethical confusion of synthesis is reflected in
the necessity. in much humanist thought. of modifying
155.Ibid .. II. IV.i.1.
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theological imperatives in order to accommodate them within an
essentially man-centred moral vision. In Calvinism. this
ambivalence vanishes before a theology dedicated to the
revival of the Augustinian separation of God and secular
virtue. Consequently. man is judged not in relation to
secular society. divinely-ordained or otherwise. but in
relation to his Creator and the society of the elect. Honour
remains a social concept. but one that functions solely on the
spiritual plane. defining the relation between the King of the
Society of Christ and his loyal and obedient servants.
These three conceptions of secular virtue operate during
the sixteenth century. offering conflicting interpretations of
man's status as a moral being. The Renaissance concept of
honour is thus characterised by the presence of opposing
currents of opinion which preclude a consensus position. It
reflects. not cultural unity. but the tensions at work in a
period of conflicting ethical loyalties. It is clear.
moreover, that this tension derives principally from the
confrontation of a secular and a spiritual morality and the
moral problems it engenders concerning the place of secular
virtue in the Christian universe. We have seen throughout
this introductory chapter that honour is a fundamentally
secular concept which situates active virtue within the
individual will. and that. as the preserve of the aristocracy.
this power for good is consistently destabilised by its
intrinsic relation to competition. self-assertion and the
demand for recognition. Thus. the conflict is essentially
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that between an unstable secular formulation of virtue and a
Christian ethic which calls into question the moral efficacy
of the human will.
It is clear that honour in the sixteenth century is the
focus of the Renaissance debate on the extent. in his
post-lapsarian condition. of man's power to do good.
This thesis argues that Shakespeare's treatment of honour
develops not out of a unified perspective. but out of the
cultural diversity generated by rival ethical legacies. each
of which provides different answers to the central moral
problem of his age. The plurality of sixteenth-century
attitudes to honour enters into Shakespearean drama in the
form of a complex exploration of the human capacity for virtue
and the relationship between honour and Christian-derived
morality. In Henry V and Troilus and Cressida. Shakespeare
examines the chivalric integration of secular virtue into the
pattern of natural law and. in Hamlet. investigates the
problematics of revenge honour in the context of a Christian
metaphysic. The exploration of chivalric honour reveals the
tensions latent in the syncretic tradition. and in so doing
suggests the tragic potential of the honourable stance. This
potential is realised in Hamlet. in which honour forms the
basis of the dilemmas facing its protagonist. The examination
of honour as a tragic concept also shapes Julius Caesar and
Coriglanus. the two Roman plays which reflect the humanist
interest in the man-centred morality of antiquity and which
dramatise the pagan concept of social virtue in terms of an
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unstable relationship between society and aristocratic honour.
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CHAPTER 2
THROUGH HISTORY TOWARDS TRAGEDY:
CHIVALRIC HONOUR IN HENRY V AND TROILUS AND CRESSIDA.
The essence of the orthodox chivalric vision is the
reconciliation it seeks to effect between God and honour.
With its basis in the scholastic theology of compromise.
traditional chivalry envisages hierarchical social order as
the product of a rapprochement between man and God. that is to
say. as a divinely-instituted pattern which man implements
through natural reason. It posits a universal synthesis which
cautiously affirms human powers and makes secular virtue an
expression of the will of God.
In Henry V (1598-99). Shakespeare integrates this chivalric
tradition into the culminating play of an historical cycle
dealing in part with the social disorder engendered by the
tension between royal legitimacy and natural competence.
Chivalric unity is offered and celebrated as the achievement
of an ideal king capable of resolving the conflicts of the
past in a foreign war that is an act of national honour
sanctioned by God. However. this interpretation of Henry's
reign is not one that the spectator is asked to accept
uncritically. Rather. the chivalric ideal is put under
pressure by dramatic impulses which call attention to the
irreducible complexity of historical process and the
problematic nature of kingship.
In Troilus and Cressida (1602). Shakespeare moves from the
exploration of chivalric orthodoxy as an historical model to
a consideration of the 'world picture' on which it bases its
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reconciliation of the divine and the secular. In its
depiction of the Greeks. the play tests hierarchy's claim to
universality by dramatising its connections to a competitive
heroic ethic. Through its portrayal of the Trojans. the play
deals with another form of chivalric idealism. based upon
courtly and Neoplatonic values. Both chivalric impulses are
exposed as self-contradictory. as the sources of notions of
honour and heroism that are essentially individualistic. In
going one step further than Henry V in its exploration of
chivalric honour. Troilus and Cressida approaches tragedy. for
in its dramatic world of debased ideals what is shown to be
impossible is not merely chivalric fusion. but virtue itself .
••• *** •••• ***.******
In the second scene of Henry V. the Archbishop of
Canterbury delivers the 'honeybees' speech. which presents
England under the rule of its new king as a society reflecting
God's will:
Therefore doth heaven divide
The state of man in divers functions.
Setting endeavour in continual motion:
To which is fixed. as an aim or butt.
Obedience: for so work the honey-bees.
Creatures that by a rule in nature teach
The act of order to a peopled kingdom.
1.2.183-89.1
The lines offer a vision of a divinely-ordained social order
whose division into a structure of God-given functions fosters
1.All quotations from the play are from The Arden Shakespeare:
Kina Henry V. ed. John H. Walter (London and New York: Methuen
and Co .. 1954).
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obedience to a single authority. which in turn guarantees
unity in diversity. the 'one consent' (1.2.181.206) of an
integrated and harmonious nation. This social system is
encoded in the natural world. The hive image. with its
multiplicity of social functions revolving around the
'emperor' (1.2.196). identifies the unified monarchical state
as an inherent natural order emanating from God.
Thus. the 'honeybees' speech posits a cosmic synthesis in
which England. unified under its king. participates in God's
will. This syncretism belongs to the orthodox chivalric
tradition. with its conception of human society as an
harmonious relationship between man and God - the relationship
evoked in the honeybees passage between a deity intimately
involved in human affairs and a society capable of learning
the 'act of order'. of inferring from the natural world the
workings of the law of nature. This collaborative effort
achieves a double reconciliation of God and honour. Not only
does it effectively blur the distinction between the sacred
and the secular; in acknowledging the spiritual efficacy of
the natural reason. it also assumes that men retain some
capacity to translate divine imperatives into active virtue.
Yet in the 'honeybees' speech. natural order is identified
specifically with the monarchical state; its vision is thus
neo-chivalric. the term used to denote the Renaissance
formulation of chivalry on a national rather than a feudal
scale. It is by operating harmoniously within the natural
organic unity of monarchical England that the ideal of honour
98
can be thought of as reflecting divine purpose:
Others. like soldiers. armed in their stings.
Make boot upon the summer's velvet buds;
Which pillage they with merry march bring home
To the tent -royal of their emperor. . . .
I.2.193-96.
The 'honeybees' speech claims a triumphant resolution.
through exemplary kingship. of the tensions and contradictions
of the recent historical past. Bolingbroke's coup d'etat.
justified in Richard II (1595) on the grounds of the superior
public competence of its instigator. is nonetheless implicated
in naked political opportunism. and the moral inadequacy of
policy is given a metaphysical context. The prophecies of
national discord in Richard II - 'foul sin gathering head I
Shall break into corruption .. .' (R2.. V.1.58-59)2 - assume
both that there is an order above the secular which usurpation
violates and that this violation will have political
consequences: Bolingbroke's realpolitik destabilises the
relationship between the king and the nobles who helped him to
power. generating civil war.3 Thus. usurpation involves
2.AII quotations from Richard II are taken from The Arden
Shakespeare: Kini Richard II. ed. Peter Ure (London: Methuen
and Co. Ltd .. 1961). Ure discusses power and its transcendent
sanction in the play in his excellent 'Introduction'. lxxx.
3.John Danby. in Shakespeare's Doctrine of Nature (London:
Faber and Faber. 1948). has put forward the influential view
of the Henry IV plays as a dramatic world where power and
political expediency are the only values. where there is no
'frame of absolute moral values that embraces both the
individual and society and yet transcends them .... ' (p.83).
Yet it would seem that the second tetralogy's portrayal of
historical processes is rather more complex than Danby's
formulation would allow. The plays insist both on the need
for political acumen and on its moral deficiency. and the
social disorder consequent upon the 'sin' of usurpation.
99
Bolingbroke in a deep-seated contradiction: his political
efficiency can operate only in a negative fashion. to enforce
the monarchical hegemony he himself challenged. His seizure
of power disrupts public values and fragments society.
producing a nation made up of partial and opposing claims.
The order of the usurper is placed in relation to Rebellion
and Misrule4 and their respective principles. honour and
instinct.
In Henry IV. Part One (1596-97), chivalric honour is
examined as the martial function of the nobility. Hotspur's
spirited defence of Mortimer against the king's accusation of
treason identifies this function as the capacity to face pain
and danger; Percy invokes Mortimer's 'mouthed wounds'
(1.3.96). 'willingly' received in combat with Glendower
(1.3.110).5 His dual emphasis on injury and volition is
crucial. for those voluntarily received wounds declare
Mortimer's intention to serve while associating aristocratic
virtue with the resolution to endure what ordinary men
(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
coupled with Henry's own troubled conscience. serves to remind
us that there is more to life than the acquisition of power.
that the political and the moral are not only inextricably
connected. but are. by implication. governed by an
otherworldly reality.
4.1 am here borrowing C.L. Barber's term. from Shakespeare's
Festive Comedy. A Study pf Dramatic Form and its Relatipn to
Social Custom (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press. 1959).
See pp.192-221.
5.All quotations from KinK Henry IV. Part One are from
The Arden Shakespeare: KinK Henry IV. Part One. ed.
A.R. Humphreys (London and New York: Methuen. 1960).
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instinctively shun. It is this strength of will that forms
the foundation of the nobleman's honour in the play.
In identifying public virtue with courage. Hotspur sets up
an explicit opposition between honour and policy:
Never did bare and rotten policy
Colour her working with such deadly wounds ....
I.3.107-108.
While the honourable man willingly risks his life in the
execution of his public role. the politician eschews danger
through self-serving opportunism. cunning and treachery. Yet
Hotspur's lines also imply a distinction between honour and
instinct. between the willingness to confront and the natural
impulse to avoid that which threatens one's safety and
well-being. Death. after all. is the test of honour (a fact
to which Falstaff later calls our attention) because it is
what we most fear. The distinctions that inform Percy's lines
lay claim to a superiority that is at once social and moral.
However. if Hotspur is a great nobleman and 'the king of
honour' (IV.1.10) because he stands firm when ordinary men
flee from danger. his strength of will is portrayed not as the
calm self-control of the man who has quelled his own nature.
but as ardent self-assertion:
Send danger from the east unto the west.
So honour cross it from the north to south.
And let them grapple: O. the blood more stirs
To rouse a lion than to start a hare! I.3.193-96.
As Hotspur. relishing the prospect of 'some great exploit'
(I.3.197). imagines honour 'grappling' with danger. he
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conceives of martial virtue as the ability to compete with
peril. Battle is a contest in which he asserts himself
against adversity. and it is in this contest that he proves
his greatness. his own capacity for virtue - hence his
enthusiasm at the promise of a fresh encounter with danger.
The hunting metaphor likens this eagerness to the thrill of
the chase. which is all the more intense the more fearsome
the quarry. Hotspur's self-assertiveness is not teeth-
gritting force. but Alan. the highspiritedness of the man who
rushes headlong towards a new opportunity to manifest his
heroic nature.6
Honour emerges from these lines as a form of passionate
self-affirmation. As such. it is essentially self-regarding.
When Hotspur imagines himself effortlessly plucking honour
from the pale-faced moon. we get another glimpse of this
self-relationship. for his hyperbole claims a power for virtue
that puts the impossible easily within his grasp:
By heaven. methinks it were an easy leap
To pluck bright honour from the pale-fac'd moon.
Or dive into the bottom of the deep.
Where fathom-line could never touch the ground.
And pluck up drowned honour by the locks.
So he that doth redeem her thence might wear
Without corrival all her dignities:
But out upon this half-fac'd fellowship I
1.3.199-206.
The final lines of the speech supplement internal honour with
6.Norman Council connects Hotspur with the Platonic
identification of honour with highspiritedness. but confines
his analysis to a consideration of Percy's irascibility. See
When Honour's At the Stake. Ideas of Honour in Shakespeare's
~ (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd .• 1973). p.45.
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the public honours. or 'dignities'. that constitute its
reflection and reward. Hotspur's refusal to share these
honours. his repudiation of 'half-fac'd fellowship'. clarifies
honour's intrinsic relation to competition and pride. What
Percy seeks is singularity; his aspiration to excellence is at
bottom the aspiration to excel over others.
Hotspur's passion for the heroic self lies at the heart of
his aristocratic nature. making him throughout the play proud.
self-assertive. impetuous. irascible and more than a little
exasperating for his companions. As a passionate man. he is
also able to accommodate the private life. as his relationship
with his wife Kate and her moving eulogy in Henry IV. Part Two
(1597-98) make clear. But he remains an individualist. who
exhibits the tension between honour and authority. and between
the self and communal action. The play offers no conclusive
moral judgement. Rather. its dramatic structure ensures that
its commentary works two ways. Thus. Hotspur's contempt for
policy. which calls for some endorsement. is shown to render
his honour hopelessly impractical. as his conduct at
Shrewsbury demonstrates.7
Analogously. the play uses Falstaff to celebrate the values
of 'holiday' leisure scorned by honour.8 Falstaff's code of
conduct reflects an engrossment in the life of appetite. that
7.Ibid .• pp.46-49.
B.See Barber. pp.195-97.
103
is to say. the pursuit of pleasure. comfort. safety and
well-being. Like Hotspur. he is intensely self-involved. But
the physical gratifications he pursues. and his profound
cynicism towards religion. morality and public service locate
him at the opposite pole to honour's inflexible personal
idealism. This dramatic embodiment of the instinct for
survival lives 'out of all order. out of all compass' (~.
111.3.18-19) and gets away with it through a fertile wit that
tirelessly recodes reality to his advantage. His
improvisatory flair and comic opportunism succeed in creating
around him an enchanted space which keeps at bay the
consequences of his self-gratification. But even his most
brilliant equivocations cannot conceal his essential egoism.
even when they seem to recreate the world itself in his own
rotund image: 'banish plump Jack. and banish all the world. '
(~. 11.4.473-74). But the world is more than Falstaff's
imaginative solipsism. as Hal's retort makes plain: 'I do.
I will.' (lH!&.. 11.4.475) .
The mockery of morality that underlies Falstaff's comic
resourcefulness becomes explicit in his comments at the Battle
of Shrewsbury. Through them. the play offers an alternative
perspective on an ethic which dictates that for a man to live
honourably he has to be prepared to die. Falstaff's famous
catechism on honour reduces it to a word: 'What is honour?
A word .... Who hath it? He that died a-Wednesday.'
(V.1.134:136). Honour is granted no more than nominal value
because the reality is injury. death and posthumous
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'detraction' (V,l.139),9 The voice of 'instinct' strips
honour of its mystique and calls it death: 'I like not such
grinning honour as Sir Walter hath. Give me life.
(V.3.58-59). Yet the demystification does not finally
demystify responsibility and courage. and verbal brio in the
service of individual survival will not make unreal the claims
of others and the fact of death.
Thus. in the dramatic world of Henry IV. Part One. policy.
honour and instinct emerge as mutually inimical national
energies. The dramatic structure which permits one world to
comment on another is organised around the figure of the
prince who is responsive to all three perspectives. The play
consistently places Hal in relation to the worlds of the
court. the rebels and the tavern. and numerous critics have
suggested. though in a variety of ways. that this dramatic
design constitutes Shakespeare's institutio principis.
exhibiting the growth of a sovereign nature that somehow
tempers and harmonises these opposing values.10 It is
9.See Council. pp.38-42.
10.The most common formulation of Hal's nascent royalty in
Part One is the quasi-Aristotelian paradigm of honour. which
sees Hotspur as the excess. Falstaff the defect and Hal the
virtuous mean of the truly honourable man. See. for example.
E.M.W. Tillyard. Shakespeare's Histpry Plays (London: Chatto
and Windus. 1944). pp.264 -304: Hiram Haydn. ~
Cpunter-Renaissance (New York: Harcourt. Brace and World.
Inc .• 1950). p.600: David Berkeley and Donald Eidson. 'The
Theme of Henry IV, Part One'. SQ. XIX (1968). 25-31: and
Sherman H. Hawkins. 'Virtue and Kingship in Shakespeare's
Henry IV'. ~. 5 (1975), pp.327-29. Council argues
persuasively against this interpretation in his chapter on the
play, pp.36-59. The formulation of integrated sovereignty
which I put forward here is closest to that offered by C.L.
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tempting to read Part One along these lines. as dramatising
the reconciliation in Hal of honour and instinct. Certainly.
the prince's acquaintance with Eastcheap allows him to parody
Percy's battle passion - 'he that kills me some six or seven
dozen of Scots at a breakfast. washes his hands. and says to
his wife. "Fie upon this quiet life. I want work".'
(11.4.100-103) - and thereby capture the narrowness of his
aristocratic nature. At the same time. however. Hal is shown
to understand the limitations of Falstaff's world. its
essential indifference to public emergencies: 'What. is it a
time to jest and dally now?' (V.3.55) - a perception dependent
on a complementary awareness of the value of honour.
The broadened social perspective which Hal acquires in
Eastcheap is frequently regarded as a crucial factor in his
progression towards an inclusive. national royalty.11 In
learning to speak the language of the common people ('I can
drink with any tinker in his own language during my life.'
lEi. 11.4.18-19). Hal can be seen to transcend a class-bound
aristocratic ethic. and to develop a communal rather than a
sectional national consciousness:
and when I am King of England I shall command all
(Footnote 10 continued from previous page)
Barber in Shakespeare's Festiye Comedy. pp.195-201.
II.See J. Dover Wilson. The Fortunes of Falstaff (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press. 1943). pp.24-25; Paul A. Jorgenson.
Redeemin& Shakespeare's Words (Berkeley and Los Angeles.
Calif.: Univ. of California Press. 1962). pp.65-67.; C.L.
Barber. Sbakespeare's Festiye Comedy. pp.2DD-201; and Zdenek
Stribrny. 'Henry V and History'. in Shakespeare: Henry V.
A Casebook. ed.Michael Quinn. The Macmillan Casebook Series
(London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd .• 1969). pp.186-87.
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the good lads in Eastcheap. ~. 11.4.13-14.
Yet this school of criticism represents an incomplete response
to the text. For example. the tone of Hal's observation here
is mock-heroic. and his fellowship with the 'leash of drawers'
(11.4.7) patronising. Indeed. after his soliloquy in the
second scene ('I know you all. ... '~. I.2.190-212). we
can never wholly trust his Eastcheap friendships. or be
certain of the warmth and authenticity of his life with the
people. It is difficult for us to decide just what it is that
he gains from it; in one view at least - that of Warwick - the
language he learns from his drinking mates 'comes to no
further use I But to be known and hated.' (~. IV.4.72-73).12
The tavern scenes of Part One show us a prince who is an
accomplished impersonator. who shares with Falstaff a delight
in playing roles. In his soliloquy. Hal discloses his plan to
enhance his accession to the throne with a 'reformation' which
he understands to be inherently dramatic: the repudiation of
the former self to some extent cultivated simply in order to
be rejected.13 This acute sense of the theatricality of
kingship forms at least as significant a part in the portrait
of Hal's nascent sovereignty as do the royal virtues
frequently cited by critics. It is an art of government that
the prince shares with his father. In Henry's speech to Hal
12.AII quotations from Henry IV, Part Two are from Ih. Arden
Shakespeare: Kina Henry IV. Part TwQ. ed. A.R. Humphreys
(London: Methuen. 1966).
13.See Michael Goldman. Shakespeare and the Eneraies of Drama
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 1972). pp.52-55.
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in Part One (III.2.29-91). his calculated formation of the
public role is at once an essential political skill that
fosters obedience to royal authority. and a cynical political
commodity. the expedient means to power. Bolingbroke's
conscientious maintenance of the public persona neglected by
his predecessor is compromised by its unscrupulous history.
Thus. the capacity to cultivate the public role is by no means
an unmixed blessing. The Henry IV plays make clear the damage
which the prince's public destiny inflicts on his private
being. They also. of course. alert us to the Machiavellian
implications that attend the dissociation of the private man
from the public figure.
Therefore. if Part One severely qualifies its suggestion
that through Hal aristocratic honour and the common life can
be fused into an instrument of national solidarity. the
integration of policy into this alleged synthesis proves even
more problematic. The plays strongly imply that policy's
legitimate claim to authority - its efficiency and public
responsibility - is irrevocably implicated in usurpation and
the 'indirect crook'd ways' (lHi. IV.5.184) through which
Bolingbroke came to power. Henry undoubtedly has a strong
sense of public accountability. and he maintains order at
great personal cost. But his competence operates only
negatively - to quell the disorder he unleashed - and
ultimately has to rely on naked political machination. as the
Gaultree Forest episode makes clear. This bears directly on
Hal's future role as king. for although he learns from his
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father's experience of rule that the crown brings with it an
enormous burden of public service ('polish'd perturbation I
golden care!' ~. IV.S.22). the king's deathbed counsel urges
expediency: a foreign war to avert the rebellion that will
threaten the son of a usurper. notwithstanding his claim of
hereditary right. Thus. the power won by 'indirect crook'd
ways' will finally be consolidated by the same means.
Henry's last speech to his son informs us how heavily the
past will hang over the new king. Hal inherits a legacy of
usurpation and division. and advice on how to deal with the
threat of factious nobles. The speech. coupled with the final
lines of Henry IV, Part Two. in which John of Lancaster
reports that he has heard a bird singing of a French war.
whose music 'pleas'd the King' (lHi. V.S.108). hardly
encourages us to feel that for Henry V policy will function
as an unproblematic royal virtue within an integrated
sovereignty.
The opening scene of Henry V shows us two clerics worrying
about a bill before Parliament threatening to expropriate
Church lands and discussing the near-miraculous transformation
of the new king. The description of Henry's reformation is
explicitly religious in character. its language based on the
baptismal service from the Book of COmmon Prayer:14
The breath no sooner left his father's body.
But that his wildness. mortified in him.
14.Walter. 'Introduction'. The Arden Shakespeare: Kini Henry V
xviii.
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Seem'd to die too; yea. at that very moment.
Consideration like an angel came.
And whipp'd th'offending Adam out of him.
Leaving his body as a Paradise.
T'envelop and contain celestial spirits.
1.1.25-31.
This is nothing less than a cleansing of the taint of original
sin. The passage's allusion to baptism evokes the restoration
through grace of the rectitude of will damaged by the Fall.
for baptism offers man a regeneration 'which by nature he
cannot have,.15 However. it also emphasises the role of
'consideration' in Henry's redemption. J.H. Walter has
elucidated the religious significance of this term. its
association with the 'intense spiritual contemplation. and
self-examination' through which. with the help of heavenly
beings. man communicates with God.16 Thus. if the line.
'Consideration like an angel came'. articulates man's
dependence on grace. it equally presupposes a natural reason
not wholly darkened by the Fall. In this way. Canterbury
assumes a degree of collaboration between nature and grace: he
expresses a compromise theology that also signifies the accord
between secular leadership and its divine sanction. His
account of Henry's conversion thus anticipates the syncretic
vision of the 'honeybees' speech.
These implications of synthesis are reinforced by
15.'The Ministration of Holy Baptism'. The Book of Cammon
Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments and other Rites
and Ceremonies of the Church. New York: The Church Pension
Fund. 1945. p.274.
16.See Walter. 'Introduction'. The Arden Shakespeare: Kini
Henry V. xix.
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the clerics' commendation of the new king's inclusive royal
virtues: Henry can 'reason in divinity'. 'debate of
commonwealth affairs'. 'discourse of war'. and search to the
bottom of 'any cause of policy' (1.1.38-47). The emphasis is
on the unification of what is diverse. in contrast to the
fragmentation that characterised the reign of Henry IV. and
specifically on the integration of the three opposing dramatic
worlds of the Henry IV plays: in Henry. policy and honour are
plainly reconciled. and even 'instinct' is present in the
natural idiom of the clerics. which implies that the new
king's acquaintance with Misrule has proved 'fruitful' - for
'wholesome berries' ripen best 'by fruit of baser quality'
(I.1.61-62). The partial claims of a divided society are
fused in the king who contains within himself the unity in
diversity imaged in the 'honeybees' passage.
This corporate identity is presented as the reflection of
the king's natural abilities. Canterbury and Ely discuss at
some length how riot could generate such royal perfection.
concluding that. because 'miracles are ceas'd' (I.l.67). the
riot must have been a disguise. beneath which Henry 'obscur'd
his contemplation' (I.l.63). Their natural idiom suggests an
organic growth into sovereignty and posits perfect harmony
between the two natures of the king. his body natural and the
body politic he assumes in the ceremony of coronation.17
17.See Ernst H. Kantorowicz. The Kini's Two Bodies. A Study in
Mediaeval Political TheoloiY (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Prass , 1957). pp.7-23.
111
In this view. Henry's reformation crowns the accord between
self and role with divine favour. Natural energies flow into
royal virtue. which is in turn completed and legitimated by
grace. In Henry. it is suggested. an ideal unity is
established which joins royal and divine authority and thereby
harmonises God and secular virtue.
However. the clerics' theory of the king's feigned former
self. the 'veil of wildness' (1.1.64). alerts us to the fact
that his reformation is as public as it is private. that it
represents at least in part the dramatic transformation first
planned at the start of Henry IV, Part One and now executed
with stunning success. This suggests that the role is to some
extent a calculated public performance. that part of Henry's
effectiveness as king resides in the theatrical skill with
which he takes centre stage:
when he speaks.
The air. a charter'd libertine. is still.
And the mute wonder lurketh in men's ears.
To steal his sweet and honey'd sentences ..
1.1.47-50
While this proficiency at play-acting need not cast doubt upon
the reality of Henry's virtues. it makes us aware that the
relation between the private and the public man is
considerably more complex than the portrait of the ideal king
would allow.
The clerics' account of Henry's reformation is further
coloured by their ecclesiastical interests currently under
legal threat. How far this is the case can be shown by
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Shakespeare's alteration of his sources. In Hall and
Holinshed. the prelates introduce the subject of war with
France in order to distract Henry's attention from the bill of
temporal dispossession. The king plays a passive role in
their accounts. He has no attitude towards the bill. which is
simply brushed aside by Canterbury's 'sharpe invention,.18
The clerics' offer of financial support for the war is made
only after the statement of the legality of Henry's claim to
the French throne.
Shakespeare changes this material in two significant ways.
First of all. the prelates do not initiate the discussion of
foreign war. When Canterbury makes his bid to preserve Church
property. the cause is already 'in hand' (1.1.77). The
mention of the arrival of the French ambassador reinforces our
awareness that Canterbury is responding to a prior interest in
France. for although we are not told until the next scene that
the ambassador has come in response to Henry's claim to 'some
certain dukedoms' (1.2.247). Canterbury informs Ely that he
can easily guess the purpose of his embassy. In the
chronicles. no such claim to French territory has been made.
the dukedoms in question forming part of the rightful
18.Holinshed's Chronicles of Eniland. Scotland, and Ireland
(London: J. Johnson. 1808). 111.65: Edward Hall. The Union of
the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York (1550) (Menston:
Scolar Press. 1970). fol.iii.
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inheritance which Canterbury urges the king to secure.19
By establishing the cause of foreign war as already under
consideration. Shakespeare significantly alters the nature of
Canterbury's political manoeuvrings:
He seems indifferent.
Or rather swaying more upon our part
Than cherishing th'exhibiters against us;
For I have made an offer to his majesty.
Upon our spiritual convocation.
And in regard of causes now in hand.
Which I have open'd to his grace at large.
As touching France. to give a greater sum
Than ever at one time the clergy yet
Did to his predecessors part withal. 1.1.72-81.
The Archbishop's machinations now take the form of flattering
what he takes to be the king's military designs. by 'opening'
(or 'fully expounding') the causes 'now in hand,.20 and by
offering what is. in effect. a substantial financial bribe.
19.Holinshed reads: 'Whereupon. on a day in the parliament.
Henry Chichele. Archbishop of Canterbury. made a pithy oration
wherein he declared how not only the duchies of Normandy and
Acquitaine. with the counties of Anjou and Maine and the
country of Gascoigne. were by undoubted title appertaining to
the king as to the lawful and only heir of the same. but also
the whole realm of France. as heir to his great grandfather
King Edward the Third.' (Holinshed's Chronicles. 111.65).
See also Hall. fol.iiii.
20. 'Open' is a somewhat ambiguous verb. As in ~ 1.9. it can
signify 'To lay bare or make manifest to the (mental or
spiritual) view: to reveal. disclose. declare. make known'.
This gloss. favoured by C.T. Onions in A Shakespeare Glossary.
2nd edn. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1919). implies that
Canterbury has introduced the subject of war. However. in
view of the Archbishop's knowledge of Henry's prior claim to
dukedoms. it is difficult to ascribe this role to him. QEll
1.10. 'To unfold the sense of: to expound. explain.
interpret'. seems to fit the sequence of events more closely.
This reading is adopted by Irving Ribner and George Lyman
Kittredge. eds. The Complete Works of Shakespeare (Waltham,
Mass. and Toronto: Xerox College Publishing. 1971) and Gary
Taylor, ed. ijenry Y. The Oxford Shakespeare (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press. 1982).
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Yet it is important to distinguish between Shakespeare's
modification of his sources. which becomes clear through study
but remains imperceptible to an audience. and the way he
dramatises his own version of events. The reworking of the
chronicles certainly suggests the dramatist'S intention to
make Henry's role in initiating war more problematic than it
appears in Hall or Holinshed. But his presentation of the
clerics' political scheming seems designed to arouse
suspicions of the king's motives without confirming them. The
Archbishop's report of his meeting with Henry is suggestive
but imprecise. The repeated verb 'seems'. coupled with the
pattern of statement and counter-statement. evokes conjecture
and uncertainty: Henry first 'seems indifferent'. and then
more inclined to the Church than to the Commons: he 'seems' to
receive the offer of financial support with 'good acceptance'
(1.1.82-83). but apparently has not countenanced it. the
meeting having been interrupted before Canterbury could assure
him of the legality of his claim. The passage suggests that
in making overtures to the king. the prelate can only guess at
his attitudes and motives. Henry mayor may not be
susceptible to his inducement. and if Canterbury believes that
a foreign war is in the offing. he also assumes that it
depends upon the verification of the king's 'true titles to
some certain dukedoms. I And generally to the crown and seat
of France .. , (1.1.87-88). It is only with the benefit of
hindsight that we can feel properly sceptical about Henry's
legal scruples. for at this stage we do not know that he has
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already claimed the dukedoms in question; we have only the
Archbishop's hint. which closes the scene and encourages us to
attend carefully to the ambassadors' message. Nor does close
examination of the text enable us to point to Henry's prior
interest in France as proof of his political scheming. for in
the next scene his title to these territories. descended from
Edward III through the Treaty of Bretigny. is apparently not
thought to require confirmation. the only claim in question
being that to the French throne. derived from Edward Ill's
mother. Isabella.21
By suggesting. through his treatment of ecclesiastical
interests. that Henry may be responsive to pressure groups.
and that he may be actively seeking war. Shakespeare alerts us
to possible flaws in the image of an ideal king who resolves
the tensions generated by usurpation. We cannot discount the
possibility that Henry's dodgy inheritance is shaping events.
that he is pursuing foreign quarrels to forestall the threat
of disorder bequeathed to him. The clerics' confidence in
synthesis is consequently put under pressure. both by doubts
21.1n both Hall and Holinshed. Canterbury distinguishes
between the claim to dukedoms and the larger claim to the
French throne. and his legal arguments are designed solely to
refute the 'false feigned Law Salique. which the Frenchmen
allege ever against the Kings of England in bar of their just
title to the crown of France.' (Holinshed's Chronicles.
111.65). See also Hall. fol.iiii. For historical accounts of
Henry's two distinct claims to French territory. see Peter
Saccio. Shakespeare's Enilish Kinis: History. Chronicle and
DL4ma (London. Oxford and New York: Oxford Univ. PresS. 1977).
pp.75-77; E.F. Jacob. Henry V and the Inyasion of France
(London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd .• 1947). pp.14-23: and J.D.
Griffith Davies. Henry V (London: Arthur Barker Ltd .• 1935).
pp.143-48.
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concerning the legitimacy of Henry's title and intimations
that his talent for performance may be Machiavellian
dissimulation.
The second scene continues the discussion cut short by the
arrival of the French ambassadors and gives out similarly
ambiguous signals. Henry's initial appeal for truth promises
to allay our doubts. for in reminding Canterbury of the grave
moral consequences of opening 'titles miscreate' (1.2.16). the
king appears to guard conscientiously against what he knows to
be the Archbishop's bias for war:
For God doth know how many now in health
Shall drop their blood in approbation
Of what your reverence shall incite us to.
Therefore take heed how you impawn our
person.
How you awake our sleeping sword of war:
We charge you. in the name of God. take
heed .... 1.2.18-23.
Yet there is a curious undercurrent in Henry's lines. The
verbs. 'incite'. 'impawn'. 'awake'. make him a passive
instrument. the Archbishop the active instigator of war. This
apparent eagerness to transfer all responsibility to his
counsellor makes us uneasy. for it becomes difficult to tell
whether Henry is concerned chiefly to avoid an illegitimate
campaign or to exonerate himself from blame for a possibly
unjust war that he knows will be officially sanctioned. The
entire exchange between the king and Canterbury conflates the
issues of justice and responsibility. After the Salic Law
speech. Henry asks. 'May I with right and conscience make this
claim?' (1.2.96). to which Canterbury replies. 'The sin upon
117
my head. dread sovereign!' (I.2.97). Consequently. we do not
know whether Henry's scruples are sincere or a performance
masking political opportunism while betraying symptoms of the
private man - his moral evasion and sense of guilt.
Shakespeare places the burden of legal proof on a speech
arguably 'unrivalled for tediousness' in the entire canon.22
Perhaps the chief problem of the Salic Law speech is the
discrepancy between its style and its substance. In content.
it establishes two main points - that the Salic Law does not
apply to France and that French kings have for centuries
claimed the throne through the female line - which effectively
dispose of the law as a bar to Henry's claim. Yet the
Archbishop's concluding remark. that Henry's legal title is
'as clear as is the summer's sun' (I.2.86). is a pointed bit
of humour. for the speech is long. unwieldy and full of
unintelligible genealogies.23 Although it can be decoded in
the study. it is extremely difficult to follow in the theatre.
How does one respond to a speech that is not doubletalk but
sounds suspiciously like it? It may be that Shakespeare's
faithful reproduction of Holinshed is designed neither to
relieve nor verify the doubts he has raised about the validity
of the enterprise. but to keep the matter an open question.
One may with justice feel sceptical of Canterbury's arguments.
22.A.R. Humphreys. ed .• Henry V. New Penguin Shakespeare
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd .. 1968). p.26.
23.See Norman Rabkin. Shakespeare and the Problem of Meanina
(Chicago and London: Chicago Univ. Press. 1981). p.52.
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or one may accept them. while recognising that the motives for
the war remain suspect.
The legal warrant is pressed home with rousing appeals to
Henry's honour to claim what is rightfully his. This honour
is portrayed in terms of lineage and nature; it is the
capacity for martial virtue transmitted to the king through
the blood of Edward III and the Black Prince: 'The blood and
courage that renowned them / Runs in your veins.
(1.2.118-19). This natural royal virtue expands into national
honour; the king's deeds. inhabiting historical time. flow
into the history of the nation. In renewing the feats of his
illustrious ancestors. Henry will embody England's greatness.
enshrined in the memory of the near-miraculous victory at
Cressy:
o noble English. that could entertain
With half their forces the full pride of France.
And let another half stand laughing by.
All out of work. and cold for action! 1.2.111-14.
The king's collective self. here identified as his honour.
again grows out of natural abilities and incarnates the
'nation'. which emerges in the 'honeybees' speech as a 'rule
in nature' issuing from God. This national identity is
contained in history - the story of English honour which
inspires the present to revive the heroic past while also
teaching the prudence that Henry exhibits in forestalling
Scottish incursions. Accordingly. Henry presents his decision
to enforce his legal claim on France as an affirmation of
royal honour. that is. as a determination to win a glorious
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place in English history:
Either our history shall with full mouth
Speak freely of our acts. or else our grave.
Like Turkish mute. shall have a tongueless mouth.
Not worshipp'd with a waxen epitaph. 1.2.230-33.
However. the scepticism which the play has engendered
towards the war extends as well to this stirring unitary
vision of king. nation and God. Canterbury and Ely are the
chief spokesmen of national honour. and their renewed pledge
of financial assistance casts a shadow over their assertion of
perfect accord between religion and secular power. Moreover.
the neo-chivalric harmony so memorably evoked in the
'honeybees' speech becomes a questionable national image when
proffered by the representative of a sectional interest.
It is at this point that the French ambassadors are
admitted. and we hear explicitly of the demand for dukedoms
hinted at in the first scene. Shakespeare's rather cryptic
presentation of this prior claim. pointing inconclusively at
private reasons for the war. serves to complicate our response
to the Dauphin's gift of the tennis balls. This insult to
king and nation provides an opportunity to arouse
nationalistic fervour for the war. turning it into an
honourable quarrel as well as a legal claim. Henry greets the
Dauphin's gift with a proud affirmation of his royal stature:
But tell the Dauphin I will keep my state.
Be like a king and show my sail of greatness
When 1 do rouse me in my throne of France ..
1.2.273-75.
This assertion of English power against foreign humiliation is
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stunningly effective rhetoric. and would ordinarily invite
wholehearted approval of a king capable of rising so
brilliantly to meet a challenge to his honour. But it is just
this simple response that the play hinders by having alluded
to a political gambit by Henry that might be construed as
provocation. However crude the Dauphin's insult. the
patriotic sentiments it arouses are qualified by this further
suggestion that there may be more to Henry's charismatic
role than meets the eye. a suggestion intensified by
the king's eagerness to treat the Dauphin as he treated
Canterbury - as a repository for the transgression of
bloodshed:
and his soul
Shall stand sore charged for the wasteful
vengeance
That shall fly with them .... 1.2.282-84.
The first act of Henry V offers the possibility of a
sublime universal order. accomplished by a great and virtuous
king whose role is an expression of his natural gifts.
perfected and ratified by God: that through this king who
embodies the identity of his nation. its greatness of spirit
will be realised in a foreign war at once heroic and just:
that secular virtue will become an instrument of national
unity compatible with the divine order. Yet all this depends
on taking for granted precisely what the play asks us to
question: that there is an essential compatibility between the
man and the role and between the role and God. In the first
act's portrayal of a war the validity of which hangs in the
121
balance. Henry's public persona may be a reflection of a man
in whom honour is consistent with piety and statecraft. or it
may be a performance concealing the political manoeuvres of a
young king at once incapable of resolving his problematic
legacy and uneasy at the moral implications of a war of
expedience. The neo-chivalric view of Henry's reign is
celebrated throughout the play. in its patriotic and martial
rhetoric and especially in the Chorus's epic narrative. But
the ambiguous presentation of Henry in the first act
encourages us to feel both the tensions beneath the mask of
triumphant monarchy and the king's remoteness from a world of
private men for whom his emotions and motives must remain in
shadow: and it is these conflicts and ambivalences in kingship
that develop in complexity during the course of the play.
exposing cracks and strains in the neo-chivalric conception of
honour.
The second act deepens our perception of the relation
between the natural self and its corporate identity by
focussing on the king's friendships. Henry's treatment of the
conspirators Cambridge. Grey and Scroop in 11.2 makes it clear
which of these three betrayals makes the deepest impression.
It is the treason of Scroop. the friend who 'knew'st the very
bottom of my soul' (11.2.97). that prompts the long. deeply
emotional speech in which Henry grieves for the trust and
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intimacy that now seem irrevocably lost to him.24 This
episode is framed by the two scenes dealing with the death of
Falstaff. whose rejection at the end of Henry IV. Part Two is
presented by his associates as a kind of betrayal: 'The king
has killed his heart.' (II.1.88). The public role damages
rather than reflects the private man. Henry inhabits a public
realm where amity is an illusion. where he must at once suffer
and commit acts of personal disloyalty.
In the invasion scenes of the third and fourth acts. the
neo-chivalric vision is sustained chiefly in the nationalistic
and martial rhetoric of Henry and the Chorus. It presents. in
the person of the ideal king. a transformation of honour from
a reckless class-bound value rooted in individual pride into a
synthesizing function of the nation-state consonant with
piety. These two acts show us a king whose inspirational role
as commander is tempered by his pragmatism. The withdrawal to
Calais is the action of a king who combines courage with
tactical advantage:
We would not seek a battle as we are;
Nor. as we are. we say we will not shun it.
III.6.169-70.
Here. Henry represents a realistic honour. that is. one that
accepts but does not invite danger.
24.1 am indebted for my reading of Act II to Prof. Anne
BartonJs essay. 'The King Disguised: Shakespeare's Henry V and
the Comical History'. in The Triple Bond: Plays. Mainly
Shakespearean. in Performance (University Park. Penn. and
London: The Pennsylvania State Univ. Press. 1975). pp.103-104.
See also Goldman. p.64.
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The king whose graced virtues express a compromise between
God and honour further balances his role as general with that
of priest. rousing his soldiers to valiant deeds while also
fulfilling the sacramental function of affirming man's
dependence on God. The military campaign. Henry declares.
'lies all within the will of God' (1.2.289): he will deliver
'Our puissance into the hand of God' (II.2.190): and on the
march to Calais. when Gloucester fears a French attack. Henry
reassures him that 'We are in God's hand. brother. not in
theirs.' (III.6.174).
We saw in our examination of Hotspur that martial honour is
conceived of as the power of the will to outface danger. In
Henry's oration before Harfleur. this mechanism within the
self is depicted as a wilful self-transformation. from man to
tiger:
But when the blast of war blows in our ears.
Then imitate the action of the tiger:
Stiffen the sinews. conjure up the blood.
Disguise fair nature with hard-favour'd
rage;
Then lend the eye a terrible aspect;
Let it pry through the portage of the head
Like the brass cannon .... 111.1.5-11.
The rhetoric conjures up a physical metamorphosis. The
soldier becomes as fearsome as the dangers he encounters in
battle and. thus transfigured. is able to challenge adversity.
The man who 'conjures up the blood'. disguises 'fair nature'
with 'hard-favour'd rage'. and bends up 'every spirit I To his
full height' (111.1.16-17) is summoning the power within
himself to contend with danger.
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Yet Henry's appeal to honour is social rather than
competitive and individualistic. The power for valour he
invokes resides not in the superior class or individual. but
in an English nature. passed on through blood and breeding
both to Henry's nobles. whose 'blood is fet from fathers of
war -proof' (1II. 1.18) and his yeomen: 'let us swear I That you
are worth your breeding' (111.1.27-28). The oration thus
conceives of honour as originating in a kind of national
gene-pool which is derived from and recreates the natural
unity of England. This national honour does not obliterate
distinctions in rank: rather. it purports to incorporate class
chivalry into a communal endeavour. The aristocracy becomes
part of a national chivalry in which the yeoman and common
soldier share in its nobility of spirit:25
For there is none of you so mean and base
That hath not noble lustre in your eyes.
III.1.29-30.
However. for all its appeal. there is a certain tension in
this vision of national honour. Henry's nobles must teach
'men of grosser blood' how to fight (111.1.24). while the
common soldiers who have 'noble lustre' in their eyes are at
the same time 'mean and base'. It is not easy to sustain this
simultaneous reinforcement and blurring of class divisions.
and the strain in Henry's language suggests commensurate
25.See Zdenek Stribrny. 'Henry V and History'. in Shakespeare:
'Henry V'. A Casebook. ed. Michael Quinn (London: Macmillan
and Co. Ltd .. 1969). pp.174-75.
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strain in his extension of honour to the rank and file. The
effect of Henry's collective nobility is to transform his army
into a community of honourable men. in which the king himself
participates. In his rallying cry of 'dear friends' before
Harf1eur (111.1.1) and. later in the play. in his repeated
refusal of the royal prerogative of ransom. Henry presents
himself not merely as his soldiers' king. but as their
comrade. The effectiveness of this image. particularly to an
army isolated and exposed to mounting danger. should not be
underestimated.26 Yet with the second act's pessimistic
portrayal of Henry's personal relationships fresh in our
minds. we are free to sense as well both the appeal that the
idea of fellowship might hold for a man whose private self is
submerged in his royal office and the difficulty. even
impossibility. of the easy comradeship he offers.27 The
tensions apparent in the Harf1eur oration indicate that it is
with those most socially distant from him. his ordinary
soldiers. that genuine fraternity is most problematic.
There is another subtle undercurrent at work in the heroic
self-mutation imaged in the first section of the speech. As
martial rhetoric. the passage is remarkable for the contrast
it establishes between the qualities suitable to peace and
war: and the verbs 'disguise' and 'lend'. describing the
transition from the former state to the latter. portray a
26.8ee Barton. 'The King Disguised: Shakespeare's Henry V and
the Comical History'. p.104.
27.Ibid .• pp.l04-106.
126
transformation that is superficial and temporary. necessary
'when the blast of war blows in our ears'. Yet this moderate
tone is to some extent countered by the steady accretion of
physical detail. which urges the spectator to visualise the
frightening physical distortions invoked. Moreover. the
language associates honour with 'blood' and 'rage'. and with
a certain distancing of the self from nature. The line.
'Disguise fair nature with hard-favour'd rage'. expresses the
disparity between nature and honour in terms that stress the
opposition between what is kindly and humane and what is grim
and violently angry.28 It urges the unleashing of a passion
(albeit provisionally) cut loose from the restraints of
'natural' human feeling. The language of the oration
qualifies rather than subverts the heroic mood by suggesting
that if the man turned tiger becomes superhuman in courage. he
simultaneously becomes bestial in ferocity. the embodiment of
a lower passional nature untempered by human sympathy.
Accordingly. in Henry's speech to the citizens of Harfleur.
the 'enraged soldiers in their spoil' (III.3.25) are likened
to an inexorable force of elemental nature quite outside of
human control: and in Burgundy's speech in Act V. this rampant
nature is termed 'savagery' and represents the devastation
28.J.H. Walter. in The Arden Shakespeare: Kina Henry Y.
glosses 'fair nature' as 'natural kindly looks'. Ribner and
Kittredge. in The Complete Works of Shakespeare. as 'natural
humane appearance' and Dover Wilson. in Henry Y. The New
Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1947). as
'kindly feeling'. In the glossary to his edition. Dover
Wilson defines 'natur~' in this line as 'the natural feelings
of humanity' (p.196). Walter reads 'hard-favour'd' as
'grim-faced'. and C.T. Onions (A Shakespeare Glossary) glosses
'rage' as 'warlike ardour. impetuosity or fury'.
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wreaked by war eV.2.47.59). In portraying heroism and
brutality as two sides of the same coin. the play draws
attention to one possible source of conflict in the yoking
together of honour and religion.
Henry's warning to the governor of Harfleur shows him to be
quite aware of the savagery that is the dark side of honour
and of his own rhetoric. In announcing that the 'no
surrender' point in the siege has been reached and urging
capitulation.29 Henry presents a horrifyingly graphic account
of the atrocities that attend the sacking of a town. He
speaks here as a military pragmatist and formidable opponent.
but also arguably with the persuasive force that comes from an
acute sensitivity to the horrors of war - a sensitivity. and
indeed a concern with the responsibility for these horrors.
reminiscent of his speeches in the second scene.
As the French put mounting pressure on Henry's enfeebled
army. the frictions in neo-chivalry rise increasingly to the
surface. reaching near-crisis point on the eve of Agincourt.
The Chorus invites us to visualise a 'ruin'd band' (Chorus.
IV.29). comforted and emboldened by Henry's sun-like majesty:
Nor doth he dedicate one jot of colour
Unto the weary and all-watched night:
But freshly looks and overbears attaint
With cheerful semblance and sweet majesty;
That every wretch. pining and pale before.
Beholding him. plucks comfort from his looks.
29.See J.H Walter's gloss in The Arden Shakespeare; Kina
Henry V. that of Ribner and Kittredge in The Complete Works
of Shakespeare and Dover Wilson's in Henry V. The New
Shakespeare.
128
A largess universal like the sun
His liberal eye doth give to everyone.
Thawing cold fear. that mean and gentle all.
Behold. as may unworthiness define.
A little touch of Harry in the night.
Chorus. IV.37-47.
What IV.1 shows is a rather more troubling encounter between
the king. disguised as a common man. and three of his ordinary
soldiers. Williams. Bates and Court. The king-in-disguise
gives form to the monarch's dual nature. and it is the tension
inherent in this doubleness that is shown to be the source of
difficulty in Henry's relation to his men. His first speech
alerts us to his dilemma:
I think the king is but a man. as I am: the violet
smells to him as it doth to me: the element shows
to him as it doth to me. .. .Therefore when he
sees reason of fears. as we do. his fears. out of
doubt. be of the same relish as ours are: yet. in
reason. no man should possess him with any
appearance of fear. lest he. by showing it. should
dishearten his army. IV.1.101-104: 108-13.
Henry argues here for the common humanity of the king. but his
speech also informs us that although he may be a man with
private emotions. as the king. responsible for sustaining the
morale of his troops. he cannot show them. The role places
constraints on his humanity. Throughout this scene. Henry
seems to want not only loyalty to the public figure. but also
fellowship. his soldiers' recognition of him as a man like
themselves whom they can know as a private individual. This.
however. is precisely what his soldiers refuse. Henry's
attempt to assure them of the king's true attitude towards the
impending battle - 'I think he would not wish himself any
where but where he is.' (IV.l.120-21) - meets with Bates's
insistence. not on comradeship. but on the privileges of rank
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separating the king from the common soldier:
Then
sure
saved.
I would he were here alone: so should he be
to be ransomed. and a many poor men's lives
IV.l.122-24.
Henry answers with an assertion of solidarity:
methinks I could not die any where so contented as
in the king's company. his cause being just and
his quarrel honourable. IV.l.127-29.
To which Williams replies. 'That's more than we know.'
(IV.l.130). Fellowship thus turns out to depend on a
knowledge unavailable to ordinary men. cut off from the
circles of power where political decisions are made. They do
not know what lies behind the public pronouncements: they know
only that they are the king's subjects and owe him obedience.
Responsibility for the justice of the cause resides with the
king alone.
Henry's meeting with his soldiers illuminates an
alternative version of the relationship between subject and
monarch which touches on what we suspect is a raw nerve: the
guilt attaching to the instigator of an unjust war. Williams
draws a disturbing picture of the 'heavy reckoning' Henry will
have to make 'if the cause be not good' (IV.1.135-36) - a
reckoning to which he gives a transcendent dimension:
when all those legs
off in a battle. shall
day. and cry all. "We
swearing. some crying
their wives left poor
debts they owe. some
left. IV.1.136-43.
and arms and heads. chopped
J01n together at the latter
died at such a place": some
for a surgeon. some upon
behind them. some upon the
upon their children rawly
This ultimate perspective brings to the surface a radical
questioning of the moral status of war which has hitherto
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simmered under the play's heroic vision. Williams fears that
few men die a Christian death in battle. 'for how can they
charitably dispose of any thing when blood is their argument?'
(IV.1.144-46). If the nature of war inhibits 'dying well'. it
will be a 'black matter' (IV.1.147) for the king who leads his
obedient subjects into the battlefield.
What is immediately striking about Henry's long and
eloquent rejoinder is that it does not address the question of
the justice of his cause. which simply slips out of sight.
Instead. he takes up the charge that he is responsible for the
fate of his soldiers' souls. but in a mannner that turns the
argument away from the impiety of death in battle to
individual sinfulness. The central assumption underlying
Henry's speech is that sin is coextensive with life. and that
it is the atonement one makes for these sins before death that
determines whether one is saved or damned. This assumption is
incorporated into two scenarios. both of which absolve the
'master' of blame should his 'servant' die unprepared. The
analogy of service with which Henry begins presents the deaths
of the son and servant as the inadvertent outcome of their
duties. for which the father and master cannot be held
responsible. Henry then adds the king to this list: none of
them purpose their servants' deaths 'when they purpose their
services.' (IV.l.162-63). The appeal to intention. while
sound enough in respect of the father and master. seems a
curious justification to be deployed by a king and general.
who may not intend his soldiers to die. but knows when he
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purposes their services that some (perhaps many) of them will.
Given the extremity of the danger facing Henry's men. his
analogy seems at the very least strained.
Henry then extends the idea of individual sin to the
criminal elements present in every army - the robbers and
murderers whose deaths in battle represent a just retribution.
War is thus transformed from an arena of hatred and carnage
into an execution chamber of God's justice: 'war is his
beadle. war is his vengeance .... ' (IV.1.174-75). Again.
Henry puts forward a case in which the king is clearly not
guilty of his soldiers' damnation. but which has only a
limited applicability to his own situation. Criminal soldiers
are a very special case and not at all representative of the
men who comprise his army.
The king's insistence on preparation for death. his
perception of a man's soul as constituted not by a battle, but
·by his whole life. offers a counter-truth to Williams's cogent
critique of war and permits Henry to assume his priestly role:
'Therefore should every soldier in the wars do as every sick
man in his bed. wash every mote out of his conscience'
(IV.1.184-86). Moreover. the arguments he uses to dissociate
himself from this version of the private relationship between
the subject and his soul are hard to fault on strictly logical
grounds. If they remain unsatisfying, it is perhaps because
they obscure the plight of the ordinarily sinful men risking
their lives on his behalf. It may well be that the king, as
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such. cannot respond in human terms to their predicament. If
so. this merely serves to demonstrate that the perspectives of
king and subject are logically incompatible. and that the
dream of a comradeship of honour cannot be realised.
Be that as it may. when Williams declares that the justice
of the king's cause is 'more than we know'. he speaks for many
in the audience as well. Henry's silence on this matter
revives suspicion that he may be evading a major source of
disquiet. and it leaves unanswered our questions about the
legality of the war and the king's private motives.30 Coupled
with the obvious rhetorical sophistication with which he
defends his position. Henry's reticence exposes the facility
of his professions of fellowship. for it shows us. the
audience. that his private self is finally not available for
his subjects' or our own scrutiny.
Henry's arguments convince his men; even Williams concurs
that 'the king is not to answer' the particular endings of his
soldiers (IV.l.194). However. their expression of loyalty
clearly does not satisfy Henry. for he seeks at this point to
reaffirm fellowship: 'I myself heard the king say he would not
be ransomed.' (IV.l.197-98). Henry wants an acknowledgement
of the unity of man and public role. yet once again encounters
scepticism:
Ay. he said so. to make us fight cheerfully; but
when our throats are cut. he may be ransomed. and
30.See Barton. 'The King Disguised: Shakespeare's Henry V and
the Comical History'. pp.100.102.
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we ne'er the wiser. IV.l.199-201.
Williams sees the role not as an honest reflection of the
private man. but as a politically useful performance. and he
mocks Henry's suggestion that the king can be called to
account by his lowly subject should he fail to keep his word:
That's a perilous shot out of an elder-gun. that a
poor and a private displeasure can do against a
monarch. IV.l.203-20s.
This final insistence on the distance separating the powerless
commoner from the king provokes a quarrel between Henry and
one of his 'brothers' in arms.
After the battle. Williams learns from Henry that it 'was
ourself thou didst abuse.' (IV.8.s0). He receives both a
royal pardon and reward. but Henry's magnanimity has on this
occasion to share the stage with Williams's trenchant defence:
Your majesty came not like yourself: you appeared
to me but as a common man. and what your
highness suffered under that shape. I beseech you.
take it for your own fault and not mine ..
IV.8.s1-s2:s3-s6.
Williams's plea drives home the point that Henry cannot be
both a king and a man to his soldiers. cannot claim both their
loyalty and their comradeship. However sincere his desire to
befriend them. his conduct towards them on the eve of
Agincourt demonstrates at the same time that even when
disguised the role isolates him from other men.
Henry's encounter with his soldiers prompts his only
soliloquy. That the encounter has left him uneasy is clear
enough. for the speech deals with the burden of royal
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responsibility. the 'condition' of greatness (IV.l.239). The
opening lines. which echo Williams's portrayal of the 'heavy
reckoning' to be made by a king with an unjust cause. show
that the question left unanswered did not go unnoticed:
Upon the king! let us our lives. our souls.
Our debts. our careful wives.
Our children. and our sins lay on the king!
We must bear all. IV.l.236-39.
It is in a mood at once weary and bitter that Henry enumerates
the responsibilities that have been laid on his shoulders and
goes on to consider his role as monarch. the public office
which deprives him of private ease and pleasure. giving in
return only 'ceremony'. These attributes of his majesty Henry
holds at arm's length and systematically demystifies. The
ideal corporate identity which a man assumes when he ascends
the throne may be worshipped as a god. but it does not raise
the mere mortal who embodies it above the fears and
infirmities of his human condition. Behind the symbols of the
immortal body politic there is a human being unable either to
achieve unity with the role or to separate himself from it.
Kingship alters a man's being because it sunders the natural
self irrevocably from the unremarkable felicities of natural
time which even the 'wretched slave' enjoys:
next day after dawn.
Doth rise and help Hyperion to his horse.
And follows so the ever-running year
With profitable labour to his grave ...
IV.l.280-83.
In Henry's soliloquy. royalty does not absorb and enlarge the
man's 'natural' energies and talents. The needs of the
natural self and the demands of his public destiny are at
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odds. The king who steps back from his glamorous office and
'finds' ceremony 'a proud dream' (IV.l.265.263) is no Richard
II. convinced of the magical properties of his sacred name.31
But he is no Richard III either. glorying in his manipulative
skills. For Henry. the role is something that he must play.
but the exhaustion and resentment that fill his lines make us
see this performance not as simple Machiavellian detachment.
but as the effort of a man. isolated from other men. who must
strain to inhabit historical time and carry the burden of a
collective persona. This need not mean that the role. in its
contradictory claims. does not exact a moral price: but it
does mean that it also exacts a heavy psychological and
emotional one.
This recognition of the impossibility of unity between
self and role leads on. in the prayer that follows. to a
recognition of the uncertain alliance between his authority
and its divine sanction:
Not to-day. 0 LordI
o not to-day. think not upon the fault
My father made in compassing the crown!
IV.1.298-300.
A soliloquy is no guarantee of sincerity: and one may feel
disinclined to take wholly for granted the quality of a
religious feeling that emerges at a moment of crisis.
However. the prayer tells us not only that Henry regards the
guilt of the past - of the deposition and murder of an
anointed king - as part of his inheritance. but also that he
31.See Rabkin. Shakespeare and the Problem of Meanini. p.47.
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has all along been attempting to atone for it through acts of
contrition. The sin. however. has not been expiated. It
hangs over him still. making his 'relationship' with God
intensely problematic. In his position. he cannot assume that
his title is divinely countenanced. The prayer suggests the
depth of Henry's piety; he clearly states that the outcome of
the approaching conflict is ultimately in God's hands. But of
divine favour in that battle he cannot be certain. Moreover.
although he rehearses his acts of atonement. he shows no faith
in the efficacy of his own efforts:32
More will I do;
Though all that I can do is nothing worth.
Since that my penitence comes after all.
Imploring pardon. IV.1.308-11.
In these lines. Henry distinguishes between good works and
grace. assuming not their collaboration. but his absolute
dependence on the divine pardon he here implores. The line.
'all that I can do is nothing worth'. seems resonant with the
conviction of human insufficiency. and displays a piety that
is not of the middle-of-the-road chivalric variety. Instead
of a king touched by grace. embodying the harmonious
interaction between man and God. we see a king with an
insecure title. filled with a sense of unworthiness. We
perceive a tension between the severity of Henry's private
piety and the necessary confidence in human powers of his
public generalship.
32.In a well-known essay. Una Ellis-Fermor sees Henry's prayer
as an attempt to 'bargain with God like a pedlar'. See ~
Frpntiers of Drama (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .• 1945). p.47.
However. she does not consider the significance of the final
lines of the speech.
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On the eve of Agincourt. the entire neo-chivalric structure
teeters on the brink of collapse. We have witnessed a
progressive questioning of the play's syncretic vision.
culminating in the quasi-Calvinistic rigour of Henry's prayer.
Given these conflicts and the distress that Henry's one moment
of dramatic solitude calls forth. it is difficult not to feel
a corresponding strain in the public performance of the St.
Crispin oration that follows it.33
The oration represents Henry's most rousing appeal to
honour. As in the speech before Harfleur. it is measured by
the danger a man is able to endure. The army must not wish
for reinforcements. because the greater the peril each soldier
faces. the greater his share of honour. The lines make clear
that the honour of which the king speaks is an internal rather
than an external quality:
By Jove. I am not covetous for gold.
Nor care I who doth feed upon my cost;
It earns me not if men my garments wear:
Such outward things dwell not in my desires:
But if it be a sin to covet honour.
I am the most offending soul alive. IV.3.24-29.
The honour that Henry 'covets' refers only indirectly to
social esteem and explicitly to the inner worth that manifests
itself in honourable deeds. What he desires is the chance to
demonstrate his inherent capacity for virtue. understood as
valiant deeds performed in the face of danger and death.
33.For an interesting reading of the St. Crispin oration. see
Goldman. pp.70-71.
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After his prayer. it is hard not to construe this as image-
projection rather than self-expression. Henry skilfully
deploys the interdependence of honour and danger to present
a struggle against insurmountable odds as an opportunity to
reveal one's intrinsic worth. seeking to inspire his troops
with the example of his own ardour. Yet the speech itself is
not only negatively. or reactively. affected by the prayer
that precedes it. Its appeal to a secular morality that
assumes the natural capacity for virtue is couched in
theological terms that call it into question: if it is a sin
to covet honour. Henry is the most offending soul alive. This
is curious language for a martial address. and it may be
possible to detect. in Henry's ostensible rejection of this
doctrinal position. an underlying lack of conviction in the
individual pride he here affirms.
The fervent honour Henry recommends. although reminiscent
of Hotspur. is again enlarged into the collective courage of
a group of individuals bound together by shared danger - the
solidarity which the king calls 'fellowship' (IV.3.39). This
community of honourable men Henry portrays as participants in
an event of historical moment. By naming the day of the
battle. he endows it with historical significance. making the
feast of Crispian an occasion of personal and national
commemoration. In his evocation of the soldier standing
'a tip-toe when this day is name'd' (IV.3.42). feasting his
neighbours and showing them his scars. memory is the seat of
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self-respect in a social setting. The exploits of war turn
into the narrative of peace. Moreover. these individual
memories. transmitted from one generation to the next - 'This
story shall the good man teach his son' (IV.3.56) - blend into
the collective memory of the nation.
This emotionally charged vision of communal virtue. mutual
dependence and national renown rises to the climactic coda:
We few. we happy few. we band of brothers:
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother: be he ne'er so vile
This day shall gentle his condition ....
IV.3.60-63.
This is Henry's warmest expression of fellowship and
collective honour. yet the events of the night make it
impossible for us to measure accurately or conclusively the
personal conviction which underlies it. It may articulate his
wish to find in his corporate identity as king a genuine
community of interests. or it may be part of the public
performance. the calculated effort to sustain his soldiers'
morale.
Certainly. the play makes it plain that Henry cannot
ultimately reconcile his piety with the social and secular
morality he invokes to such dazzling effect. For when the
battle is over and the seemingly impossible discrepancy in the
English and French death tolls is presented - an impossibility
that according to the terms of the St. Crispin speech should
redound to the honour of Henry's soldiers - the king ascribes
the victory exclusively to God: 'Praised be God, and not our
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strength. for it!' (IV.7.S9). This is insisted upon:
o God. thy arm was here:
And not to us. but to thy arm alone.
Ascribe we all! IV.S.10S-10.
Finally. we hear the startling pronouncement:
And be it death proclaimed through our host
To boast of this or take that praise from God
Which is his only. IV.S.116-1S.
It is clearly impossible to interpret these declarations as
expressing a neo-chivalric compromise theology. for they in
effect deny that natural ability played any part in the
victory. Henry's prayer militates against seeing this
self-effacing piety as a simple instance of role-playing. Yet
his response to the resounding English win. although to some
extent prepared for. still takes one aback. Indeed. the play
calls attention to the vehemence of Henry's religious feeling.
His proclamation of death elicits an incredulous response.
even from the loyal Fluellen:
Is it not lawful. an please your majesty. to tell
how many is killed? IV.8.119-20.
Henry consents. but with a proviso: 'but with this
acknowledgement. / That God fought for us.' (IV.8.121-22).
The battle is framed by two emphatic statements of the
inadeqaucy of natural virtue. Yet we are prevented.
particularly after the event. from giving this perspective our
conclusive assent.
After Agincourt. Henry insists that it is indeed a sin to
covet honour. The play leaves us free to ascribe his
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astonishing success to his own formidable morale-boosting
powers. or even to the ruthless pragmatism with which he
commands each soldier to 'kill his prisoners' (IV.6.37) as the
French forces mass for a second attack.34 But Henry presents
it as an act of grace - a miracle proclaiming the divine
favour for which he had hardly dared hope before the battle.
The victory is God's judgement on a dynasty. a forgiveness of
past sin denoting grace rather than human strength. We can
recognise that this public expression of his private piety is
politically useful for Henry - after all. it consolidates the
legitimacy of his rule - without casting doubt on its
sincerity. Yet paradoxically. the triumph that appears to
unite secular leadership to its divine sanction sees God and
honour fall apart. The penitent son of a usurper cannot
finally reconcile what he owes to his subjects with what he
feels he owes to God. The conflict between his secular and
priestly functions resurfaces in the Chorus to Act V. where
Henry. 'free from vainness and self-glorious pride' (Chorus.
V.20). forbids a triumphal entry into London. only to find
that its citizens have crowded the streets to 'fetch their
conqu'ring Caesar in' (Chorus. V.28).
By the close of Act IV. the neo-chivalric synthesis appears
too simple to accommodate the complexities either of history
or of kingship. The play sustains our awareness. both through
Henry's prayer and through its ambiguous presentation of his
34.See Gary Taylor. 'Introduction'. Henry V. The Oxford
Shakespeare. pp.32-34.
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cause and motives. of the pressures which the past exerts on
the present. Political expediency is an aspect of rule that
we are not permitted to discount. and the shadow it casts
across the play. along with the suggestions of Henry's own
anxieties. qualifies the uncritical celebration of national
unity by encouraging consideration of its moral cost.
Throughout the play. the simple epic perspective on Henry
offered by the Chorus before each act is accompanied by a
relentless exploration of the complex price the man pays for
the role which makes us feel his greatness less as an heroic
unity of man and function than as an ability to carry a burden
of almost tragic dimensions. The play ends in courtship and
marriage. but even its engaging comic resolution depends in
part on the difficulties which a private declaration of love
creates for a king embarking on a dynastic union: 'Give me
your answer; i' faith. do: and so clap hands and a bargain.'
(V.2.130-31).35 And of course. the Epilogue. with its bleak
reminder of impending civil war. undercuts the promise of
future harmony. The play's simultaneous affirmation and
interrogation of ideal unity serves to expose the inadequacy
of the two central tenets of neo-chivalric honour. The
national chivalry promised by a monarch whose private self
must perforce remain hidden behind the mask of kingship is a
community of honour in which we can never wholly believe.
while the stubborn tensions of the historical past are shown
to generate a self-deprecating royal piety that denies the
35.See Barton. 'The King Disguised: Shakespeare's Henry y and
the Comical History'. pp.l06-107. and Goldman. pp.72-73.
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collaboration of nature and grace.
*****.*******.****.
Ulysses's 'degree' speech in the Greek council scene of
Troilus and Cressida shares with the 'honeybees' speech of
Henry V the idea that social harmony derives from conformity
with a universal order encoded in nature. The hive image
reappears. identifying as 'natural' the single authority which
unifies society's disparate functions:
When that the general is not like the hive
To whom the foragers shall all repair.
What honey is expected? 1.3.81-83.36
Yet the 'degree' speech extends this syncretic vision beyond
the terms of the 'honeybees' speech by justifying sovereign
power specifically on the grounds of the universal principle
of hierarchy:
The heavens themselves. the planets. and this
centre
Observe degree. priority. and place.
Insisture. course. proportion. season. form.
Office. and custom. in all line of order.
And therefore is the glorious planet Sol
In noble eminence enthron'd and spher'd
Amidst the other. . 1.3.85 -91.
Moreover. although Henry V calls attention to the problems
that undermine the neo-chivalric interpretation of English
history. Troilus and Cressida exposes Ulysses's stronger
version of chivalric unity to the charge of unreality and
failure. He presents it as an ideal that has collapsed in the
36.All quotations are from The Arden Shakespeare: Troilus and
Cressida. ed. Kenneth Palmer (London and New York: Methuen and
Co. Ltd .• 1982).
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Greek camp. It has been subverted by the 'external' honour -
the public esteem and 'honours' - that. in crowning Achilles
with 'an imperial voice' (1.3.187). has challenged the
authority that is the keystone of degree. and turned
singleness of purpose into its antithesis: the inactivity born
of 'so many hollow factions' (1.3.80). By claiming that
public honour disrupts rather than consolidates universal
order. the Greek council scene appears to question not simply
the survival of chivalric unification in the world of the
play. but the very terms which define it.
To discuss the Greek council at the level of ideas is not.
of course. to imply that it is undramatic. In drama. ideas
are not merely defined. but used. and are continually
qualified or undercut by the interactive psychological motives
of the speakers. Thus Agamemnon's and Nestor's defence of
constancy can be seen. in the dramatic context. as
rationalisations of inactivity; and Ulysses's justification of
authority as a manipulative device for rousing the Greeks from
their torpor. If. in what follows. I attend to the
intellectual content of what is said. I do so on the
assumption that the ideas themselves are self-defeating. and
that the dramatic irony is reinforced by an intellectual
irony.
The 'degree' speech identifies moral superiority as the
theoretical justification of hierarchy. Degree is a social
order that establishes an equivalence between moral and social
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eminence:
Degree being vizarded.
Th'unworthiest shows as fairly in the mask.
1.3.83-84.
Hierarchy objectifies moral worth; the better the man. the
higher his position on the social ladder. The 'degree' speech
is full of the language of inherent superiority: the planet
Sol is 'enthron'd' due to its 'noble eminence' (1.3.90);
degree permits 'age. crowns. sceptres. laurels' to 'stand in
authentic place' (1.3.107-108). If the speech stresses the
paramount position of the king as the pinnacle of virtue.
degree emerges equally as the organising principle of society.
It forms the basis of a social order reflective of moral
order. in which each man knows his place and treats his
superiors with due respect. Degree. therefore. is put forward
as the antithesis of individualism. Ulysses's vision of the
disorder that follows the collapse of degree evokes a world in
which power has no other basis than the individual will driven
by appetite:
Then everything includes itself in power.
Power into will. will into appetite.
And appetite. an universal wolf.
So doubly seconded with will and power.
Must make perforce an universal prey.
And last eat up himself. 1.3.119-24.
In overturning the social hierarchy, public honour produces
a society dominated by individualism. Public honour as it
functions in the Greek camp is presented as a form of
idolatry:
They were us'd to bend.
To send their smiles before them to Achilles.
To come as humbly as they use to creep
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To holy altars. 111.3.71-74.
The champion's deeds inspire hero-worship. which in turn
generates pride: the conviction of supremacy that leads
Achilles to slight his superiors and separate himself from his
fellows:
The great Achilles. whom op1n1on crowns
The sinew and the forehand of our host.
Having his ear full of his airy fame.
Grows dainty of his worth. and in his tent
Lies mocking our designs. . .. 1.3.142-46.
As others are infected by his example. social order gives way
to emulation. hierarchy to mutual rivalry and self-assertion:
The general's disdain'd
By him one step below. he by the next.
The next by him beneath: so every step.
Exampled by the first pace that is sick
Of his superior. grows to an envious fever
Of pale and bloodless emulation. 1.3.129-34.
The language portrays this inversion of the hierarchical
ladder as a form of sickness; the infringement of natural
order in the competition for power reflects not healthy
vigour. but an enervating disease that saps morale and
results in prostration.
The equation of moral worth and social prominence is the
traditional basis not only of monarchy. but also of the
aristocratic principle. which defines the nobility's status in
terms of the moral superiority which ordains them to defend
society and merit its rewards. These two levels. of social
obligation and social reward. constitute the two meanings of
'honour': the nobleman's performance of virtuous deeds and the
respect that society bestows on those deeds.
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The Greek council scene accordingly elaborates a theory
of honour. or aristocratic virtue. alongside its presentation
of hierarchical order. In Agamemnon's and Nestor's opening
speeches. honour is conceived of as constancy. as the will to
remain loyal to one's aims in the face of adversity:
Why then. you princes.
Do you with cheeks abash'd behold our works.
And call them shames which are indeed naught else
But the protractive trials of great Jove
To find persistive constancy in men.
The fineness of which metal is not found
In fortune's love? 1.3.17-23.
The role of fortune in this idea of virtue stresses that it is
in the encounter with adversity that inherent worth is
revealed:
For then the bold and coward.
The wise and fool. the artist and unread.
The hard and soft. seem all affin'd and kin:
But in the wind and tempest of her frown.
Distinction. with a broad and powerful fan
Puffing at all. winnows the light away.
And what hath mass or matter by itself
Lies rich in virtue and unmingled. 1.3.23-30.
Misfortune distinguishes between men: it separates the
constant from the inconstant. the exceptional from the
ordinary. The great emerge as such through trial. revealing
an inner stability that is not prey to natural impulses of
fear and self-preservation:
but when the splitting wind
Makes flexible the knees of knotted oaks.
And flies flee under shade. why then the thing of
courage.
As rous'd with rage. with rage doth sympathize.
And. with an accent tun'd in self-same key.
Retires to chiding fortune. 1.3.49-54.
Nestor evokes a contest with adversity which sees 'the thing
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of courage' oppose his will to the 'storms of fortune'
(1.3.47). The strength of will that sets the hero apart from
his moral subordinates derives not from self-conquest. but
from self-assertion.
Agamemnon's and Nestor's speeches thus portray honour in
terms of the moral superiority that lies at the heart of the
'degree' speech. Honour is depicted as an instance of
individual excellence that is rooted in a self-assertive
impulse and claims a 'distinction' that is necessarily
relative - not just superiority. but superiority over others.
Agamemnon and Nestor are appealing to the Greek princes for
collective constancy. But their speeches simultaneously
expose the competitive individualism inherent in honour which
undermines the communal effort to virtue by encouraging the
individual pursuit of distinction. The Greek warriors become
a collection of individuals competing for the prize of virtue
where the success of one presupposes the failure of many. By
illuminating the tensions at work in an honour culture. the
speeches identify the Greek camp as prone to pride and
emulation.
Moreover. the moral implications of these speeches extend
beyond honour to degree itself. for the idea of virtue as the
inherent moral superiority that forms the basis of hierarchy
promotes the individualism that the 'degree' speech has
denounced as destructive of hierarchical order. This
confusion is compounded when one considers the relation
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between the individual honour recommended by Agamemnon and
Nestor and the public honour that rewards it. Again. it is
clear that this relationship is fundamental to chivalric
social order. for public honour grants moral superiority
a commensurate social dimension. thereby implementing the
essential premise of degree. However. it is also clear that
an ethic of the superior inJividua1 fosters 'idolatry'.
subverting the authority fundamental to degree.
Thus. honour in the Greek camp seems at once an expression
of traditional chivalry and the manifestation of its opposite.
The heroic ethic clearly grows out of degree. for the honour
of the nobleman consists in the individual excellence which is
acknowledged by public honour. the social equivalence of his
superiority. Yet it is equally clear that the concept of
honour as moral pre-eminence foments competitive
self-assertion and precludes stratification and obedience. for
where the exaltation of one involves the diminishment of
another. each man is necessarily 'sick' of his superior.37
The worship of the hero who has proven his supremacy elevates
him above authority's imperial voice. swelling his self-esteem
and aggravating emulation. the envy of the rivals belittled by
his greatness.
37.For an interesting analysis of emulation in the Greek camp
as an instance of 'mimetic desire'. see Rene Girard. 'The
Politics of Desire in Troilus and Cressida'. in Shakespeare
and the Question of Theory. eds. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey
Hartman (New York and London: Methuen. 1985). pp.201-209.
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If the heroic ethic is both the reflection and the
antithesis of degree. then orthodox chivalry emerges from the
Greek council scene as a form of social and moral order that
undoes itself. Thus. the situation in the Greek camp is not.
as first appears. that honour has generated a gap between the
ideal and the real. It is rather that the ideal produces the
real; degree is neglected in the Greek camp. but it is degree
which fosters the heroic ethic that ensures its collapse. The
Greek council scene therefore dramatises a situation which
prohibits moral and social order. It presents both degree and
its contrary and. by establishing the subtle interplay between
the two. reveals social stability and individual virtue to be
logical impossibilities. The play's portrayal of the Greeks
focusses on the decline of a society whose moral and social
construct leads inexorably to moral and social collapse.
At this point. it is necessary to devote a few words to
Agamemnon. The degree speech makes it abundantly clear that
hierarchy only functions through the strong leadership that
enforces obedience. In the case of the Greeks. such
leadership is conspicuously absent. and the play employs
Agamemnon's mode of speech to stress his inadequacy. His
speech on aristocratic virtue is full of such features of the
'high style' as doublings ('tortive and errant'. 'bias and
thwart') and obscure Latinate diction ('conflux'. 'tortive'.
'errant') which. coupled with sententiae and lengthy, tortuous
similitudes -
As knots, by the conflux of meeting sap,
Infects the sound pine and diverts his grain
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Tortive and errant from his course of growth.
1.3.7-9. -
contrive to make his formal style sound pompous rather than
dignified.38 His language suggests a leader whose claims
to authority are as pretentious as his rhetoric. a general who
is not at one with his public role. The later account of
Patroclus's portrayal of Agamemnon as a ham actor (1.3.151-61)
only reinforces this. The brisk. efficient verse of the
'degree' speech that immediately follows Agamemnon's
exhortation serves. as we shall suggest. to identify Ulysses
as the real leader of the Greek forces.
Analysis of the ideological content of the Greek council
has shown that the relationship between hierarchy and honour
assumes a collusion of degree and individualism. This
relationship itself exhibits the discrepancy between
profession and practice in the Greek camp: Agamemnon and
Nestor condemn emulation and give their assent to Ulysses's
diagnosis of Greek demoralisation. while their own speeches on
honour clearly encourage unbridled self-assertion. This
gulf between what the Greek leaders think they are saying and
what they are actually saying betrays a confusion born of a
moral language that operates on two levels. one explicit and
38.For this account of the stylistic quality of Agamemnon's
speech on virtue. 1 am indebted to Derek Traversi. An Approach
to Shakespeare (London. Sydney and Toronto: Hollis and Carter.
1969). 11.38. For the linguistic features of the 'high
style'. see S.S. Hussey. The Literary Laniuaie of Shakespeare
(London and New York: Longman. 1982). pp.SS-56. 162-63. See
also T.P. McAlindon. 'Language. Style and Meaning in Troilus
and Cressida'. fMLA. 84 (1969). pp.3S-36.
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the other implicit. This duality of degree is manifested most
clearly in Ulysses's account of Greek disorder. The 'degree'
speech and the description of Achilles's pride simultaneously
condemn individualism and provoke competitive fury by
reminding the Greek generals of their champion's contempt for
their authority. This instance is of particular interest. for
Ulysses's detailed representations of Patroc1us's 'pageants'
of the Greek leaders show the language of degree sliding
naturally into the language of emulous rivalry. as Ulysses
tells the generals. 'Look how that man despises us'. That
Ulysses can use the language of moral order to foment
emulation indicates that the former involves the latter.
At this point. it must be stressed that Ulysses. unlike
Agamemnon and Nestor. is fully conscious of the double
significance of his speech. As his plot will subsequently
make clear. he deliberately exploits the relationship between
degree and competitive rivalry. Thus. the play reveals the
situation in the Greek camp as one ripe for policy. for if the
moral language contains its opposite. then the politician can
use the language of moral 'truth' to further po1icy.39
Ulysses's scheme aims to reactivate Achilles in order to
defeat Troy once and for all; he will try to replace the pride
that generates inactivity with the restless urgency of
39.It is a commonplace of Trgi1us and Cressida criticism that
the means Ulysses employs to spur Achilles to action represent
a contravention of the ethical terms of the 'degree' speech.
See. for example. L.C. Knights. Some Shakespearean Themes
(London: Chatto and Windus. 1959). p.69.
153
emulation. but in such a way as to secure the backing of moral
authority. The 'degree' speech. then. is ultimately a tool of
policy: the politician. for whom the ends justify the means.
for whom pride is an evil not because it subverts order. but
because it is inactive. alone stands outside of the social
disharmony of the Greek camp. separated from it by the
lucidity of sophisticated manipulation.
The play gives the Trojans. like the Greeks. a scene which
establishes their dominant cultural values. Moreover. the
Trojan council scene (rr.2) exhibits a similar subversion of
moral 'truth' in favour of an individualistic honour.
However. unlike the Greek council. the Trojan debate does not
expose a covert alliance between the moral concept and its
opposite. The debate form itself stresses not the
co-operation. but the antagonism of the two points of view
expressed. Consequently. the position held by Hector in the
discussion has a special status in the play. His moral
'truth' stands apart as the play's sole genuine affirmation of
virtue. Yet here. too. though for reasons different to those
demonstrated in the Greek council. virtue is shown ultimately
to be thwarted.
The question debated in the Trojan council is whether or
not it is right to keep Helen. Hector answers in the
negative. on two grounds: that Helen is not worth what it
costs to defend her. and that her abduction represents a
violation of natural law. Throughout the scene. Hector's
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position is depicted as rational and objective. He is shown
to believe that there is a general standard of right and
wrong. intelligible to rational enquiry and enshrined in law.
and that value is more than the projection of individual will.
residing also in things as they exist independently of a man's
private desire.
Troilus. on the other hand. replies affirmatively to the
question. on the grounds that it is dishonourable to let Helen
go. When. in response to Hector's assertion that Helen 'is
not worth what she doth cost the keeping' (11.2.52). Troilus
asks. 'What's aught but as 'tis valued?' (11.2.53). the debate
emerges clearly as a confrontation between Hector's rational
objectivism and Troilus's subjective honour. In the speech
that follows. Troilus attempts to deal with the problem of
value. He begins by acknowledging the difficulty of making
an objective assessment of another's worth: if the senses are
skilled navigators. yet the shores between will and judgement
remain 'dangerous' (11.2.64-66). Honour. however. demands
that the subject remain constant to the object of his choice
even if the will should later 'distaste what it elected'
(11.2.67). But later in the same speech. Troilus identifies
honour not with fidelity to the object of choice regardless
of its value. but with fidelity to one's original appraisal
of value: the Trojans decided to 'do some vengeance on the
Greeks' (11.2.74). and declared their prize to be
"'Inestimablel '" (11.2.89); they cannot now change their
minds without proving more inconstant than fortune:
155
why do you now
The issue of your proper wisdoms rate.
And do a deed that never Fortune did -
Beggar the estimation which you priz'd
Richer than sea and land? II.2.89-93.
Troilus's honour. then. turns out to involve an idea of
subjective constancy to one's original perception of merit.
It makes the value the subject places on the object the only
measure of its worth; there is no recognition of value
independent of the valuer. and no standard of right and wrong
independent of the agent. The debate makes clear that for
Troilus this formulation of honour constitutes the foundation
of moral order. As in the Greek council. constancy is
conceived of as the mechanism for virtue within the self. It
becomes the means whereby the individual creates stability
against the random fluctuations of fortune. As such. it
offers a defence against relativism. for to remain loyal to
one's estimation of value is to maintain its truth. its status
as 'knowledge'. Constancy's role as the anchor of virtue is
guaranteed by courage. for fear makes a man the plaything of
his impulses. Thus. Troilus dismisses reason. which considers
the ethical context of action. as the rationalisation of
cowardice and self-interest:
You know an enemy intends you harm.
You know a sword employ'd is perilous.
And reason flies the object of all harm .
. . Nay. if we talk of reason.
Let's shut our gates and sleep: manhood and honour
Should have hare hearts. would they but fat their
thoughts
With this cramm'd reason. . .. II.2.39-41:46-49.
As the keystone of virtue, honour assumes the status of an
156
absolute: it is 'infinite' and 'past-proportion' (11.2.29).
However. if Troilus's honour is portrayed as aspiring to
moral legitimacy. Hector's arguments effectively demolish
subjective constancy's claims to virtue. Honour is identified
not as a moral concept. but as 'mad idolatry' (11.2.57).
Hector insists that 'value dwells not in particular will'
(11.2.54). that it must also be the property of what one
values. To make value merely subjective means imputing merit
to what one desires because one desires it:
And the will dotes that is attributive
To what infectiously itself affects.
Without some image of th'affected merit.
11.2.59-61.
Underneath Troilus's subjectivism lurks appetite. so that
constancy to one's original choice is nothing more than
constancy to one's own appetite.
How telling Hector's diagnosis is should be plain to the
audience. which recognises in Troilus's ardent defence of
Helen the voice of the man sexually obsessed with Cressida.
and who has every reason to wish to see a romantic. as opposed
to a realist. ethic prevail. However. as in my discussion of
the Greek council. the contradiction of the ideas expressed by
Troilus can also be seen at work in the ideas themselves.
Ignoring the ~ cause of the abduction of Helen. Paris's
infatuation with and seduction of the beautiful Spartan queen.
Troilus foregrounds the decision to avenge Hercules's
abduction of Hesione that prompted the Trojan expedition to
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Greece. Yet by highlighting honour as the motive that
subsequently led the Trojans to countenance the rape of Helen
as a vindication of the collective prestige damaged by the
rape of Hesione. Troilus merely exposes the affinity between
honour and sensuality. as Hector makes plain:
for pleasure and revenge
Have ears more deaf than adders to the voice
Of any true decision. 11.2.172-74.
Hector identifies both motives as blind passions. colluding
through 'affection' (11.2.178) and the 'partial indulgence' of
'benumbed wills' (II.2.179-80) in an abduction that violates
the natural law determining the husband's claim upon his wife.
If the 'moral laws / Of nature and of nations' (Il.2.185-86)
demand Helen's return. then the Trojan honour that insists on
keeping her does not extenuate but merely compounds the error.
Whether collective or individual. honour is more than
constancy to appetite. It is appetite itself. a passion for
one's moral and social standing that acts in contravention of
moral law. This places Troilus's rejection of reason in a
very different light: one repudiates reason as cowardice in
order to invalidate any argument that inhibits the
gratification of desire. Fidelity to Helen becomes the means
whereby one indulges one's appetite for greatness:
She is a theme of honour and renown.
A spur to valiant and magnanimous deeds.
Whose present courage may beat down our foes.
And fame in time to come canonize us ....
11.2.200-203.
The self-contradictory nature of the honour Troilus
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advocates is clear. He presents it as the power for virtue
within the individual will. But the Trojan debate shows this
energy for good to be involved in a self-assertive passion
that flouts such morally authoritative faculties as reason and
law. In Hector's speeches. law. natural and positive. emerges
as the authentic basis of moral order. in that it offers an
ethical framework for action and places a curb on individual
excesses. the 'raging appetites that are I Most disobedient
and refractory.' (11.2.182-83). Without such a stabilising
framework. honour is self-defeating: the will to virtue
collapses into egoism.
The Trojan debate dramatises a conflict of styles as well
as a conflict of ideas. Both brothers adopt a clear and
emphatic mode of expression appropriate to the debate form.
But in Troilus's case. the presentation of argument coexists
with a particular kind of rhetoric. His opening speech on
honour takes the form of an extended question; it develops.
through a series of consecutive clauses that intensify rather
than elucidate. to a climactic repudiation of Hector's
position:
Will you with counters sum
The past-proportion of his infinite.
And buckle in a waist most fathomless
With spans and inches so diminutive
As fears and reasons? Fie for godly shamel
II.2.28-32.
This is an emotive rhetoric that seeks to discredit not by
giving reasons. but through assertion and emphasis. The
style is that of the subjectivist who deals in distaste and
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contempt. In Troilus's lengthy speech on knowledge and value.
the same stylistic subjectivism is apparent. The ordered
enumeration of ethical points is repeatedly interrupted by
lyrical passages that exhibit the lapse of argument into
romantic ardour:
Is she worth keeping? - Why. she is a pearl
Whose price hath launch'd above a thousand ships.
And turn'd crown'd kings to merchants.
11.2.82-84.
It is not that Troilus lacks ideas. but they remain
unexamined; he values them more for their emotive charge than
their rational implications. Because they are self-generated
rather than tested in the real world. he continually reverts
to unreflective modes of expression.
Hector's style. by contrast. is entirely free of linguistic
emotionalism. He opposes Troilus's position not with a
reactive rhetorical extravagance. but with logically presented
argument. His speech on value develops systematically and
economically from one point to the next. He is principally
concerned with elucidating a complex argument. drawing
accurate distinctions and finding apt analogies. In no more
than eight lines of compressed verse. he presents a radical.
indeed memorable. critique of subjectivism. He has the
intellectual control that comes from resistance to ready-made
notions. His ethical vocabulary ('discourse of reason'.
'benumbed wills'. 'raging appetites') lends dignity to his
case. but his consistent verbal directness - 'Brother. / She
is not worth what she doth cost the keeping. '. 'But value
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dwells not in particular will'. 'Nature craves / All dues be
render'd to their owners' - prevents the tone from becoming
moralistic, pompous or sententious.
Hector's language serves as a moral and intellectual norm
in the play. contrasting not only with Troilus's subjectivism.
but also with Agamemnon's tortuous style. and even with the
tenets of the 'degree' speech. Throughout the Trojan debate.
Hector has insisted that true virtue must transcend individual
inclination. The conception of morality he represents is thus
anti-individualistic. and it shares with the 'degree' speech
the notion that the chaos of egoism is escaped through
responsiveness to a natural order beyond the single self. Yet
if Hector's principle of morality is in this sense
hierarchical. it does not extend to the idea of a society
stratified according to moral worth. which the Greek council
showed to stimulate competitive individualism. The absence of
this aspect of degree from Hector's discourse stresses
hierarchy's dubious moral standing in the play. while
reinforcing his position as the play's sole exponent of truth.
The Trojan debate relates Troilus's honour to a form of
chivalric idealism which has courtly and Neoplatonic roots.
We have seen that Troilus describes Helen as being of
incomparable worth. The intoxication with honour is
channelled into idealisation. which in turn is focussed on
the physical beauty that itself gives form to Trojan honour:
he touch'd the ports desir'd.
And for an old aunt whom the Greeks held captive.
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He brought a Grecian queen. whose youth and
freshness
Wrinkles Apollo's. and makes stale the morning.
II.2.77-80.
The beauty that for Troilus represents Trojan supremacy over
the Greeks (the ravishing young queen for 'an old aunt')
is elevated to the status of a virtue. In these lines.
Helen's beauty transcends the merely physical; her perfection
suggests that she transmutes form into essence. The Trojan's
prize thus comes to embody the Beautiful, and is accordingly
made an object of worship. Honour becomes a religious
relationship between subject and object. as Troilus's (that
is. Shakespeare's) identification of Helen with the parable
of the kingdom of heaven as a pearl of great price (II.2.82)
implies.
Thus. out of the subject's passion. an 'idea' of the object
is engendered commensurate with the passion that creates it:
like the honour she represents, Helen's worth is 'infinite'.
The Neoplatonic strain in Troilus's idealism in turn
transfigures honour into the principle of moral ascendancy.
As the worship of moral beauty, it becomes the channel of
transcendence:
She is a theme of honour and renown,
A spur to valiant and magnanimous deeds,
Whose present courage may beat down our foes,
And fame in time to come canonize us ....
I1.2.200-203.
Troilus conceives of honour as the foundation of a secular
religion, its virtuous deeds being inspired by the veneration
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of beauty and canonized by everlasting fame.40
Yet the play undermines Troilus's exalted claims by
identifying. through his language. the appetitive origins of
his aristocratic faith. His discussion of the related
questions of knowledge and honour is crucially formulated in
terms of taste:
- how may I avoid.
Although my will distaste what it elected.
The wife I choose? 11.2.66-68.
Troilus's example construes choice as preference. or 'taste'
(with its antonym 'distaste'). Moreover. his response to
Cassandra's prophecies of disaster shows. in the event. that
his honour prohibits any subsequent reconsideration or change
of mind:
her brain-sick raptures
Cannot distaste the goodness of a quarrel
Which hath our several honours all engag'd
To make it gracious. 11.2.123-26.
The repeated verb 'distaste' reinforces the involvement of
the Trojan cause in appetite. It generates an ideal the value
of which is kept in place by constancy ('honour'). whatever
the consequences - even if they extend to the catastrophe
Cassandra foresees.
The real source of Troilus's idealism has already been
established. of course. by the opening scene of the play.
40.It is worth noting that Shakespeare's portrayal of
chivalric idealism anticipates Huizinga's judgement of
chivalry as an aesthetic ideal masquerading as an ethical
ideal. See J. Huizinga. The Wanina of the Middle Aaes• trans.
F. Hopman (London: Edward Arnold and Co .• 1924). p.S8.
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Troilus thinks of his love for Cressida as the worship of
ideal beauty. Like Helen. she is idolised as a pearl of great
price (1.1.100).41 while Troilus is a pilgrim. as it were.
prostrated before his shrine:
o - that her hand.
In whose comparison all whites are ink.
Writing their own reproach. to whose soft seizure
The cygnet's down is harsh. and spirit of sense
Hard as the palm of ploughman. 1.1.55-59.
But even this refinement of beauty betrays signs of
physicality in such words as 'soft seizure'. In fact.
throughout the scene Troilus speaks of love in terms of
physical sensation so intense as to be incapacitating: he is
unable to fight because he feels 'such cruel battle here
within' (1.1.3); his heart is an 'open ulcer'. or festering
sore (1.1.53): love is a wound made by beauty (1.1.61-63).
This violent response to beauty may be the underlying cause of
Troilus's curious passivity as a lover: overwhelmed by desire.
he is obliged to rely on another - Pandarus - to negotiate the
practical side of the affair.
Troilus's dependence on Pandarus serves to bring out the
self-deception and sensuality in his idealisation of Cressida.
Pandarus's view of the affair is practical and realistic. His
colloquial prose. which presents love in the unromantic terms
of preparing and eating food. is sensible and quotidien.
However. it is also frankly sensual. even prurient: 'nay. you
41.See A.P. Rossiter. An&e1 with Horns, Fifteen Lectures on
Shakespeare. ed. Graham Storey (New York: Longman Group Ltd ..
1961). pp.142-43.
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must stay the cooling too. or you may chance burn your lips.'
(1.1.24-26).42 By alluding to love's physical consummation.
Pandarus is whetting Troilus's appetite even as he appeals to
him for patience. and arguably (like the true procurer)
getting a vicarious thrill from the passion he enflames. In
the same way. he dwells on Cressida's charms. exciting Troilus
to a pitch of erotic desire:
I tell thee I am mad
In Cressid' s love: thou answer' st. 'She is fair':
Pour'st in the open ulcer of my heart
Her eyes. her hair. her cheek. her gait. her
voice ....
But saying thus. instead of oil and balm.
Thou lay'st in every gash that love hath given me
The knife that made it. 1.1.51-54: 61-63.
Troilus's language. with its disturbing metaphors of physical
rending and infection. conveys an intense sexual craving. At
the same time that he reproaches Pandarus. he is unconsciously
colluding in his game. Troilus thinks he is in the realm of
value: but his idealising imagination is deeply rooted in the
world of appetite.
The Trojan council. largely through Troilus. but with the
support of Paris. exhibits an idea of honour that cannot
achieve the moral legitimacy it seeks because it is fed by
self-regarding desire. However. Troilus emerges as the winner
of the argument. not because he has made the better case, but
because his opponent collapses. Quite abruptly, Hector
concludes his defence of a virtue that is more than
42.See R.A. Foakes, 'Troilus and Cressida Reconsidered', llIQ,
XXXII (1963). p.143.
165
a projection of 'particular will' with a volte-face:
My spritely brethren. I propend to you
In resolution to keep Helen still
For 'tis a cause that hath no mean dependence
Upon our joint and several dignities.
1.2.191-94.
This reversal is generally considered to be either
dramatically inexplicable or a cynical betrayal of ethical
truth.43 It is unquestionably a major dramatic crux.
Hector capitulates to what may seem by the close of the Trojan
debate to be the prevailing ideology of Troy. enacted in the
collective endorsement of the abduction. given expression in
Troilus's and Paris's arguments. and exhibited in the play's
opening scenes. The contest is not between two alternatives
of equal currency. but between a formulation of virtue and the
ruling Trojan ethos which it contradicts. Nevertheless.
Hector is not alone in questioning the validity of this
dominant ideology. In the course of the discussion. Troilus
and Paris are reproved by Helenus and Priam respectively.
and Cassandra makes an appearance to warn of impending
calamity. Yet Helenus is immediately silenced by Troilus's
sharp rejoinder - 'You are for dreams and slumbers. brother
priest. . . .' (II.2.37) - while Priam's rebuke fails to
muzzle Paris. Without the benefit of hindsight. Cassandra'S
43.Hiram Haydn sees only cynicism in Hector's volte-face. See
The Counter-Renaissance (New York: Harcourt. Brace and World.
Inc .• 1950). p.609. By contrast. A.P. Rossiter finds his
reversal incomprehensible. See AOiel with Horns. p.143. Jean
Gagen explores sixteenth-century theories of the duel. and
concludes that Hector's surrender represents the man of
honour's reluctant endorsement of an unjust course of action
out of the necessity of avoiding the imputation of cowardice.
See 'Hector's Honor'. SQ. XIX (1968). p.137.
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prophecies can easily be dismissed as the ravings of a
madwoman. For the audience. these characters serve to
underline the flaws in Trojan honour: but they are shown. both
here and in the playas a whole. to be impotent.
However. the point is arguably not that Hector collapses
because he receives no effective support from his society. but
that the support he receives is rendered ineffectual by his
collapse. In his sudden acknowledgement of the primacy of
Trojan 'dignities'. Hector displays a considerable degree of
attachment to the ideology he has decisively refuted - an
allegiance already implicit in his 'roisting challenge' to the
Greeks (11.2.209). which antedates his part in the debate. and
which he now reveals. He is not a cynic. but he is a Trojan.
And although he cannot finally sacrifice honour for truth. the
honour he embodies represents a kind of compromise between the
two poles of the Trojan debate. insofar as it operates within
chivalric conventions that attempt to bring warfare and
self-assertion under social regulation. He thus remains
committed. even in his post-lapsarian state. to the necessity
of a ratified system of forms and rules to hold individual
appetite in check. In stressing his persistent regard for
principles of conduct beyond individual desire. the play
distances the Trojan champion from Troilus and makes him the
moral opposite of Achilles. Nevertheless. there is no denying
the implications of Hector's failure to press home his
arguments: it shows that in Troy virtue cannot compete with
honour. and it seals his fate and that of his country.
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Moreover. Hector's chivalric standards of conduct. for all
their appeal. will prove disastrously out of touch with the
climate of the Trojan War .
....... ** •••• * •• *** ••••
In its central acts. the play's interrogation of the Greek
and Trojan chivalric ideals develops into a radical rewriting
of the received narrative of the Trojan war.44 The depiction
of the Greek camp focusses on Ulysses's plot. which works in
two stages. In the first. he transfers military hero-worship
from Achilles to Ajax. The scene portraying this process
(11.3) takes place before Achilles's tent. The Greek
commanders enter. and Achilles immediately withdraws. earning
their weighty censure of his self-regard and contempt for the
common cause. Yet their righteous indignation is too facile.
for the scene goes on to demonstrate. albeit in burlesque
form. that the social values which they embody generate the
very pride they condemn. In the terms of my argument. the
scene portrays honour as the expression and subversion of
hierarchy.
Throughout the episode. the Greek leadership speak the
44.If Lydgate is a critic of the Trojan War. his account of
the conflict is nonetheless suffused with the spirit of
chivalric romance. particularly in the descriptions of the
Trojan heroes. See John Lydgate. Lydiate's Troy Book. Part
One. ed. Henry Bergen. Early English Text Society. 1906
(e.s.97). 11.4775-4941. See also E.M.W. Tillyard.
Shakespeare's Problem Plays (London: Chat to and Windus. 1951).
pp.41-46.
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orthodox language of degree:
and worthier than himself
Here tend the savage strangeness he puts on.
Disguise the holy strength of their command.
And underwrite in an observing kind
His humorous predominance. .. 11.3.127-31.
Agamemnon presents Achilles's pride as an inversion of degree:
the leader who. according to the terms of hierarchy. maintains
the authority of command due to his pre-eminent virtue. is
forced to defer to a man less worthy than himself. The Greek
leaders condemn Achilles's pride by echoing Ulysses's speech
on degree. in which he likens self-will to a form of chaos:
Imagin'd worth
Holds in his blood such swol'n and hot discourse
That 'twixt his mental and his active parts
Kingdom'd Achilles in commotion rages
And batters down himself. 11.3.173-77.
The lines present pride as a passion that makes the individual
prey on himself. recalling the appetite which Ulysses found to
be the cause and the consequence of the collapse of order.
Moreover. in the phrase 'kingdom'd Achilles'. they sound again
the civic concerns of the earlier speech. As in the state. so
in the self. unbridled will means anarchy.
The Greek generals show all the symptoms of self-serving
orthodoxy. Their speech abounds in windy generalisation:
and you shall not sin
If you do say we think him over-proud
And under-honest. in self-assumption greater
Than in the note of judgement ....
11.3.124-27 ..
and moral sententiae mixed with proverbial wisdom:
The elephant hath joints. but none for courtesy:
His legs are legs for necessity. not for flexure.
11.3.107-108.
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Agamemnon. in particular. continues to show that he possesses
a special talent for turning gravity into platitude:
He that is proud eats up himself: pride is his own
glass. his own trumpet. his own chronicle; and
whatever praises itself. but in the deed. devours
the deed in the praise. 11.3.156-59.
The affectedly archaic syntax of the initial pronouncement.
the pedantic triple repetition ('his own glass. his own
trumpet. his own chronicle') and the smug chiasmus of the
final proverb create something akin to a parody of moral
solemnity; they serve to turn 'truth' into pretentiousness.
These linguistic suggestions of the dubious moral status of
degree are confirmed in what follows. Thp Greek leaders. in
seeking to punish Achilles for his pride. cynically pretend to
transfer public prestige to Ajax:
o Agamemnon. let it not be so!
We'll consecrate the steps that Ajax makes
When they go from Achilles. Shall the proud lord
That bastes his arrogance with his own seam
And never suffers matter of the world
Enter his thoughts. save such as do revolve
And ruminate himself - shall he be worshipp'd
Of that we hold an idol more than he?
11.3.183-90.
The Greeks' charade betrays the integral connection between
hero-worship and degree. Its object is. in effect. to make
Ajax Achilles's superior. By urging that Ajax should not be
allowed to entreat Achilles. Ulysses claims to be safeguarding
the interests of hierarchy:
No: this thrice worthy and right valiant lord
Shall not so stale his palm. nobly acquir'd.
Nor. by my will. assubjugate his merit -
As amply titled as Achilles is -
By going to Achilles. 11.3.191-95.
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The lines of Ulysses's speech abound in the language of
superiority. the excessive formality of which conveys its
parodic quality: 'stale his palm' denotes demeaning the emblem
of the superiority evinced through deeds. while 'assubjugate
his merit' signifies cheapening one's intrinsic value. Ajax.
if he defers to another. will render himself inferior. To be
great demands that one jealously guard the pre-eminence which
the speech evokes through its religious idiom ('consecrate'.
'idol') and sun imagery ('great Hyperion' 11.3.198).
Honour as idolatry is firmly rooted in the very ethic of
moral superiority which holds up hierarchical order.
Ulysses's mock-insistence on precedence is the inverted image
of Agamemnon's earlier criticism of Achilles's violation of
natural hierarchy: 'and worthier than himself. Yet the
comparison with Agamemnon is instructive. for the language of
hero-worship clarifies that if idolatry is born of degree. it
also undermines the established power structure. that the
'idol' challenges the 'holy strength' of command. Moreover.
Agamemnon's insistence on his own supremacy suggests the
rivalry generated by degree. just as Ulysses's parodic version
of hero-worship stresses that excellence is relative. The
emphasis on 'distinction'. if it implies emulation. is also
shown to encourage pride: the refusal to defer and so
compromise one's greatness.
Ulysses's burlesque of public honour uncovers the logic of
Greek demoralisation - a logic which shapes the scene as a
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whole. The duping of Ajax gives comic form to the joint
condemnation and generation of pride which we noticed in our
discussion of the Greek council. The Greeks' asides. which
mock the lack of self-knowledge which their feigned idolatry
has aggravated. reflect back ironically on their disparagement
of Achilles's 'imagin'd worth'. Ajax himself indulges in
an extended rebuke of Achilles's pride. which in turn provides
a kind of debunking of the Greek leaders' earlier self-
contradictory moralising. Ajax's censure echoes the
conventional moral vocabulary - 'A paltry. insolent fellowl'
and 'Can he not be sociable?'(II.3.209.211) - while reducing
it to the level of the crudest antagonism:
If I go to him. with my armed fist
I'll pash him o'er the face. 11.3.203-204.
This is a caricature of the competitive envy lurking beneath
the surface of Greek 'specialty of rule' (1.3.78). for Ajax is
shown to despise pride because he is proud himself:
Do you not think he thinks himself a better man
than I am? 11.3.146-47.
It is this emulous individual psychology that Ulysses's plot
exploits.
This episode is farcical. but its humour is finally bitter
in tone. for the comic interplay depicts a society which
foments self-regarding competition only to deplore it. and in
which hero-worship and contempt are two sides of the same
coin. The Scene deflates heroism by showing the Greeks
engaged in a parody of their own heroic ethic which
necessarily rebounds on them. The joke is finally on the
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entire Greek camp. Yet the scene's anti-heroic strain
encompasses a radical questioning of the chivalric social
ideal. for it shows that if individual virtue in the Greek
camp is consumed in self-will. it is the self-defeating logic
of hierarchy which dictates that the situation could hardly be
otherwise.
The play will make equally clear that the joke is also on
Ulysses. The second stage of his plot concentrates on the
relationship between individual honour and public honour. The
collective scorning of Achilles forces the Greek champion to
reconsider his own merit:
I do enjoy
At ample point all that I did possess.
Save these men's looks: who do. methinks. find out
Something not worth in me such rich beholding
As they have often given. 111.3.88-92.
This is not yet inconfidence. but it shows that Achilles is no
longer able to take his sense of his own value absolutely for
granted. The prescient Ulysses senses this, and times his
attack perfectly:
no man is the lord of anything.
Though in and of him there be much consisting.
Till he communicate his parts to others:
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught.
Till he behold them form'd in the applause
Where th'are extended: who. like an arch.
reverb'rate
The voice again. . . . 111.3.115-21.
Through his account of the 'strange fellow' he is reading
(111.3.95). Ulysses reminds Achilles that the merit of the
self is not wholly in command of the individual. but is in
large part dependent on reputation. that is. on the respect of
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others. This is an argument for the social nature of virtue.
but it is tailored for an egoist. Its appeal to the 'social'
does not extend to anything as altruistic as regard for the
common cause. but is restricted to the concern for the status
of the self.
It is in this perspective that Ulysses introduces the name
of the man who seems to have displaced Achilles in public
esteem. True to his general objective (to get Achilles to
fight). he discusses the Greek champion's predicament. now
that he has been overtaken by the 'unknown' Ajax (111.3.125).
He flatters Achilles by referring to his rival as 'the lubber
Ajax' (111.3.139). a 'very horse. that has he knows not what'
(111.3.126). His real purpose is not. however. to hold up to
scorn the bad judgement of the generals who prefer the
inferior man to the superior one. for that would merely
confirm Achilles in the justice of his own self-esteem. His
true intention is to show up the unreliability of reputation.
Accordingly. he emphasises the gap that can exist between
the value of a thing and its place in public esteem:
Nature. what things there are
Most abject in regard and dear in usel
What things again most dear in the esteem
And poor in worthl 111.3.127-30.
He has no difficulty in getting Achilles to accept this
flattering idea. And on that basis. he reveals the thrust
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of his intervention:45
For emulation hath a thousand sons
That one by one pursue; if you give way.
Or hedge aside from the direct forthright.
Like to an enter'd tide they all rush by
And leave you hindmost;
Or. like a gallant horse fall'n in first rank.
Lie there for pavement for the abject rear.
O'er-run and trampled on. III.3.156-63.
Reputation. without which true worth remains unrealised and
impotent. is extremely unstable and transient. Time. made up
of collective competitive strivings. turns into an
irresistible forward motion which makes heroic complacency an
impossibility. The hero is condemned to incessant struggle if
he wishes to maintain an eminence under the perpetual threat
of emulation. Ulysses stresses Achilles's superiority by
contrasting the greatness of past deeds with the inferiority
of the present; the 'gallant horse' is overtaken by 'the
abject rear'. He evokes a heroic stature that is forgotten
and despised. surpassed by its subordinates.
The play leads us to believe that the transference of
hero-worship to Ajax is intended to provoke action by
reminding Achilles that his greatness exists only insofar as
it is authenticated by his peers. Ulysses. however. is more
far-seeing than this limited objective suggests. He wants
to avoid a process that would merely repeat what has gone
before - idolisation followed by withdrawal. What he seeks
is not a temporary renewal of activity. but an unremitting
45.For Ulysses's distortion of the theory of social
interdependence. see Frank Kermode. 'Opinion. Truth and
Value'. ~. V (1955). pp.183-84.
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scramble for precedence. He promotes a conception of honour
which dictates that the hero can never afford to rest on his
laurels for fear that another less worthy than himself will
oust him from prominence.
In the final analysis. Ulysses is manipulating the central
components of degree - individual superiority and its
confirmation in exalted social position - in order to
guarantee unceasing emulation. His goal is a kind of
collective individualism: Ulysses wants to stimulate a
competitive energy that. 'controlled' by the fear of one's
rivals. cannot envisage the alternative of opting out. Yet
the substance of Ulysses's arguments illuminates the
impossibility of this joint aggravation and restriction of
passion. In order to reawaken Achilles's emulous rivalry and
banish the inactivity of pride. Ulysses is forced to intensify
his conviction of superiority and devalue social response as
a measure of individual worth. Thus. he bAa to flatter
Achilles as the 'great and complete man' (111.3.181) who is
incomparably superior to the blockhead whom society now
worships. and he ~ depict a society which forgets virtuous
deeds. which. dominated by time. values only what is new. even
if worthless:
One touch of nature makes the whole world kin -
That all with one consent praise new-born
gauds. . .. 111.3.175-76.
In attempting to promote the contention underlying degree.
Ulysses necessarily exacerbates the fragmenting effects of the
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heroic ethic. His promotion of collective individualism
involves a contradiction in terms: what could be described as
antisocial sociality. In the event. all his plotting produces
is two pre-eminent warriors. each 'consumed with greatness'.
The second stage of Ulysses's plot culminates in Thersites's
'pageant of Ajax' (111.3.271). which enacts pride as a
self-absorption so complete that it destroys the human. The
Ajax who cannot tell Thersites from Agamemnon has 'grown a
very landfish. languageless. a monster.' (111.3.262-63).
Analogously. Achilles is shown finally to be driven not by
commitment to the common cause. but by private passion. He
continues to keep out of the fray because of his alleged love
for 'one of Priam's daughters'. Polyxena (111.3.194) - a love
for which he is prepared. like Troilus and Paris. to sacrifice
everything else:
Fall. Greeks: fail. fame: honour. or go or stay:
My major vow lies here. this I'll obey.
V.1.42-43 ..
and he returns to the fray from equally egoistic motives -
private revenge for the death of his 'masculine whore'.
Patroclus (V.l.16). Ulysses's policy. far from counteracting
social disintegration. contributes to and confirms it.
It is precisely to this chaotic state of affairs that
Thersites. the play's chorus. draws our attention. It is
significant that the play's choric character should represent
a cynical perspective. for what Thersites perceives is what we
can see for ourselves: the absence of virtue not only in the
Greek camp. but in the Trojan conflict as a whole. driven as
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it is by the overwhelming reality of appetite.
Thersites's cynicism functions in particular to debunk
the ethic of the superior individual through his abuse of the
Greek heroes, Achilles and Ajax. The main target of his
contempt is the warriors' stupidity. He re-presents these
heroes as dull-witted brutes who are 'here but to thrash
Trojans' (11.1.48). This diminishment of martial virtue
deflates hero-worship: Achilles is merely the 'idol of
idiot-worshippers' (V.1.7). It is not only the followers who
are self-deceived, but the heroes themselves. Thersites's
abuse of Ajax as a fool who 'knows not himself' (11.1.68)
culminates in the 'pageant of Ajax' to which we referred
above, which satirises heroic pride as self-infatuation.
Achilles too is 'a valiant ignorance' (111.3.310), and his
decision to place love before every other consideration is
attributed to 'too much blood and too little brain' (V.1.47).
Generally, for Thersites, heroism is nothing more nor less
than an egocentric passion. His comment on the outcome of
Ulysses's policy confirms this heroic disorder as the dominant
force in the Greek camp and associates it with a state of
social degeneration:
They set me up in policy that mongrel cur Ajax,
against that dog of as bad a kind Achilles: and
now is the cur Ajax prouder than the cur Achilles.
and will not arm today: whereupon the Grecians
begin to proclaim barbarism, and policy grows into
an ill opinion. V.4.12-17.
Nor is Thersites's cynicism limited to the Greek side of
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the conflict. The Greeks are worthless not simply because
they are driven by the appetite for self-aggrandisement. but
because they are fighting for a worthless cause:
All the argument is a whore and a cuckold: a good
quarrel to draw emulous factions. and bleed to
death upon. 11.3.74-76.
The war's basis in a love triangle associates heroic passion
with sexual appetite: 'war and lechery confound all!'
(11.3.77). Thus. 'blood' emerges as the motivating force
behind the Trojan war. and Thersites's curses on the Greek
camp. with their invocation of the diseases of lechery. define
a state of general corruption:
After this. the vengeance on the whole camp - or
rather. the Neapolitan bone-ache: for that
methinks is the curSe depending on those that war
for a placket. 11.3.18-21.
In the final scenes of the play. Thersites's commentary
embraces both sides in the conflict. and his invective serves
to reduce the narrative of Troy from its traditional
late-medieval presentation as the embodiment of heroic ideals
to the sordid story of the degradation engendered by kindred
forms of appetite.
Yet for all his masterful diagnostic powers. Thersites
remains part of the corruption he detects. He too is driven
by a particularly nasty passion. as his eager stalking of
Diomed to Calchas's tent makes plain:
I will rather leave to see Hector than not to dog
him; they say he keeps a Trojan drab. and uses the
traitor Calchas' tent. I'll after. Nothing but
lechery: all incontinent varlets! V.1.94-98.
Once on the scent of depravity. nothing will distract
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Thersites from sniffing it out. Like a true cynic. he takes
pleasure in discovering dirt.
The identification of the Trojan war with sexual desire is
of crucial importance in the play's treatment of love as a
manifestation of Trojan chivalric idealism. We have seen that
in the depiction of its central love affair. the play uses
Pandarus to embody the chasm between the ideal and the real.
demonstrating how far the idealistic impulse is rooted in
sensuality. The play drives this point home in its second
scene. which shows us Pandarus wooing Cress ida on Troilus's
behalf. The motive and technique remains the same as in the
opening scene. Pandarus's praise of Troilus is calculated to
titillate. and the procession of Trojan warriors across the
stage becomes a kind of male beauty contest. as Pandarus
enumerates the qualities that make Troilus more desirable than
other men:
Is not birth. beauty. good shape. discourse.
manhood. learning. gentleness. virtue. youth.
liberality and such like. the spice and salt that
season a man? 1.2.257-260.
Yet Cressida is a realist and knows exactly what Pandarus
is up to - 'By the same token. you are a bawd.' (1.2.286) -
and indeed. what idealism really means:
Women are angels. wooing:
Things won are done; joy's soul lies in the doing.
That she belov'd knows naught that knows not this:
Men prize the thing ungain'd more than it is.
That she was never yet that ever knew
Love got so sweet as when desire did sue.
1.2.291-96.
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Cressida's soliloquy locates the idealising impulse in sexual
attraction that pales upon achievement. It also tells us that
she returns Troilus's desire. but that. given the instability
of desire generally. she cannot respond simply to him:
instead. she resorts to a strategy of coyness which. by
whetting the appetite. allows her to maintain the tactical
advantage. The soliloquy tells us as much about Cressida as
it does about Troilus: and its identification of love with the
transitory urgings of appetite. and portrayal of a woman
radically divided within herself. torn between desire and
self-protection. anticipate the infidelity that will
eventually shatter her lover's self-deceived 'idea' of her.
The play's central love scene brings together this trio of
courtship. As Troilus awaits the consummation of his passion.
he can scarcely endure his sensual rapture:
Th'imaginary relish is so sweet
That it enchants my sense: what will it be
When that the wat'ry palate tastes indeed
Love's thrice-repured nectar? Death. I fear me.
Sounding destruction. or some joy too fine.
Too subtle-potent. tun'd too sharp in sweetness
For the capacity of my ruder powers. 111.2.17-23.
The passage exhibits. but to a greater degree. the remarkable
fusion of refinement and appetite. of purity and sensation.
that we have already encountered in Troilus. Once again. his
language subtly clarifies the erotic springs of idealism.
There is no transcendence in the passage. just the
intoxication of sensual experience. as the verbs 'relish' and
'taste' indicate.
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It is to this lover. beside himself with longing. that
Pandarus. oozing with sexual innuendo ('Words pay no debts.
give her deeds .... ' 111.2.55). brings the divided Cressida:
I have a kind of self resides with you.
But an unkind self. that itself will leave
To be another's fool. III.2.146-48.
In this confession. Cressida watches herself betray herself;
the self that desires betrays the self that would 'hold off'
(1.2.291); desire defeats circumspection. Cressida's intense
self-consciousness and her low opinion of the human sexual
instinct contrast with Troilus's idealism and his commitment
to constancy in love. Throughout the scene. Troilus presents
himself as the soul of fidelity and portrays fidelity as the
very principle of moral order:
o that I thought it could be in a woman -
As. if it can. I will presume in you -
To feed for aye her lamp and flames of love;
To keep her constancy in plight and youth.
Outliving beauty's outward. with a mind
That doth renew swifter than blood decaysl
Or that persuasion could but thus convince me
That my integrity and truth to you
Might be affronted with the match and weight
Of such a winnow'd purity in love -
How were I then uplifted! 111.2.156-66.
For Troilus. constancy preserves and expresses singleness of
being. It is 'integrity'. 'truth'. a type of unity that
overcomes the flux of time. The image of 'winnow'd purity'
associates constancy with a perfected state of being.
unsullied by base matter. It is this purity that Troilus
wants to find in Cressida. Yet. far from expressing
confidence. the passage resounds with uncertainty. with the
fear of how difficult it is to sustain a reciprocity of
subjective faith.
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The troth-plight ritual which ironically closes the scene
suggests that the three characters are performing a single
doomed dance:46 the lover constant to the beautiful woman to
whom desire imparts an ideal value; the insecure woman for
whom love is an unstable passion subject to time: and the
bawd. or 'broker-between' (111.2.202). who battens on both.47
With the arrival of the news that Cressida is to be exchanged
for Antenor. the trio of courtship is replaced by the sexual
triangle of Troilus. Cressida and Diomed. Through this love
triangle. the play confirms the lovers' prophecies; dramatic
time registers Troilus's constancy and Cressida's falseness
and makes the lovers' defining qualities the basis of a
re-enactment of the cause of the Trojan war.
In Cressida's betrayal of Troilus. the play concludes its
depiction of her in terms of the divided self. associating
her doubleness with the instability of appetite:
Troilus. farewell I One eye yet looks on thee.
But with my heart the other eye doth see.
Ah. poor our sexl this fault in us I find:
The error of our eye directs our mind.
What error leads must err: O. then conclude.
Minds sway'd by eyes are full of turpitude.
V.2.106-11.
The stylized verse. with its rhyming couplets. provides a
46.David Kaula. in 'Will and Reason in Troilus and Cressida'.
SQ. 12 (1961). p.276. offers an illuminating reading of this
episode of the drama.
47.Palmer. in The Arden Shakespeare; Troilus and Cressida.
cites Kina John. 11.1.582: 'This bawd. this broker. this
all-changing word'.
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little moral lesson on the error of sensuality. of the mind
operating to gratify desire. For all its reductive effect. it
anticipates the rationalising arithmetic of Troilus's 'rule in
unity' speech. Both are bound together by the logic of
appetite; but it shows itself in each in opposite ways. The
sexual desire that for Troilus constitutes an irrevocable
commitment remains for the divided Cressida essentially
variable; the heroine quite literally has a roving eye. In
the end. then. Cressida can be faithful neither to herself nor
to another; she could not 'hold off' from Troilus any more
than she now can from Diomed. and the changeable passion that
in her soliloquy characterises male desire becomes in her
final speech the typically feminine vice. The duality that
divides her first between love and self-defence and then
between Troilus and Diomed is that of the realist who sees
plainly what is the 'right' course of action. but for whom
pleasure offers a temptation that proves. especially in the
remorseless context of the Trojan War. ultimately
irresistible.
For Troilus. the discovery of Cressida's infidelity
precipitates a crisis of faith. which his 'rule in unity'
speech portrays as a collision of two irreconcilable
valuations of her. that which is objectively offered by the
evidence of his senses. and that which is subjectively
enshrined in his chivalric religion of beauty. Shakespeare's
dramatic organisation of this climactic moment of truth
emphasises Troilus's subjectivism by contrasting it with two
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very different perspectives: Ulysses's pragmatism. which
asserts simply that facts are facts. and Thersites's cynicism.
which delights in the prospect of the human degradation before
him: 'How the devil Luxury. with his fat rump and potato
finger. tickles these together! Fry. lechery. fry.'
V.2.55-57). The idealist. however. can only hold on to his
subjective faith by dividing its object into two:48
This she? - No. this is Diomed's Cressida.
If beauty have a soul. this is not she:
If souls guide vows. if vows be sanctimonies.
If sanctimony be the gods' delight.
If there be rule in unity itself.
This is not she. V.2.136-41.
The parallel clauses mark a progression through the tenets
of faith in order to reaffirm the 'truths' that have been
negated: if beauty has a 'soul'. if it does indeed reflect
inner being: if this soul guarantees the sacred vow of love.
and defines a person as one essential. knowable thing and not
another. then this cannot have been Cressida before him.
Troilus's subjective 'truths' illuminate the central
epistemological problem of his chivalric idealism: whether
physical beauty mirrors moral beauty or whether value is
merely a projection of desire.
Troilus understands that he is involved in a 'madness of
discourse' in which reason and unreason are confounded: in
which reason can revolt against the evidence of the senses.
48.For an interesting reading of the 'rule in unity' speech.
see I.A. Richards. Troilus and Cressida and Plato'. in Ih&
Sianet Classic Troilus and Cressida. ed. Daniel Seltzer (New
York and Scarborough. Ont.: New American Library. 1963).
pp.247-55.
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and yet remain reasonable. and madness assume control without
reason revolting (V.2.141-45). Thus. Cressida divides: but
because this is an impossibility in 'a thing inseparate'
(V.2 .147), she cannot divide. And if Cressida is his. 'tied
with the bonds of heaven' (V.2.153) which cannot dissolve.
those bonds are now 'slipp'd. dissolv'd. and loos'd'
(V.2.155).
And with another knot, five-finger-tied.
The fractions of her faith. arts of her love.
The fragments. scraps. the bits. and greasy relics
Of her o'er-eaten faith are given to Diomed.
V.2.1S6-59.
Thus, subject and object fall apart. and the ideal and the
real are sundered. Yet the subjectivist does not relinquish
his constancy: rather. his constancy turns to hatred. his love
to revenge:
Never did young man fancy
With so eternal and so fix'd a soul.
Hark. Greek: as much as I do Cressid love.
So much by weight hate I her Diomed. V.2.164-67.
Troilus switches commitment from one passional urge to
another. replacing Cressida with Diomed and turning murderous.
As we observe a sexual triangle generating martial conflict.
the cause of the Trojan war is re-enacted. By making the
private plot (infidelity) replicate the public plot (war). the
play confirms Hector's claim that subjective constancy is not
virtue. but its opposite. 'mad idolatry' ,49 and gives sinister
resonance to Thersites's invocation of venereal disease as the
49.See Alice Shalvi. '"Honor" in Troilus and Cressida'. ~.
V (1965). p.297.
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appropriate curse upon 'those that war for a placket'. What
the play finally offers us. then. is the story of a war
started and fought on the basis of selfish desires that are
masked and exacerbated by chivalric ideals. It is for this
reason that the play gives Pandarus the last word; for the
figure of the disease-ridden bawd standing amid the ruins of
Troy bequeathing his infections to the audience provides an
apt symbol of the meaning of connivance between idealism and
appetite.
In Hector the play presents an honour that attempts to
escape the anarchic individualism of the Greeks' heroic pride
and the Trojans's chivalric subjectivism. We have seen that
in Hector's demonstration that virtue depends on the ability
to see beyond mere individual inclination. the play offers its
sole authentic moral voice. which tells us that honour.
without a force greater than itself to support it. degrades
rather than exalts. The fact that Hector fails to make that
voice prevail does not. of course. discredit it. But it
certainly discredits the form of action that he offers as an
alternative. however attractively he performs it. Having
refuted the claims of honour in terms of moral realism. his
re-commitment to chivalric noblesse obliie cannot but remain
radically vitiated.
Nevertheless. it has to be said that Hector's conception of
honour differs from Troilus's in one important respect: it
accepts the need for a ratified social framework for
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individual conduct. It expresses itself within chivalric
conventions like courtesy and the challenge to single combat.
which are designed to control violence and self-assertion:
If there be one among the fair'st of Greece
That holds his honour higher than his ease.
That feeds his praise more than he fears his
peril.
That knows his valour and knows not his fear.
That loves his mistress more than in confession
With truant vows to her own lips he loves.
And dare avow her beauty and her worth
In other arms than hers. . . . 1.3.264-71.
Hector's challenge. as communicated to the Greeks by Aeneas.
is not driven by unbridled appetite. like Troilus's
'challenge' of Diomed at the end of the play. The terms of
the challenge. including the service of the ·mistress'. are
impersonal and conventional. and the stylistic register
conveys their conformity to ceremonial procedure. Yet the
play will make it plain that Hector's chivalry is
anachronistic. and that by reverting to it. he has taken
refuge in an unreal social construct that proves fatally weak
in the new brutalism of the Trojan War. Although unlike
Troilus's idealism. which rejects any inhibition of passion.
Hector's chivalry resembles it in its quality as illusion.
with its pathetic reliance on rules in a game that is played
for real.
As the play presents it. Hector's chivalry is defined
by a code of conduct called 'courtesy' which dictates the
individual's behaviour towards others. specifically. in this
play about war. towards one's enemies. It regulates conduct
between adversaries both in and out of battle. seeking to
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restrain individualism and its consequent social
disintegration.
In peace. courtesy takes the form of the elaborate
politeness through which one pays honour to one's opponents:
I ask. that I might waken reverence.
And bid the cheek be ready with a blush
Modest as morning when she coldly eyes
The youthful Phoebus.
Which is that god in office. guiding men?
Which is the high and mighty Agamemnon?
1.3.226-31.
Through his ceremonious compliment. Aeneas defers to the
general of the enemy forces. His description of the Trojan
courtly virtues - 'Courtiers as free. as debonair. unarm'd /
As bending angels. . . .' (1.3.234- 35) - defines an
aristocratic grace. The image of 'bending angels' conveys an
aesthetic ideal: it expresses the cultural refinement that
makes aristocracy a higher form of secular life. The play
makes fun of Trojan courtesy. of the hyperbolic mode of
expression that leads Agamemnon to suspect that Aeneas's
extravagant compliment constitutes a subtle form of insult.
and especially of the ever-present tension between courtesy
and aristocratic pride:
By Venus' hand I swear
No man alive can love in such a sort
The thing he means to kill. more excellently.
IV.1.23-25.
Yet if the play exploits the comic potential of this 'noblest
hateful love' (IV.l.34). it stresses simultaneously courtesy's
attempt to cultivate the highly-developed social forms that
bridle self-assertion.
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Courtesy encompasses not only the refined manners that
govern interaction outside of battle. but also the rules
around which combat is structured. The play presents Hector
as the embodiment of this higher chivalry. In his encounter
with Ajax (IV.S). he is shown to refuse the honour of victory
rather than disobey the law of kinship. an act which manifests
not a proud disregard of his opponent's worth (as Achilles
claims). but a courtesy that limits the sway of war:
Weigh him well.
And that which looks like pride is courtesy.
This Ajax is half made of Hector's blood;
In love whereof. half Hector stays at home.
1V.5.81-84.
The scene thus sets up an opposition between military pride
and a courtesy that is responsive to a code beyond the
individual. Hector is the champion of martial virtue; but the
fact that he allows his power as a soldier to be restrained by
the conventions of fair play fosters human respect rather than
emulation. as Nestor makes clear:
I have. thou gallant Trojan. seen thee oft.
Labouring for destiny. make cruel way
Through ranks of Greekish youth: and I have seen
thee.
As hot as Perseus. spur thy Phrygian steed.
Despising many forfeits and subduements.
When thou hast hung thy advanced sword i'th'air.
Not letting it decline on the declin'd.
That I have said to some my standers-by
'Lo. Jupiter is yonder. dealing life' ..
IV.5.182-90.
Nestor echoes his earlier lines on the superhuman nature of
valour. but here 'the thing of courage' (1.3.51) is. like
Jove. a dealer of life. The connection between this passage
and Agamemnon's and Nestor's discredited conception of heroism
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is instructive. for it emphasises valour's decline into
rampant individualism. This point. of course. is underlined
by the contrast between the chivalric Hector and the
megalomaniacal Achilles. who ends by butchering his rival. and
the now murderous Troilus who. 'more vindicative than jealous
love' (IV.5.107). repudiates his brother's 'vice of mercy'
(V.3.37).
The fact remains. however. that this honour. which draws
its self-respect from service of an essentially social code of
conduct. is vulnerable to the critique of subjectivism. The
scene presenting Cressida's betrayal of Troi1us is followed by
one which shows Hector. deaf to his own arguments in the
Trojan debate. actively embracing honour as subjective
constancy. Andromache's dreams and Cassandra's visions have
foreseen his death. and the women comprehend in that event the
destruction of Troy. In the face of his family's pleas. and
his own knowledge that constancy in wrongdoing does not
extenuate the wrong. Hector endorses an absolute honour: 'the
gods have heard me swear.' (V.3.1S). Once again. fidelity to
one's word guarantees an honour that is 'more precious-dear
than life.' (V.3.28). Andromache and Cassandra remind him of
the very distinction that made him resist Troi1us and Paris:
'It is the purpose that makes strong the vow .... ' (V.3.23).
They insist that absolute vows are 'polluted offerings'
(V.3.17). that it cannot be 'holy' to 'hurt by being just'
(V.3.19-20). and that to persist in loyalty to a vow the
consequences of which are plainly disastrous is not to be
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virtuous. but 'hot and peevish' (V.3.16).
The scene insists that Hector is not Troilus. that his
honour. in its regard for the rules of 'fair play' (V.3.42).
has a focus beyond the self. Yet the play also makes it clear
that the compromise which Hector seeks between virtue and
individualism is an unqualified disaster. for it sustains
fidelity to a bad cause while accepting limits to what is
permissible in a war where Geneva conventions are outmoded and
unreal. Hector's magnanimity. which shines so brightly in
this play's otherwise unremitting self-interested motives.
stands no chance against the maniacal conceit of an Achilles.
for whom any means whatever are justified to secure his
self-regarding needs. Hector's fate thus acquires a sort of
desperate moral poignancy. for it reflects the predicament of
a man who. in trying to maintain a semblance of decency in
a world temporarily unable to sustain moral conduct. brings
about the destruction of his own country.
This bitter. disenchanted play approaches tragedy in that
it portrays a dramatic world in which virtue is a logical
impossibility. Honour is depicted as a value that cannot
stand on its own. that. deprived of the support of a force
greater than itself. debases rather than elevates its
proponents. Yet the medieval ideals of hierarchy and
chivalry enlisted to stabilise individual will are shown. in
their self-contradictory logic. to precipitate degradation.
The play offers us. in Hector. a glimpse of the virtue which.
192
in this dramatic world of false ideals. is denied a social
framework in which to function. and the Trojan champion who
seeks to temper honour with chivalric standards of conduct is
finally ignominiously slaughtered. This collapse is
tragically inevitable. It does not follow. however. that the
play is cynical. Its choric voice. Thersites. is indeed so:
but if he is right that the story of the Trojan War is one not
of heroism. but of appetite. the play does not ultimately
share his delight in the fact. What the climactic spectacle
of ruin shows us is that virtue. if it is impossible. is also
necessary; and that in the death of Hector and the triumph of
Achilles. there are no grounds at all for rejoicing.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TRAGEDY OF THE INDIVIDUAL:
REVENGE HONOUR IN HAMLET.
Troilus and Cressida dramatises honour as a self-
contradictory ethic in which the individual capacity for
virtue degenerates into egoism. The play shows that in
locating virtue within the individual will. honour stimulates
a relationship between a man and his own greatness which
fosters emulation and comes to disregard any moral
consideration that inhibits the pursuit of distinction. The
mechanism for virtue within the self which generates constancy
and courage by overcoming the instinct for self-preservation
deteriorates into an instrument for self-assertion indifferent
to moral distinctions. This self-defeating tension in honour
appears in Hamlet (1600-01) in a different form. It is
objectified as a contradictory task: the virtuous cause which
is simultaneously a mandate to execute private revenge. In
Hamlet. the hero is torn between the necessity to act and
the necessity that action will turn into a manifestation of
self-interest: the will to good is either neutralised or
corrupted by its inevitable relation to an ethic that
precipitates unscrupulous and egocentric action. Yet the
dramatic action of Hamlet unfolds within the context of a
Christian universe in which the possibility of providential
guidance affords the prospect. wholly lacking in Troilus and
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Cressida. of a power for good higher than honour. I
Honour makes its first appearance in Hamlet in the opening
scene. as part of that scene's portrayal of the confrontation
of the natural with the supernatural. After the first
appearance of the Ghost that comes in the shape of the late
king. Marcellus's query about Denmark's preparations for war
gives rise to a discussion of Fortinbras. father and son. We
are told the story of 'th'ambitious Norway' (I.l.64) who.
'prick'd on by a most emulate pride' (1.1.86). challenged King
Hamlet to single combat.2 Honour in these lines takes the
form of emulation. the competitive rivalry of a man envious of
another's reputation for greatness: King Hamlet was 'esteem'd'
'this side of our known world' for his valour (1.1.87-88).
I.Many critics have pointed to the importance of the Christian
tradition in Hamlet. A.C. Bradley. in Shakespearean Traiedy
(London: Macmillan and Co .. 1904). speaks of Hamlet as
manifesting 'a freer use of popular religious ideas. and a
more decided. though always imaginative. intimation of a
supreme power concerned in human good and evil. than can be
found in any other of Shakespeare's tragedies.' (p.174).
Philip Edwards. in his critical introduction to the play in
Hamlet Prince of Denmark. The New Cambridge Shakespeare
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1985). also stresses the
centrality of the play's religious element. In interpreting
this religious element in terms of the inherent ambiguity of
the hero's task. I am indebted to numerous scholars who have
also based their studies of the play on the ambivalence of
action: Maynard Mack. 'The World of Hamlet'. in 'Hamlet': A
Casebook. ed. John Jump (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan
Press Ltd .. 1968). pp.86-107; Nigel Alexander. Poison. Play.
and Duel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1979); Paul
Gottschalk. 'Hamlet and the Scanning of Revenge'. £G. XXIV
(1973). 155-70; Catherine Belsey. 'The Case of Hamlet's
Conscience'. £f. 76 (1979). 127-48; and Harold Jenkins's
'Introduction' to The Arden Shakespeare: Hamlet (London and
New York: Methuen and Co .. 1982).
2.All quotations from the play are taken from The Arden
Shakespeare; Hamlet. ed. Harold Jenkins.
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Old Fortinbras. then. was motivated by the same desire for
superiority that characterises the Greek warriors in Troilus
and Cressjda. The will to virtue was distorted into a form of
self-aggrandisement. The relationship between a man and his
own virtue became paramount. and the energy to which honour
appeals. the courage to endure the prospect of danger. was
focussed on the self in its quest for singularity: Old
Fortinbras risked death for the sake of his own greatness.
Horatio's speech moves from the past to the present.
introducing us to the play's first avenging son. Yet his
description of Young Fortinbras's planned campaign stresses
adventure rather than revenge: it portrays a young man. 'Of
unimproved mettle. hot and full' (1.1.99). seeking an
opportunity for 'some enterprise I That hath a stomach in't'
(1.1.102-103). It is the recovery of the lands lost by his
father that affords such an opportunity. and his easy change
of purpose in the later scene (11.2) clarifies that for Young
Fortinbras any occasion for adventure will suffice. What
attracts Young Fortinbras. then. are enterprises characterised
by their 'stomach'. or spirit of daring. for it is these that
permit him to demonstrate his courage. his honourable nature.
In his quest for self-realisation. he is not fussy about the
value of the cause. Horatio's speech. in stressing the
legality of the terms of the combat - 'Well ratified by law
and heraldry' (1.1.90) - underlines the illegality of
Fortinbras's undertaking. The Polish campaign. of course.
will be similarly identified by the worthlessness of its
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object.
Just as Old Fortinbras resembles the emulous Greeks of
Troilus and Cressida. so Young Fortinbras is the dramatic
counterpart of Troilus. His honour is comparably subjective.
in that it disregards the moral substance of its object.
Young Fortinbras says little until the close of the play;
he is instead the stimulus of other characters' reflections.
But his actions speak for him. and they inform us that. like
Troilus. he rejects the demand for objective value as the
voice of craven self-interest and attaches moral significance
solely to the will in its pursuit of greatness. They tell us.
moreover. that this repudiation of scruple as cowardice
entails the repudiation of any restraints on action. of any
hindrance to the performance of courageous deeds. Thus. the
honour that appears courageously to scorn self-interest is in
reality a form of self-gratification. Again. honour as the
relationship between a man and himself undoes honour as the
will to virtue. Like his father. Young Fortinbras faces
danger solely in order to prove his own worthiness.
This account of secular activity - of a world in which men
act for the self - is offered within the context of a scene
imbued with the presence of the supernatural. The appearance
of the Ghost stimulates discussion not only of Old and Young
Fortinbras. but also of the relationship between this world
and the next. This relationship is characterised chiefly by
uncertainty. by the 'fear and wonder' (1.1.47) which the
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encounter with the supernatural inspires in Horatio. Marcellus
and Barnardo. Yet out of the three men's speculations as to
the significance of the apparition. there emerges the powerful
sense of an otherworldly reality that. if it defies human
comprehension. is nonetheless intimately connected with the
natural world. Horatio interprets the Ghost's appearance in
terms of its public significance - it 'bodes some strange
eruption to our state.' (1.1.72) - and this consideration
prompts comparison with the portents preceding the
assassination of Julius Caesar. Upon the disappearance of
the Ghost at the crowing of the cock. this transcendent
reality is identified in Christian terms:
Some say that ever 'gainst that season comes
Wherein our Saviour's birth is celebrated.
This bird of dawning singeth all night long;
And then. they say. no spirit dare stir abroad.
The nights are wholesome. then no planets strike.
No fairy takes. nor witch hath power to charm.
So hallow'd and so gracious is that time.
1.1.163-69.
Marcellus's speech on Christmas evokes. in the terms of
popular religious lore. the workings of grace in this world.
The seasonal banishment of the malevolent forces to which man
allied himself in his pride illuminates grace as a partial
liberation from the taint of original sin. a momentary renewal
of man's pre-lapsarian condition that brings with it a
temporary purification of a damaged capacity for good. The
speech is suggestive rather than conclusive; its simple piety
is fixed within the realm of folk belief ('Some say'. 'they
say') and qualified by Horatio's response: 'So have I heard
and do in part believe it.' (1.1.170). It offers the
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possibility of divine regenerative power. while leaving God's
intervention in human affairs a matter of conjecture and
mystery. In the Christian universe of Hamlet. therefore. if
the mechanism for virtue within the self is distorted into a
self-centred obsession with one's moral stature. there may
also be a moral influence at work in the world higher than the
individual will. These two aspects of the play's opening
scene - the evocation of a disfigured honour and of the
possibility of divine intercession - will form the dramatic
parameters of the play's exploration of honour.
The second scene introduces the play's hero. who is
immediately presented as an isolated figure. Clad in black.
Hamlet remains in mourning for his father as the assembled
court carries on the affairs of state. having recently
celebrated the marriage of the late king's widow to his
newly-crowned brother. He is publicly reproved for his
allegedly excessive grief. and makes veiled references to the
hypocrisy of Elsinore's protestations of affection for their
dead king. It is not until he is left alone on the stage.
however. that this contrast between remembrance and
forgetfulness is fully formulated.
In the prince's first soliloquy. his intense attachment to
his father and indignation at his mother's remarriage have
been thought to reveal a morbid obsession with death and a
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pathological disgust with sexuality.3 It is clearly the case
that one's interpretation of the prince's character hinges on
this initial elucidation of his attitude towards his mother.
Is Hamlet's response 'in excess of the facts'. as Eliot
claimed?4
The soliloquy shows us Hamlet tormented by the two mutually
exclusive 'facts' of his mother's conduct: the brief space
of time in which she mourned her husband's death before
remarrying. and the intensity of her earlier demonstrations
of love and grief:
A little month. or ere those shoes were old
With which she follow'd my poor father's body.
Like Niobe. all tears - why. she -
o God. a beast that wants discourse of reason
Would have mourn'd longer - married with my uncle.
My father's brother - but no more like my father
Than I to Hercules. 1.2.147-53.
The soliloquy's repeated elaboration of the inconsistency in
Gertrude's behaviour in disjointed. unbalanced verse reflects
the anguish induced in Hamlet's mind by the inescapable truth
that his mother's hasty remarriage belies her apparent
affection. revealing it to have been no more than empty
display. The 'fact' that Hamlet confronts in Gertrude's
remarriage is that she did not really love his father. or
3.For various versions of this theory. see G. Wilson Knight.
The Wheel of Fire. rev. ed. (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd ..
1949). pp.18-24; Eleanor Prosser. Hamlet and Revenie. 2nd edn.
(Stanford. Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press. 1967). pp.127-28.;
and L.C. Knights. An Approach to 'Hamlet' (London: Chatto and
Windus. 1961). pp.59. 63-66.
4.T.S. Eliot. Selected Essays 1917-1932 (London: Faber and
Faber Ltd .. 1932). p.145.
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rather that the reality behind her conduct as wife was
appetite:5
Why. she would hang on him
As if increase of appetite had grown
By what it fed on .... 1.2.143-45.
Hindsight is working unconsciously in these lines.
transforming the conduct that seemed evidence of a profound
love into an expression of sensuality. Hamlet's reacton
cannot be reduced to a diseased aversion for normal human
sexuality, for the soliloquy insists not merely on the speed
with which Gertrude transferred her affections. but on the
inferiority of their new object:
So excellent a king. that was to this
Hyperion to a satyr .... I.2.139-40.
Whether Hamlet is right or wrong about Claudius. he makes here
a crucial distinction between objective and subjective
judgement. What concerns him is the recognition of merit
independent of the valuer. Gertrude's failure to distinguish
between men demonstrates to her son that she acts on the
promptings of subjective desire which. having no goal beyond
its immediate satisfaction. is incapable of constancy.
It is true that we have at this stage in the drama no
independent evidence to substantiate Hamlet's low estimation
of Claudius's worth. Yet this evidence is quickly provided by
the play and Hamlet's perception validated as more 'prophetic'
(1.5.41) than he could have guessed. What is important is
that his first soliloquy shows him insisting. like Hector.
S.See Bradley. Shakespearean Traiedy. pp.11S-17.
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that excellence cannot be reduced to preference: that without
objective knowledge. there is only the self bent on the
gratification of its own desires. Hamlet's devotion to the
memory of his father is therefore. as he sees it. not
excessive. but essential: for it expresses an extrinsic
apprehension of human value which acts as a kind of anchor for
virtue. Conversely. the absence of constancy in Gertrude
betrays the dominance of selfish interests. And of course.
this discovery of inconstancy applies not only to Gertrude.
but to Elsinore generally. Claudius's opening speech makes it
clear that the court has curtailed its period of mourning for
King Hamlet - the memory of whose death remains 'green'
(1.2.2) - in order to endorse Claudius's marriage to Gertrude.
This eager abandonment of former allegiances suggests another
form of 'appetite' - time-serving and self-advancement.
The soliloquy enacts the trauma of Hamlet's discovery.
He longs for oblivion. indeed wishes that suicide was not
forbidden by canon law. because the values he holds supreme no
longer appear to have any foundation in reality: so life
becomes meaningless and corrupt. 'an unweeded garden / That
grows to seed .... ' (1.2.135-36). The soliloquy thus shows
us a man whose parents are the guarantors of his world view.
Hamlet's despair is a measure of the extent to which he has
internalised the moral order represented in his parents'
relationship as it appeared to him before his father's death.
The discovery that the mother he thought was virtuous is
merely appetitive has collapsed his inner landscape. His
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despair is therefore not neurotic. but a function of the moral
convictions to which he remains committed: he abhors hypocrisy
because it denotes self-absorption. and continues to believe
in his father as a worthy object of fidelity. But in Denmark
no such image of virtue remains. and Hamlet is at once
powerless to alter this state of affairs ('But break. my
heart. for I must hold my tongue.' 1.2.159) and isolated by a
moral intelligence that makes him cling to values which no
longer seem to have any place in his world.
At this stage of the drama. honour has not yet become an
issue for Hamlet. But the moral convictions exhibited in this
scene - the opposition of constancy to selfish interests. the
insistence that people 'be' rather than 'seem' - are those to
which honour appeals in constructing the inner stability that
generates moral action. They are. moreover. centred on the
figure of the dead father whose ghost will shortly appear to
Hamlet and command him to act out of filial devotion ('If thou
didst ever thy dear father love -' 1.5.23) and constancy:
'Remember me.' (1.5.91). Yet it is equally apparent that
honour. as the play has already presented it in the adventures
of Fortinbras. father and son. is implicated in the kind of
self-centredness that Hamlet is shown to despise. The play's
opening scenes prepare us for the contradictory nature of the
Ghost's command. which will form the basis of the hero's
tragedy.
As Hamlet. Horatio and Marcellus await the appearance of
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the Ghost. the noise of the king's rouse provokes Hamlet's
comments on reputation. The 'mole of nature' speech presents
reputation as the logical complement of virtue. whether on the
national or the individual level. Hamlet is critical of the
custom of the king's revel because it obscures Danish
achievements: in making the Danes appear drunkards to the rest
of the world. it deprives Denmark of the esteem its qualities
should enjoy:
and indeed it takes
From our achievements. though perform'd at height.
The pith and marrow of our attribute. 1.4.20-22.
A comparable rupture between worth and social response occurs
'in particular men' (1.4.23) when 'some vicious mole of
nature' (1.4.24) hides an individual's virtue from onlookers.
The essence may remain 'as pure as grace' (1.4.33). but its
reflection will 'take corruption' (1.4.35) from the single
defect. Because it is not the man's character. but others'
impression of it. which is vitiated by the fault. the speech
cannot be interpreted as a statement of the Aristotelian
tragic flaw - of the 'dram of evil' (1.4.36) which leads
inexorably to Hamlet's own ruin.6
Although the speech admits the possible discrepancy between
individual worth and public image. it nonetheless assumes
throughout the importance of the social self. A man may be
almost infinitely virtuous. but what value does that moral
6.See. for example. John Dover Wilson. What Happens in
'Hamlet'. 3rd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1951).
pp.206-208.
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excellence have if it is not perceived by others? The
isolated hero we have encountered is not. therefore. a
solipsist; he understands the social self to be part of what
one is as a man. For Hamlet. who gives such weight to the
individual capacity to judge human value. virtue is
necessarily social. and the individual is responsible not only
for recognising virtue in others. but also for demonstrating
his own virtue to his fellow men. Again. what Hamlet insists
upon is that essence and appearance should correspond.
Yet the play has made clear. particularly in its account
of Old Fortinbras. that the concern for reputation can become
a self-regarding passion. The inextricable connection between
virtue and respect. the necessity that one's claim to pride be
recognised and acknowledged by others. makes social stature
the measure of moral stature. Hence the envious rivalry of
Old Fortinbras when confronted with a man whose reputation for
valour surpassed his own: in order to be the best. you have to
be accounted the best. Hence also the aristocrat's intense
sensitivity to insult. for to be treated in a disrespectful
manner is to find one's right to pride in one's moral worth
impugned. In this sense. it is dramatically appropriate that
the 'mole of nature' speech should directly precede Hamlet's
encounter with the Ghost which commands revenge.
When Hamlet confronts the ghost of his father. he is told
of an appalling injustice - of his mother's adultery and his
father's murder by the brother who now wears his crown - and
206
is commanded to correct this injustice. The figure who orders
Hamlet to act has been subjected to a variety of critical
interpretations. Scholars have seen him as a demonic spirit.
as a messenger of divine justice and as a purposefully
ambiguous figure who may be either 'a spirit of health or
goblin damn'd' (1.4.40).7 The dramatic action undoubtedly
supports the ambivalence theory. not only on the grounds
of the Ghost's doubtful provenance. but also by virtue of the
intrinsic ambiguity of a being attached simultaneously to this
world and the next. The Ghost's first statement of the nature
of Hamlet's task clarifies the extent to which the spirit
still belongs to the values of the temporal world: 'So art
thou to revenge when thou shalt hear.' (1.5.7). This
injunction is twice repeated: 'Revenge his foul and most
unnatural murder.' (1.5.25) and 'If thou has nature in thee.
bear it not. . . .' (I. 5.81) . In telling Hamlet that he is
duty-bound to avenge his father's murder. the Ghost invokes an
7.The theory of the demonic nature of the Ghost follows
Hermann U1rici's judgement. in Shakespeare's Dramatische
~. that 'it cannot be a pure and heavenly spirit that
wanders on earth to stimulate his son to avenge his murder.'
See Hamlet. A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare. ed. Horace
Howard Furness. 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications. Inc .•
1963). 11.293. Notable modern advocates of this
interpretation include G. Wilson Knight. in The Wheel of Fire
(pp.39-42). and Eleanor Prosser. in Hamlet and Revenae
(pp.118-43). A.C. Bradley. in Shakespearean Traaedy
(pp.173-74). Irving Ribner. in Patterns in Shakespearian
Traaedy (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .. 1960). pp.71-72. and
Sister Miriam Joseph. in 'Discerning the Ghost in Hamlet'.
EMLA. LXXVI (1961). 493-502. see the Ghost as a messenger of
divine justice. Scholars such as Robert H. West. in 'King
Hamlet's Ambiguous Ghost'. fHLA. LXX (1955). 1107-17. Nigel
Alexander. in Poison. Play and Duel (pp.30-33). and Martin
Dodsworth. in Hamlet. Closely Observed (London: The Athlone
Press. 1985). pp.39-43. have stressed the inherent ambiguity
of the supernatural figure.
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obligation of blood rooted in family honour. the social and
moral standing which the family inherits collectively through
the blood of its ancestors. Honour belongs to the individual
through the kinship group. This honour is an alienable
commodity. damaged or lost by acts of contempt or hostility
that impugn the group's worth and right to respect. The
equivalence of personal and collective honour makes an offence
against one family member an offence against the family as a
whole. Thus. the enemy of the father becomes the enemy of the
son. and the act of vengeance the erasure of a wrong that
diminishes father and son alike.8 The individual honour that
derives from the honour of the clan therefore carries with it
the responsibility for the integrity of the family unit. an
uncompromising duty that is inextricably bound up with the
desire for self-affirmation.
Yet the family is the site not only of the individual's
honour. but also of his closest emotional ties. both of which
are located in shared blood. In his response to an injury
inflicted on a family member. the avenger's natural feelings
of grief and outrage are inseparable from his assertion of
individual and collective honour. It is to the natural ties
of blood that the Ghost appeals to authorise the duty of
8.For a valuable discussion of family honour from the
standpoint of cultural anthropology. see J.K. Campbell.
'Honour and the Devil'. in Honour and Shame. The Values of
Mediterranean Society. ed. J.G. Peristiany (Chicago: The Univ.
of Chicago Press. 1966). pp.143-45. See also Mervyn James.
'English Politics and the Concept of Honour. 1485-1642'. ~
and Present. Supplement 3 (1978). p.15.
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revenge: 'If thou hast nature in thee. bear it not ... ,..
and 'If thou didst ever thy dear father love - , (1.5.23).
Within the kinship group. honour is measured according to the
standard of nature. The blood that 'takes fire' at an outrage
committed against the family translates love and resentment
into honourable action.
The formulation of Hamlet's duty in terms of the ethics
of private revenge has complex implications for the action
to come. It locates the power for justice in an appointed
individual who. by virtue of his relation to the victim of
injustice. is at once a partial and an injured party. The
punishment of wrongdoing. then. is entrusted to a man who is
acting out of the passion of blood ties in order to restore
his and his father's honour. This last point clarifies the
equivalence that revenge ethics establish between injustice
and dishonour. What is violated by a criminal act is the
standing of the individuals comprising the family group: what
is repaired by retaliative action is the damage done to group
pride and the egoistic self. Blood feuds arise because
retaliation inflicts on one's opponent a comparable
disparagement that must in turn be requited. thereby provoking
a potentially interminable cycle of violence. The command to
punish Claudius is therefore predicated on a concept of
retribution that is antithetical to justice: partial.
self-centred and disastrously short-sighted.
Just as injustice is equated with dishonour. so honour
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consists in the internal energy that stimulates retaliatory
action. This the Ghost makes clear:
And duller shouldst thou be than the fat weed
That roots itself in ease on Lethe wharf.
Wouldst thou not stir in this. 1.5.32-34.
Dishonour in these lines takes the form of inaction and is
equated with decadent self-indulgence: the language evokes
torpor. lethargy and oblivion and. in the words 'fat' and
'ease'. associates such indolence with a life of sense-
gratification. indifferent to everything but the satisfaction
of appetite. Not to act is to prove oneself morally
degenerate.
This speech is delivered in response to Hamlet's declared
intention to take swift and unreflective action:
Haste me to know't. that I with wings as swift
As meditation or the thoughts of love
May sweep to my revenge. 1.5.29-31.
To which the Ghost replies approvingly. 'I find thee apt.'
(1.5.31). This suggests a quantitative equation: the more
determined you are to act. the more honourable you are. It is
this consideration that underlies the traditional role of the
avenging son as Hamlet initially perceives it. for he assumes
that hasty and passionate action measures the depth of one's
filial piety: that it reflects the level of passion with which
one responds to an injury to family honour. Yet the equation
clearly encourages an uncritical attitude to action. for it
implies an equivalence between moral worth and the refusal of
limitations on action. Like Troilus. then. the avenging son
can dismiss moral considerations as the rationalisation of
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craven weakness and find in that dismissal the measure of his
honourable nature.
Thus. the Ghost's exhortation to revenge shapes Hamlet's
task in three significant ways: it rests on the assumption
that the power for virtue resides within the will of an
interested party: it makes the response to injustice the
vindication of one's own honour: and it endorses the rejection
of restraints on action as indicative of moral stature. Yet
the royal Ghost who commands secular revenge is simultaneously
a revenant from the next world. acquainted with the mysteries
of an unearthly justice. 'living' proof of the existence of
the afterlife. That the Ghost comes from the next world to
reveal a horrifying transgression suggests that he represents
a higher justice concerned with human justice. The scene
intensifies this suggestion in several ways. If the Ghost
speaks the language of family honour. he also. in the accounts
of Gertrude's adultery and Claudius's fratricide. stresses the
moral upheaval which those acts entail. Gertrude's sensuality
is called 'lust'. and identified as an engrossment in pleasure
so total that moral distinctions are effectively obliterated:
because everything serves the will in pursuit of its own
satisfaction. the lowest and most loathsome object Has the
same value as the highest:
But virtue. as it never will be mov'd.
Though lewdness court it in a shape of heaven.
So lust. though to a radiant angel link'd.
Will sate itself in a celestial bed
And prey on garbage. 1.5.53-57.
According to the Ghost. Gertrude's sensuality led her to a
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more serious transgression than a hasty second marriage to her
dead husband's brother. In his description of Claudius as
'that incestuous. that adulterate beast' who 'won to his
shameful lust / The will of my most seeming-virtuous queen.'
(1.5.42.45-46). he strongly implies that Gertrude and Claudius
committed adultery.9 The account of the murder. with its
graphic description of the grotesque effects of poison on the
workings of the human body. presents the act as a defilement
of natural order. The speeches give considerably more than
a personal significance to these crimes; they are made to
represent not merely a personal wrong. but the violation of
a moral order. Thus. when the Ghost commands.
If thou has nature in thee. bear it not.
Let not the royal bed of Denmark be
A couch for luxury and damned incest. 1.5.81-83 ..
the connotations of 'nature' transcend the level of familial
obligation; they endow Hamlet's task with the public dimension
of cleansing Denmark of a regime that is unnatural and
corrupt.
9.The phrase 'adulterate beast' is not sufficient to convict
Gertrude and Claudius of having had sexual relations while
King Hamlet was alive. for it has been shown that the word
'adultery' often referred to promiscuity and incest. See
Bertram Joseph. Conscience and the Kina (London: Chatto and
Windus. 1953). pp.16-18. Yet. as Jenkins points out (long
note. p.456). an adulterous relationship is clearly present in
Belleforest. and the phrases 'adulterate beast' and
'seeming-virtuous queen'. combined with the stress on
seduction (11.43-45) and the implied contrast with fidelity to
the marriage vow (11.48-50). strongly indicate the accusation
of adultery. Hamlet is struck anew by the extent of his
mother's viciousness (1.105) and. in the final act. states
clearly that Claudius 'whor'd' his mother (V.2.64).
Gertrude's own guilt (111.4.88-91; 94-96; 1V.5.17-20) points
to a graver sin than an incestuous marriage.
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Moreover. the Ghost places qualifications on action:
But howsomever thou pursuest this act.
Taint not thy mind nor let thy soul contrive
Against thy mother aught. Leave her to heaven.
And to those thorns that in her bosom lodge
To prick and sting her. 1.5.84-88.
The first injunction. 'Taint not thy mind'. is vague enough to
have aroused a variety of critical responses.1Q But it does
seem to indicate that there are mental and moral dangers
inherent in 'contriving' this act against which Hamlet must
guard. The second directive stipulates that he must not take
action against his mother. an injunction that diminishes the
impression of the Ghost's vindictiveness.ll and reinforces the
need for moral restraint implied by the first. It also adds
a transcendent dimension to the Ghost's appeal to justice. and
suggests that. if Gertrude's punishment belongs to an
afterlife. that of Claudius represents the workings of
a higher justice in this world.12
Hamlet. then. confronts a Ghost who instructs him to avenge
his father's murder. and who at the same time suggests that
the deed will be a restorative. purifying public act.
sanctioned by a higher authority. How does Hamlet respond to
lQ.John Dover Wilson. in What Happens in 'Hamlet'. understands
the Ghost to be warning against the dangers attendant on the
loss of mental control (pp.46.2Q9). Sister Miriam Joseph. on
the other hand. in 'Discerning the Ghost in Hamlet'.
interprets the Ghost's injunction as a warning against
personal vindictiveness (pp.S01-S02).
11.See Philip Edwards. 'Introduction'. Hamlet Prince of
Denmark. The New Cambridge Shakespeare. p.43.
l2.1bid .. pp.43-45.
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the Ghost's command? In answering this question. what we have
already learned of the play's hero is of vital importance. for
the Ghost's revelation and injunction reinforce and intensify
the world-view elucidated in the second scene. The Ghost's
appeal to filial piety is clearly compelling for the son
dismayed by his society's inconstancy to the memory of their
late king. Yet we have seen that Hamlet's devotion to his
father has its source not simply in the bond of kinship. but
in the knowledge of King Hamlet's worth; that his despair
arises from the realisation of his mother's and his society's
indifference to moral distinctions. The story which the Ghost
tells Hamlet reveals that virtue has not merely been forgotten
in Denmark. but betrayed and actively subverted. Hamlet
discovers that the moral degeneration he perceived around him
goes far deeper than he had believed. that the world of
'seeming' he inhabits hides the reality, not simply of moral
laxity. but of adultery and murder. The mandate to act out of
love and remembrance of his father thus involves far more than
righting a personal wrong. It means vindicating virtue
against the corruption that has defiled it. restoring an order
turned on its head by criminal appetite - the setting right of
a time that is 'out of joint' (1.5.196-97).
For a hero who conceives of his appointed task as the
repairing of a fractured world. the Ghost's formulation of
honour as the opposite of appetite clearly has a special
resonance: not to act is to be engrossed in selfish ease. to
be oblivious to moral purpose. to be like his mother. Thus
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Hamlet vows to act:
Now to my word.
It is 'Adieu. adieu. remember me.'
I have sworn't. I.5.110-12.
Hamlet's vow is like a baptism.13 the relinquishing of a
previous life in favour of a new and higher form of existence:
Remember thee?
Ay. thou poor ghost. whiles memory holds a seat
In this distracted globe. Remember thee?
Yea. from the table of my memory
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records.
All saws of books. all forms. all pressures past
That youth and observation copied there.
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain.
Unmix'd with baser matter. I.5.95-104.
The vow is traditionally the declaration of honour. the
vehicle through which the individual constructs the stable.
constant self. unflinching in its dedication to duty. Hamlet
vows to remember the Ghost as long as memory has any place in
a 'distracted globe' .14 to erase as trivial and foolish all
other memories and to maintain only the essential command to
act. The commitment to memory defies a world given over to
forgetfulness. and affirms order in a disordered kingdom.
holding out the possibility that the values of the past which
his father represented have not entirely lost their grip on
men. The tone of hysterical sincerity in the prince's vow
reflects both the intolerable strain induced by the Ghost's
revelations and his desperate need to recover subjective
13.Ibid .. p.45.
14.1 accept Philip Edwards's gloss: 'It is the world that
Hamlet is talking about. not his head.' The lines are
forceful in that they convey the moral significance which
Hamlet attaches to remembrance in a world on which it has
a precarious hold.
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meaning and certainty. The honour to which he appeals is a
mechanism of self-formation through which he seeks to recreate
the relationship between subject and object. desire and value.
which originally sustained his sense of identity. This
subjectivity is moral rather than egocentric. based on the
inner need for virtue in a world now proven to be devoid of
moral order.
In Hamlet's vow. honour takes the form of an anchor for
virtue. It is the means whereby he hopes to translate his
moral convictions - constancy to a virtuous object and accord
between word and deed - into action. Yet in revenge honour.
this sense of individual moral identity inevitably turns
egoistic. and becomes fixated on an unrestrained refusal of
diminishment to the self. And it is private revenge that the
Ghost has demanded of Hamlet. Consequently. the honour that
acts against injustice is inseparable from the honour that
disclaims contempt. and the determination to act in execution
of a moral imperative becomes involved in the resolution to
act in disregard of moral scruple. These two aspects of the
prince's duty are inextricably connected; yet they are at the
same time irreconcilable. for honour is focussed
simultaneously on a deed that aspires to transcend
self-interest and on a deed in which self-interest is the
motivating force.
To approach Hamlet from the perspective of honour enables
us to redefine the dramatic foundation of the play's portrayal
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of its hero's self-reproachful delay. It consists in the
contradiction that hQth action and inaction are manifestations
of self-interest. The moral being that we have come to know
in the first act is unlikely to be able either to renege on
the pressing moral duty that has been assigned to him. or to
accept that the impoverished moral assumptions of revenge
honour can in any way accomplish that task. It is Hamlet's
tragedy that the virtue which for him is objectively and
subjectively necessary cannot be restored by the deed he is
commanded to perform. Thus. he is trapped in an impasse by
a contradiction that never fully rises to consciousness. but
makes its presence felt in the combined passivity and
self-recrimination of a man unable either to renounce or to
endorse the vengeance imposed on him by the double authority
of his father's spirit and the next world. In the bitter
lines that close the first act - 'The time is out of joint.
o cursed spite. / That ever I was born to set it right.'
(1.5.196-97) - there is a hint of the terrible predicament
awaiting Hamlet. for as he faces the execution of his
momentous task. it appears to him an inescapable and
impossible burden.
• •••••••••••••••••••
By the close of Act I. Hamlet has formulated only one plan
of action - to adopt an 'antic disposition' (1.5.180). This
feature of the old Amleth story becomes considerably more than
a strategy for averting suspicion. for the assumption of the
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role of madman gives expression to the prince's estrangement
from Denmark. When the second act opens. enough time has
passed for his 'transformation' (11.2.5) to have become a
cause of anxiety - for Gertrude. but especially for Claudius.
They have sent for Hamlet's old school friends. Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern. in an attempt to discover the cause of his
affliction. Much critical disagreement has surrounded the
role of these two characters in Claudius's plot. Are they
loyal friends. motivated by concern for Hamlet's well-being.
or time-servers. prompted by the desire for self-advancement?15
In reply to the royal request for assistance. Rosencrantz
declares:
Both your Majesties
Might. by the sovereign power you have of us.
Put your dread pleasures more into command
Than to entreaty. 11.2.26-29.
Guildenstern adds:
But we both obey.
And here give up ourselves in the full bent
To lay our service freely at your feet
To be commanded. 11.2.29-32.
Their language is formal and courtly. but its expression of
deference is excessively slavish and suggests. in the context
of a sycophantic court. that they are serving authority with
an eye to the main chance. Hamlet's welfare seems a secondary
consideration. mentioned only at the close of the interview:
IS.Defenders of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern include Prosser
(p.22S). and Salvador de Madariaga. On 'Hamlet' (London:
Hollis and Carter. 1948). pp.14-20. Other critics feel that
their motives are primarily self-interested. See. for
example. Nigel Alexander. pp.70. 77-80: L.C. Knights. An
Approach to 'Hamlet'. p.42: and Roland Mushat Frye. ~
Renaissance 'Hamlet: Issues and Responses in 1600 (Princeton.
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press. 1984). pp.111-12.
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'Heavens make our presence and our practices I Pleasant and
helpful to him.' (11.2.38-39). The comradely sentiments which
Guildenstern expresses here are somewhat undermined by the
word 'practices'. with its connotations of deceit. When.
later in the play. they inform Claudius of Hamlet's 'crafty
madness' (111.1.8). Rosencrantz and Guildenstern ally
themselves overtly with the powers that be.
When the old friends first meet. their conversation dwells
on the inconstancy of fortune. the 'strumpet' (11.2.236) who
gives her favours to many and is faithful to none. Within the
structure of the play. the topic is not a new one; rather. it
serves to introduce a new concept - that of fortune - with
which to define the moral condition of Denmark. The arrival
at Elsinore of the 'the tragedians of the city' (11.2.327).
who have been overtaken in popularity by the boys' acting
companies. presents Hamlet with a particular case of
vulnerability to the random rise and fall of fashion that
dominates Denmark:
It is not very strange; for my uncle is King of
Denmark. and those that would make mouths at him
while my father lived give twenty. forty. fifty. a
hundred ducats apiece for his picture in little.
11.2.359-62.
The passage implies both the haphazard nature of fortune's
movements. that she bestows and withdraws her favours
indiscriminately. and the fickleness of her subjects. who
follow her whims with a comparable lack of discernment. The
rule of fortune. then. is one without objective truth. in
which there is no equivalence between prosperity and worth and
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men approve not what is good. but what is presently
flourishing and hence likely to ensure their own advancement.
Hamlet's reflection takes in the general corruption and
hypocrisy of Elsinore while glancing specifically at
his two friends. whose disinterestedness he now suspects.16
After welcoming the players to Elsinore. the prince calls
for 'a passionate speech' - Aeneas's tale to Dido of 'Priam's
slaughter' (II.2.428.444). The player's speech introduces
another avenging son. who is presented not as the opponent.
but as the agent of fortune. What we see in Pyrrhus is the
furious avenger for whom there are quite clearly no restraints
on action. His savage passion is expressed in his grotesque
exterior. caked with the blood of the indiscriminate carnage
that feeds a seemingly insatiable appetite for revenge:
'fathers. mothers. daughters. sons' (II.2.454) are consumed in
his progress towards the defenceless old man who is the main
target of his wrath.17 His momentary pause stresses neither
hesitation nor the loss of resolve. but the renewed ferocity
that follows:
so after Pyrrhus' pause
Aroused vengeance sets him new awork.
And never did the Cyclops' hammers fall
On Mars's armour. forg'd for proof eterne.
With less remorse than Pyrrhus' bleeding sword
Now falls on Priam. II.2.483-88.
This avenging son vindicates family honour by hacking to death
16.See Frye. pp.111-12.
17.See Harold Skulsky. 'Revenge. Honor. and Conscience in
Hamlet'. fMLA. 85 (1970). p.78.
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his helpless victim. His barbaric act. however. identifies
him with fortune's rule:
Out. out. thou strumpet Fortune! All you gods
In general synod take away her power.
Break all the spokes and fellies from her wheel.
And bowl the round nave down the hill of heaven
As low as to the fiends. 11.2.489-93.
The act of vengeance is an act of injustice. recoded as an
exemplum of fortune's dominion over human affairs. From the
murder of Priam. the speech moves to the grief-stricken
Hecuba. and the prospect of her suffering and loss prompts
another attack on 'Fortune's state' (11.2.507). presented in
terms of the pity and outrage felt for the victim of
injustice. a passion to which even the gods may be subject
(II.2.S14).
The player's speech. then. identifies two forms of passion:
the passion of vengeance which perpetrates injustice. and the
passion that responds to the suffering inflicted by that
injustice. The latter is presented as a moral faculty. as the
capacity to feel both indignation at an inhuman act and pity
for its victim. The player himself. with his pallor and
tears. embodies this intense fellow-feeling. and it is his
emotional identification with Hecuba's anguish that arouses
Hamlet's bitter self-recriminations in the '0 what a rogue and
peasant slave' soliloquy. The prince berates himself for not
being able to conjure up as much feeling for the victim of a
real injustice as the player does for 'a fiction'. 'a dream of
passion' (II.2.546) :
- no. not for a king.
Upon whose property and most dear life
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A damn'd defeat was made. II.2.564-66.
Hamlet claims that he lacks the passion to respond to
unjust suffering because he has not taken the retaliatory
action that is the measure or proof of passion. But in the
speech that has indirectly provoked his self-contempt.
retaliatory action belongs to Pyrrhus. whose savagery extends
fortune's sway over the world. And Hamlet. like Pyrrhus. is
an interested party: it is not just that the injustice to
which the hero must respond is real rather than fictional. but
that he. unlike the player. is related to the injured party:
'What's Hecuba to him. or he to her. / That he should weep for
her?' (I1.2.553-54). Trapped within the revenge ethic, Hamlet
is paralysed by the contradiction between the player's and
Pyrrhus's perspectives. For if he tells us in the soliloquy
that he does not feel enough. his self-reproaches inform us
that he does after all feel something: that he feels ashamed
for lacking the impulse to act. The soliloquy shows us. then,
that the prince is not wanting in moral commitment. but that
because revenge is the only action available to him, he is
split between moral intention and immoral implementation.
What Hamlet fails to feel is the impetus to revenge: and his
almost hysterical self-disparagement reflects both his
bewilderment at an apparently unaccountable procrastination.
and his attempt to whip himself up into the feelings he
requires in order to assume the role of avenging son.
Hamlet's self-reproaches are focussed on the question of
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honour. the internal mechanism that impels action. It is
honour he betrays by his failure to act - a failure he sees as
indicative of the sluggish indolence disparaged by the Ghost:
Yet 1.
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal. peak
Like John-a-dreams. unpregnant of my cause.
11.2.561-63.
The identification of dishonour with moral laxity and idle
self-absorption culminates in the charge of cowardice:
Am 1 a coward?
Who calls me villain. breaks my pate across.
Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face.
Tweaks me by the nose. gives me the lie
i'th'throat
As deep as to the lungs - who does me this?
Hal
'Swounds. I should take it: for it cannot be
But I am pigeon-liver'd and lack gall
To make oppression bitter. or ere this
I should ha' fatted all the region kites
With this slave's offal. 11.2.566-76.
Yet the soliloquy presents this cowardly failure to act
against injustice in a curious context. For the wrongs to
which Hamlet imagines himself too fainthearted to respond are
directed at the self: they are contemptuous insults which
diminish the recipient and so damage his honour. Hamlet is
punishing himself in these lines by transmuting his own sense
of shame into an implicitly public humiliation: he is seen to
be as worthless as he feels himself to be. But this
publicly-witnessed 'oppression' at the hands of an imaginary
assailant is what begins to generate animosity towards the
real oppressor. Claudius: it is by imagining himself on the
receiving end of injurious and degrading treatment that Hamlet
works himself up into a frenzy of rancour and bloodlust
towards his opponent. expressed in the swiftly-executed.
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brutal deed visualised in the passage and in the prince's
hysterical invective:
Bloody. bawdy villainl
Remorseless. treacherous. lecherous. kindless
villainl II.2.576-77.
The passion that Hamlet needs in order to act the part of
avenging son is the passion of a wounded ego; what stimulates
the son to avenge an injury inflicted on his father is 'gall'.
the spiteful feelings towards one's scornful enemy. Thus. the
task of revenge. based in the imperative of family honour.
dictates that action against injustice becomes retaliation
against the adversary who has injured one's honour. and that
honour itself becomes a kind of passionate self-regard. a
determination to assert one's right to respect by refusing to
endure contemptuous treatment. Hamlet's paralysing
predicament is clear enough. He must act. but if he does. he
will act not for virtue. but for the self.
Hamlet's dilemma is expressed in the ebb and flow of the
soliloquy. Although he has managed to generate the avenger's
passion. it clearly lacks conviction. for he promptly
dismisses its rant and fury as demeaning and contemptible.
This is followed in its turn by his plan to test the truth of
the Ghost's revelations. However one interprets the
play-plot. one thing remains clear: it demonstrates Hamlet's
conviction that the value of the cause is what determines the
nature of the deed. whether it is moral or immoral. virtuous
or damnable. In this. he is quite unlike Troilus. who
dismisses such scruples as craven. Hamlet makes plain. then.
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how far he is from endorsing honour's equation of moral worth
with action ~~. Yet although the soliloquy exhibits
his distaste for honour's spurious moral discourse. it also
clarifies his unavoidable connection with it. Thus. if the
play-plot legitimises the prince's cause. it will at the same
time confirm him in the role of avenging son.
The appearance of the 'To be or not to be' soliloquy
directly after the formulation of the play-plot suggests that
Hamlet's new plan of action cannot afford him even a temporary
respite. The soliloquy is essentially a continuation of the
inquiry into how to deal with fortune. The 'question' with
which the soliloquy begins presents two alternatives: to
endure the 'slings and arrows of outrageous fortune'
(II1.1.58) or 'to take arms against a sea of troubles / And by
opposing end them.' (III.1.59 -60) . It is the relative
nobility of patience or opposition which Hamlet considers in
these much-discussed lines. Scholarly controversy has centred
on the second option: what kind of resistance is Hamlet
proposing? Although many answers have been given. critics
fall roughly into two camps. claiming either that Hamlet is
thinking about killing the king or that he is contemplating
suicide.18
18.Supporters of the theory that Hamlet is contemplating
suicide in the soliloquy include John Dover Wilson. ~
Happens in 'Hamlet'. pp.127-28: G.B. Harrison. Shakespeare's
Traiedies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1951). p.100:
Paul N. Siegel. Shakespearean Traiedy and the Elizabethan
Compromise (New York: New York Univ. Press. 1957). p.108:
Philip Edwards. ed. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. The New
Cambridge Shakespeare. pp.48-50: and Martin Dodsworth. Hamlet
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One version of the former theory sees Hamlet making a
choice between enduring injustice and taking resolute action
against it.19 According to this reading. the soliloquy offers
the possibility of constructive action - by 'opposing' one's
troubles. one 'ends' them - and then turns abruptly to a
secondary consideration: that action against Claudius will
lead to Hamlet's own death: 'To die - to sleep. / No more'
(111.1.60-61). The weakness of this reading lies in the fact
that the soliloquy provides no real indication that a break in
the flow of Hamlet's thoughts has taken place. When such a
break does occur a few lines on - 'To sleep. perchance to
dream - ay. there's the rub' (II1.1.65) - we are left in no
doubt that it has taken place. The line. 'And by opposing end
them. To die - to sleep'. does not suggest that a contingent
event (the prince's death) has been foreseen. Rather. it
implies that the phrase 'To die' defines the condition of the
cessation of adversity; in other words. that one opposes and
ends 'a sea of troubles' only by drowning in it. But if death
cannot be seen simply as an inadvertent outcome of avenging
(Footnote 18 continued from previous page)
Closely Observed. pp.114-1S. Other scholars have interpreted
the soliloquy, with varying emphases. as a debate on the
relative claims of action and passivity. Among these are I.T.
Richards. 'The Meaning of Hamlet's Soliloquy'. eMLA. XLVIII
(1933). 741-66; Hiram Haydn. The Counter-Renaissance (New
York: Harcourt. Brace and World. Inc .. 1950). pp.628-30;
Eleanor Prosser. Hamlet and Revenie. pp.160-73; and Catherine
Belsey. 'The Case of Hamlet's Conscience'.
19.1 am here summarising Eleanor Prosser's reading of the
soliloquy's opening lines. See Hamlet and Revenie.
pp.161.166-67.
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action. neither can it be seen as the inevitable consequence
of a futile defiance of omnipotent fortune.20 The
construction 'by opposing end them' implies that conquering
one's troubles through death is not the unavoidable result.
but the purpose of 'opposing' them.21 This becomes still
clearer when the phrase is viewed in context:
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles
And by opposing end them. To die - to sleep.
No more: and by a sleep to say we end
The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to: 'tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish'd. III.1.59-64.
The repetition of the verb 'end' stresses that the objective
of opposing 'troubles' is the termination of suffering. an
objective that can be attained only by intentionally embracing
death. The contest with fortune ~ futile. in the sense that
one cannot seriously challenge her control over the sublunary
sphere. But there is one act through which the individual can
oppose her by asserting his independence of her - and that act
is. of course. suicide. It seems clear that the two
alternative responses to fortune which Hamlet offers in the
opening lines of the soliloquy are endurance or
self-slaughter. the latter envisaged not as a cowardly retreat
from life. but as a courageous act competing for the title of
superior nobility.
Nevertheless. one can detect no note of triumphant defiance
20.See Jenkins's long note. The Arden Shakespeare; Hamlet.
pp.490-91.
21.See Skulsky's illuminating analysis of this passage, p.82.
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in Hamlet's hypothetical victory over fortune through suicide.
The two options he puts forward are ghastly because they
assume that there is no possibility of subverting fortune's
power. no hope of constructively changing the world. In the
drastically reduced scope of human nobility which he presents
to himself. his soliloquy tells us that Hamlet. about to test
Claudius's guilt and possibly act against him. feels powerless
to accomplish his task of rectifying the world. The unspoken
assumption underlying this sense of impotence must be that
revenge is incapable of repairing the condition of Denmark.22
The world-view which Hamlet holds at this point in the drama
reflects the despair induced by his inability to correct what
he feels he must correct. Life. which in the first soliloquy
was meaningless and corrupt. has now become an unalterable
condition of oppression. which subjects its victims to a
punishing succession of wrongs and humiliations:
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time.
Th'oppressor's wrong. the proud man's contumely.
The pangs of dispriz'd love. the law's delay.
The insolence of office. and the spurns
That patient merit of th'unworthy takes ....
III.1.70-74.
The world of the soliloquy is one riddled with injustice and
the undeserved misery it inflicts. over which fortune holds
absolute sway. In such a world. Hamlet identifies with the
victims: yet his soliloquy indicates that because this
identification is powerless. he includes himself among their
22.See Edwards's 'Introduction'. Hamlet. Prince of Denmark.
The New Cambridge Shakespeare. p.48. I am indebted for my
interpretation of the soliloquy to Prof. Edwards's insightful
reading.
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number. He too is at the mercy of fortune's blows.
In his impotence. Hamlet sees the condition of Denmark as
the irrevocable human condition and entertains the idea of
suicide as the only path of active opposition left open to
him. But that path too is quickly closed by 'the dread of
something after death' (IILL 78). The vision of suicide as
an honourable act derives from a long pagan tradition.
associated particularly with certain schools of Stoicism.
which interprets the taking of one's life as both rational and
heroic. the act through which a man declares himself master of
his destiny by voluntarily removing himself from adversity.23
This tradition was repudiated by Christian doctrine. which
regarded suicide not as a moral action. but as an infringement
of the sixth commandment.24 Hamlet's fear of the uncertain
end awaiting him in the next world is not presented in
explicitly Christian terms: 'what dreams may come', 'something
after death'. the 'undiscover'd country' (111.1.66.78.79) -
these phrases evoke the human tendency to fear what we cannot
know. However. the play does. of course, make unequivocal
23.For an account of Stoic attitudes to suicide, see J.M. Rist
Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969).
pp.17.130.231-54. Prof. Rist stresses that the Stoics had no
single theory of suicide. though most Stoic thinkers
considered it a rational act. an expression of self-mastery to
be undertaken after due consideration and under reasonable
circumstances. It is in the works of Seneca that suicide is
exalted as the ultimate expression of human freedom.
24.Although there appears to be no specific biblical
injunction against suicide. the Church consistently viewed it
as an act of homicide. See St. Augustine. The City of God,
trans. John Healey. 2 vols. (London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd ..
1945). I. 1.16-27.
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reference to the Christian injunction against suicide - in the
Everlasting's 'canon 'gainst self-slaughter' (1.2.132). and in
the gravedigger's malaprop inquiry into the circumstances of
Ophelia's death: 'Is she to be buried in Christian burial.
when she wilfully seeks her own salvation?' (V.1.1- 2) .
In view of this explicitly Christian context. it is
difficult to interpret Hamlet's fear of the afterlife as
anything other than a recognition of the possibility that he
will be punished in the next world for an act that contravenes
divine law. His uneasiness would therefore seem to represent
the result not of a morally neutral reflective process. but of
moral anxiety about the nature of the proposed action. The
faculty which thwarts his resolution by generating disquiet is
identified as conscience: 'Thus conscience does make cowards
of us all. , Cl II. 1.83) .
There seems little justification for the widespread gloss
of conscience as 'consciousness,.2S The passage from Timon of
Athens often invoked in its defence is exceptional in the
2S.J. Dover Wilson. ed •. The Traiedy of Hamlet. Prince of
Denmark (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1936) gives
'reflection. consciousness': Irving Ribner and George Lyman
Kittredge. eds .. The Complete Works of Shakespeare (Waltham.
Mass. and Toronto: Xerox College Publishing. 1971) read
'consciousness. reflection. consideration': G. Blakemore
Evans. ed .. The Riverside Shakespeare (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin. 1974) gives 'reflection (but with some of the modern
sense too).' Bradley. in Shakespearean Traiedy. advocates the
gloss ·consciousness'. In contrast. the ~ favours the
modern sense. as do Jenkins. in The Arden Shakespeare; Hamlet.
and Edwards. in Hamlet. Prince of Denmark. The New Cambridge
Shakespeare.
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Shakespearean canon: 'Canst thou the conscience lack / To
think I shall lack friends?' (11.2.170-71) .26 Shakespeare
more commonly uses the word 'conscience' to mean the moral
faculty that distinguishes between right and wrong. and in
this he conforms with what several scholars have shown to be
customary Elizabethan usage.27 Richard III offers
particularly striking parallels with the Hamlet passage. for
the play consistently presents 'conscience' as the inner voice
of moral judgement which inhibits action by warning of its
consequences. For example. the second murderer hired to kill
Clarence fears 'to be damned for killing him. from the which
no warrant can defend me.' (I.4.107-109). though. corrupted by
earthly reward. he finally dismisses conscience as cowardice:
'I'll not meddle with it: it makes a coward .... '
(1.4.126).28 In Hamlet. the word occurs on seven other
occasions. each of which strongly implies the modern sense.29
26.Reference is to The Arden Shakespeare: Timon Of Athens. ed.
H.J. Oliver (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .• 1959).
27.See. for example. The Arden Shakespeare: Henry V. ed. J.H.
Walter (London and New York: Methuen and Co .• 1954). 1.2.96:
The Arden Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice. ed. John
Russell Brown (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .. 1955), II.2.1-30:
Ibe Arden Shakespeare; Titus Andronicu§. ed. J.e. Maxwell
(London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .. 1961). V.1.74-78; The Arden
Shakespeare; Othello, ed. M.R. Ridley (London: Methuen and Co.
Ltd .. 1958). 1.2.1-3 and 111.3.206-208. Scholars who uphold
the modern reading of conscience by reference to Elizabethan
usage include Joseph. pp.108-10; Prosser. p.169; and Belsey.
'The Case of Hamlet's Conscience', pp.127-48.
2a.Reference is to The Arden Shakespeare; Richard III. ed.
Antony Hammond (London and New York: Methuen. 1981). See also
V.3.310-312.
29.See 11.2.601: 111.1.50: IV.5.132: IV.7.1.: V.2.58: V.2.67:
V.2.300.
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Indeed. Claudius employs it in this way immediately before the
'To be or not to be' soliloquy. when he reveals his guilt to
the audience for the first time: 'How smart a lash that speech
doth give my conscience.' (III.1.50).
Scholars who favour the reading 'consciousness' gain some
support from the apparent apposition between the conscience
that makes us cowards and 'the pale cast of thought' that
'sicklies o'er' 'the native hue of resolution' (111.1.84-85).
'Thought' might suggest that action is impeded not by the
internal moral arbiter. but by heightened awareness and
reflection. However. 'thought' need not be a non-moral term
here; it can plausibly be seen as a property of the moral
judgement. Protestant divines like William Perkins followed
Aquinas in regarding conscience as a function of the human
understanding. as a rational principle that arrived at moral
decisions 'by a kind of reasoning or disputing' .30 Catherine
Belsey. in her valuable study. 'The Case of Hamlet's
Conscience'. has shown that in the morality tradition one of
the principal roles assigned to the allegorical Conscience was
that of encouraging the wayward hero to think: 'In what
occupation that ever ye be. / Always. or ye begin to think on
the ending' .31 It is in the nature of its evaluative function
that conscience should be identified with deliberation.
30.From A Discourse of Conscience. quoted Belsey. p.132.
31.From The World and the Child. quoted Belsey. p.134.
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For Romantic commentators from Coleridge on. 'the pale cast
of thought' denoted the excessive powers of introspection that
make Hamlet unequal to the duty of revenge. It seems closer
to the spirit of the speech and the play to interpret the
phrase as a reference to the thoughts prompted by conscience
which neutralise the hero's search for an honourable mode of
action. For Hamlet. seeking a way out of an impasse.
conscience cannot provide a satisfactory answer or in any way
enable him to understand his predicament. It merely sentences
him to passivity and self-loathing. to a tameness in the face
of injustice and corruption that can only seem to him like
cowardice and dishonour. Hence his bitter equation of
conscience with cowardice. with the 'thought' that infects and
debilitates the healthy vigour of resolution.
It is at this point in the soliloquy that Hamlet moves from
a specific meditation on suicide to a generalised
consideration of 'enterprises of great pitch and moment'
(III.l.86). inhibited by the same 'regard' of conscience
(111.1.87). If. as seems likely. Hamlet is now alluding to
his appointed task. then we can deduce that his original
'question'. prompted by despair at his inability to counter
the corruption of fortune and Denmark. expressed his anxiety
about private revenge. So 'conscience' opposes not only
suicide. but also revenge. Hamlet has to associate it with
dishonour ('Thus conscience does make cowards of us all')
because he needs to act. Yet the soliloquy tells us that if
he ~ act. he will have to do so without regard for the
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morality of the action. as Fortinbras and later Laertes will
act. It would seem. then. that it is Hamlet's moral
intelligence which both paralyses and torments him. for it
understands simultaneously the necessity of constructive
action and the insufficiency of the only forms of action open
to him. It pulls him in opposite directions. towards two
conflicting and incompatible truths. Hamlet's predicament
once again emerges in the form of that contradictory honour
which his moral being at once demands and restrains.
The scene depicting the play-within-the-play examines
honour within the cluster of ideas which the play has
established: passion. fortune. constancy. Hamlet's advice to
the players focusses on excessive passion as a distortion of
the mimetic principle of dramatic art; it misrepresents
nature. What he advocates is not the eradication. but the
tempering of passion:
for in the very torrent. tempest. and. as I may
say. whirlwind of your passion. you must acquire
and beget a temperance that may give it
smoothness. 111.2.5-8.
This notion of the control of passion forms the basis of
Hamlet's speech in praise of Horatio. What Hamlet admires in
his friend is his indifference to fortune:
for thou hast been
As one. in suff'ring all. that suffers nothing.
A man that Fortune's buffets and rewards
Hast ta'en with equal thanks. . . . 111.2.65-68.
Horatio does not endure 'outrageous fortune': rather. he
receives her 'buffets and rewards' with 'equal thanks'.
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Hamlet goes on to identify this immunity from fortune with
self-control:
and blest are those
Whose blood and judgement are so well commeddled
That they are not a pipe for Fortune's finger
To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
That is not passion's slave. and I will wear him
In my heart's core. ay. in my heart of heart.
As I do thee. 111.2.68-74
Because Horatio's 'blood and judgement' are commingled. he is
not the slave of his own irrational passions. Again. Hamlet
favours the rational restraint. not the extinction. of
passion. The man who attains this self-mastery is 'blest'. or
happy. possessed of an inner stability impervious to the
fluctuations of circumstance.
What Hamlet celebrates in Horatio unquestionably resembles
the twin Stoic ideals of honour and tranquillity. Stoic
ethics sought immunity from the suffering caused by factors
outside the individual's control. Peace of mind resides
within a man and is a property of his virtue. which consists
in the deliberate control of irrational impulses. It is this
condition of rational self-command that the Stoics termed
'honour'. Through it. a man comes to own himself and so
achieve independence of fortune's caprices. Although suicide
would seem incompatible with an ethical theory devised to make
fortune impotent. the Stoics generally held that it was
rational and honourable to remove oneself from external evils
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when they endangered one's integrity.32 We have encountered
this Stoic idea of suicide in the 'To be or not to be'
soliloquy. and Horatio. declaring himself 'more an antique
Roman than a Dane' (V.2.346). will seek the same
self-liberation at the end of the play. What is less
recognizably Stoic in Hamlet's eulogy is his formulation of
the 'commedd1ing' of reason and passion; for although the term
apathia originally referred to the conquest not of passion as
such. but of reckless and destructive desires. it was
generally mistaken during both antiquity and the Renaissance
for the total abolition of emotion.33 It is clear.
nevertheless. that the stable self based on the fusion of
blood and judgement has the Stoic aim of control over the
irrational desires that make us the creatures of fortune.
This connection between unrestrained passion and subjection
to fortune has another point of reference in the speech.
Hamlet begins his eulogy of Horatio with a consideration of
the nature of choice which reintroduces the subject of
objective and subjective judgement:
Why should the poor be flatter'd?
No. let the candied tongue lick absurd pomp.
And crook the pregnant hinges of the knee
Where thrift may follow fawning. Oast thou hear?
32.St. Augustine pointed out the contradiction in Stoic
doctrine. See The City of God. II. xix.4. At the end of
Julius Caesar. Brutus criticises suicide as unStoic. but is
compelled to embrace it himself out of regard for his honour.
See The Arden Shakespeare: Julius Caesar. ed. T.S. Dorsch
(London and New York: Methuen. 1955). V.1.101-120.
33.See Rist. pp.26.34.52-53. and The Cambridie History of
Renaissance Philosophy. ed. Charles B. Schmitt (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988). pp. 361-67.
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Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice.
And could of men distinguish her election.
Sh'ath seal'd thee for herself.
111.2.59-65.
Hamlet's choice of Horatio as a friend. based on knowledge of
his merit. is contrasted with the false friendship of those
who choose opportunistically. On this level. his speech
reiterates the abhorrence of subjectivism that has estranged
Hamlet from Elsinore and from Rosencrantz and Guildenstern.
the false friends (as he sees them) whose dismissal
immediately precedes his warm reception of his real friend and
confidant. Hamlet's friendship with Horatio preserves those
principles - the independent recognition of value. the
existence of moral distinctions - that are the condition of
his own sense of purpose as a man and a prince. The speech
reaffirms the convictions which the soliloquies have shown to
be frustrated by their necessary connection with private
revenge.
Hamlet. of course. envies his friend's tranquillity with an
intensity which suggests that it is for him an unattainable
ideal. What distinguishes him from Horatio is that he has the
task of eradicating fortune's sway over the values of the
court of Denmark. And this is a task. as we have seen. which
prohibits the blending of blood and judgement: which turns
objective value into subjective desire. and passionate
indignation into immoral action. Hamlet cannot act without
becoming 'passion's slave' and he cannot renounce action
without submitting to injurious fortune. Either way. he is 'a
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pipe for fortune's finger'. It is not hard to understand why
Horatio's honourable self-mastery should inspire Hamlet's
admiration.
The play-within-the-play which rapidly follows Hamlet's
eulogy of Horatio continues to attend to the motifs of
passion. constancy and fortune. which are a striking feature
of this sustained phase of the dramatic action. The climax of
the 'Mousetrap' - the re-enactment of the murder of King
Hamlet in order to test Claudius's guilt - is delayed by a
lengthy discussion of why men do not do what they purpose to
do. The player queen's vows of undying love are answered by
the player king's speech on the difficulties of keeping one's
resolutions. more specifically. of translating one's feelings
into action:
The violence of either grief or joy
Their own enactures with themselves destroy.
III.2.191-92.
A promise has no meaning unless it is enacted. fulfilled in
deeds.34 Two reasons are given why vows of constant love are
not kept: first. as the above passage implies. because
purposes inspired by passion are intrinsically unstable:
secondly. because love is often guided by fortune. and so
fluctuates in accordance with the prosperity of its object.
In the context of the episode. the vow in question is the
marriage oath. and the conduct required that of a faithful
34.The QED glosses 'enacture' as 'carrying into act.
fulfilment' .
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wife and widow. On this level. the second of the player
king's explanations for infidelity. like the entire sequence
of the 'Mousetrap'. clearly alludes to the hypocrisy of
Gertrude's protestations of love. Yet the player king's
speech is not only specific: its gnomic couplets also make a
statement of general truths. This stylised. sententious
quality has regularly led critics to see it as a comment on
Hamlet's own failure to act. If this is so. the speech makes
indirect reference to honour. a particular instance of
constancy. or. more accurately. to dishonour. the failure to
'honour' a promise. The player king sees life as dominated by
mutability. forgetfulness. opportunism - to the extent that he
cannot know whether 'love lead fortune or else fortune love'
(111.2.198). and concludes that 'Our thoughts are ours. their
ends none of our own.' (111.2.208). Love fades with time. so
constancy becomes. as it were. a race against time. If love
is enlarged to include filial love (as it must if the speech
is to be seen as alluding to Hamlet's delay). then. when
revenge is demanded by love. action has to be swift to
overtake the progress of forgetfulness. Once again. the
criterion of sincerity. or honour. becomes rapidity rather
than legitimacy of execution. action rather than scruple.
This oblique commentary on revenge honour is perhaps
grasped more readily in the study than in the theatre.
However. the hints it provides will be made explicit later
in the play when Claudius employs the player king's two
explanations of inconstancy in order to hustle Laertes into
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adopting a criminal plot to recover his family honour. Its
function. for the moment. is to make clear that the principles
of inconstancy applying to Gertrude are identical to those
applying to Hamlet. and that the obligations of love coincide
with the obligations of vengeance.
It is at this point in the play. then. when Claudius's
guilt has been verified independently of the Ghost and Hamlet
knows that he must act. that he is depicted most clearly as
the avenging son. During the play-within-the-play. Hamlet's
commentary has exhibited a state of mounting excitement. and
the tone of his brief concluding soliloquy strongly suggests
that ocular proof of Claudius's guilt has generated the hatred
and bloodlust of an avenger:
'Tis now the very witching time of night.
When churchyards yawn and hell itself breathes out
Contagion to this world. Now could I drink hot
blood.
And do such bitter business as the day
Would quake to look on. 111.2.379-83.
Hamlet is here speaking the traditional language of blood
revenge. familiar to us from his blood-thirsty rant in the
'0 what a rogue and peasant slave' soliloquy. On that
occasion. Hamlet's rhetorical extravagance clearly lacked
authenticity. Is this latest assumption of the role he is
required to play equally artificial? Both speeches display an
abrupt change of register. from the language of blood to the
language of reflection:
Soft. now to my mother.
o heart. lose not thy nature. Let not ever
The soul of Nero enter this firm bosom. . .
111.2.383-85.
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However. it is clear that Hamlet's attitude to the role of
revenger has changed: he is no longer deriding a sensational
idiom which he has strained to generate. but seeking to calm
his own homicidal impulses in anticipation of his meeting with
Gertrude. He thinks himself capable at this moment of
murdering his own mother. What Hamlet's state of mind is at
this point has been variously debated.35 From the perspective
of the play's interrogation of revenge honour. however. the
speech can be read as exhibiting at once the terrifying extent
to which he has at last achieved identity with the role of
avenging son and his attempt to stand outside the role and
impose restraints upon it. There is a tension between the
revenger and the moral being. who maintains just enough
control to bridle his bloodlust.
Hamlet. then. obeys the Ghost's command to leave Gertrude
'to heaven'. at least to the extent that he will not take
retributive action against her. However. he does not obey the
Ghost's further instruction to leave her 'to those thorns that
in her bosom lodge I To prick and sting her.' (1.5.87-88).
Hamlet's determination to punish Gertrude with words. if not
with daggers. reflects the moral motive inherent in his
35.Eleanor Prosser interprets the speech as a sign of Hamlet's
decline into inhuman ferocity (pp.185-86). Philip Edwards. on
the other hand. suggests that the line. 'Now could I drink hot
blood'. should be spoken with 'a shiver of apprehension and
disgust'. and reflects Hamlet's fear that he may be slipping
into hellish activity. See the 'Introduction' to Hamlet.
Prince of Denmark. The New Cambridge Shakespeare. p.52.
Martin Dodsworth sees the speech as a piece of play-acting in
which Hamlet tries out the traditional role of avenger
(p.l77).
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conception of 'action'. We cannot assume that because Hamlet
obeys Gertrude's summons rather than immediately seeking
Claudius. he has allowed his desire to awaken her conscience
to take precedence over the duty of revenge. Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern have just announced that the king is 'in his
retirement' (111.2.293): and when Hamlet goes to his mother.
he does not hesitate to kill when he thinks he has Claudius at
his mercy. What we can say. however. is that the reformative
impulse remains entangled with the retributive one.
On his way to his mother's closet. Hamlet comes upon
Claudius at prayer. but decides that to kill him there and
then would be insufficiently severe: 'Up. sword. and know thou
a more horrid hent .... ' (111.3.88). To expedite Claudius's
soul to heaven. or at the very least to purgatory. would fail
to meet the criterion of revenge. and repay an injury with
reward rather than punishment:
A villain kills my father. and for that
I. his sole son. do this same villain send
To heaven.
Why. this is hire and salary. not revenge.
III.3.76-79.
Retributive justice cannot countenance killing a man who has
denied his brother the last rites when that man is. or seems
to be. in a state of grace. Nor would such a deed count as
honourable. The phrase 'hire and salary' suggests a gross
betrayal of the filial relationship: it is as if Hamlet had
hired Claudius to murder his father and were now paying him
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his wages.36 To kill Claudius at prayer seems tantamount to
proof that Hamlet does not love his father, that he is in fact
a monstrous hypocrite like Claudius. To be honourable. to
translate constant love into action, is to repay his uncle's
injury in kind: thus. to be honourable is to damn Claudius's
soul.
In this speech, the desire to avoid moral degeneracy
through retaliatory action is shown to result in the
assumption of unlimited powers for the self. in the prince's
conviction that he can effect justice not only in this world.
but in the next. Through Hamlet's ludicrously inflated
conception of his own authority. the play exhibits the absurd
logic of revenge ethics. which turns plaintiff into magistrate
and law into retribution, making it 'moral' to seek the
damnation of one's enemy: Hamlet is not repudiating morality
in this speech: rather. he is making a conscious attempt to
act in a virtuous manner. according to the terms of revenge
honour. The consequences of his fidelity to the revenge ethic
are an appalling vindictiveness that. for Dr. Johnson. made
this speech 'too horrible to be read or to be uttered',37 and
36.This is Kittredge's gloss, in The Complete Works of
Shakespeare. eds. Irving Ribner and George Lyman Kittredge
(Waltham. Mass. and Toronto: Xerox College Publishing. 1971).
37.In The Plays of Shakespeare. vol.8 (London. 1765). Modern
scholars who agree with Dr. Johnson's verdict include Irving
Ribner. Patterns in Shakespearian Traaedy. p.77: Paul
Gottschalk. 'Hamlet and the Scanning of Revenge'. p.165; and
Roland Mushat Frye. The Renaissance 'Hamlet'; Issues and
Responses in 1600. p.135. G.B. Harrison. in Shakespeare's
Traaedies, p.l03. sees the playas here employing an
acceptable theatrical convention.
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pride. the conviction of his own unlimited moral authority.
The perspective of honour on the play does not force us to
claim. with numerous critics. that Hamlet is procrastinating
in this speech. or that he is too sensitive to murder a
defenceless man.38 He is simply trapped in the logic of
revenge. imposed on him by an authority at once paternal.
royal and otherworldly.
Hamlet's exorbitant claims are immediately deflated in the
closet scene. Thinking he hears Claudius eavesdropping behind
the arras. the prince acts swiftly and decisively. and
promptly kills the wrong man. Far from exhibiting an
unlimited control. the murder of Polonius suggests Hamlet's
essential powerlessness to effect his own designs. The
dispenser of justice commits an injustice that makes him the
villain in a cause that mirrors his own. Yet his murder of
Polonius does not deflect him from his verbal assault on
Gertrude's complacency. Hamlet's apparent lack of remorse has
often drawn the censure of critics.39 and there is no denying
that he is now worked up into a pitch of frenzied excitement.
38.Peter Alexander. in Hamlet. Father and Son (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press. 1955). pp.144-47. and C.J. Sisson. in
Shakespeare's Traaic Justice (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd ..
1962). pp.68-69. have put forward the influential argument
that the scene illustrates the prince's inability to kill a
defenceless man. Supporters of the procrastination theory
include Hazlitt. in Characters of Shakespeare's Plays (London:
Oxford Univ. Press. 1916). p.83. and Bradley. in Shakespearean
Traaedy. pp.134-35.
39.See Prosser. p.195; Edwards. 'Introduction'. Hamlet Prince
of Denmark. The New Cambridge Shakespeare. p.54; and de
Madariaga. pp.22-23.
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The device of the two portraits. to be sure. suggests that
Hamlet is trying to raise his mother's moral consciousness by
enforcing upon her the necessity of objective value. Yet his
tirades are not disinterested exhortations. but feverish
castigations which suggest the extent to which Hamlet's own
inner stability has been damaged by his mother's apparent
betrayal of her first husband and. with him. of the
distinction between virtue and vice. Her conduct seems to him
to call 'virtue hypocrite'. to pluck the soul from 'the body
of contraction' and to make 'sweet religion' a 'rhapsody of
words' (111.4.42.46-48). Indeed. her sensuality becomes
exemplary licence:
Rebellious hell.
If thou canst mutine in a matron's bones.
To flaming youth let virtue be as wax
And melt in her own fire .... 111.4.82-85.
Hamlet's bitter words to Gertrude at the start of the scene -
'You are the Queen. your husband's brother's wife. / And.
would it were not so. you are my mother.' (111.4.14-15) -
indicate how desperately important it is for him that his
mother should not be vicious. that he is trying to purge and
reclaim her for his own sake. not merely for hers.
It is a commonplace of criticism that in his reproof of his
mother. Hamlet's moral language is symptomatic of a 'tainted
mind': and causal explanations. often Freudian. have not been
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in short supply.40 My argument leads me to take his professed
intention on its own terms. seeing here a moral. rather than a
merely psychological. crisis. But it does not follow that he
has escaped the contradictions of his predicament. The
anguished speeches pleading for the corroboration of his moral
values that his mother's reform would provide are delivered
over Polonius's corpse - the emblem of Hamlet's own lapse into
egoism. In this way. the scene gives dramatic form to the
gulf between moral aspiration and implementation. This
gap is widened by the reappearance of the Ghost. who has come
'to whet' Hamlet's 'almost blunted purpose' (111.4.111). to
sharpen a resolve which. as the prince sees it. has 'laps'd in
time and passion' (111.4.108). With the corpse of Polonius in
full view on the stage. it is hard not to see irony in
Hamlet's equation of his failure to execute the Ghost's 'dread
command' (111.4.109) with his own failure to take the swift
and passionate action required of the avenging son. He has
acted all right. His only failure is that he has killed the
wrong man.
Indeed. it is the gap between intention and action that
underlies Hamlet's response to the Ghost's return:
Look you how pale he glares.
His form and cause conjoin'd. preaching to stones.
Would make them capable. - Do not look upon me.
Lest with this piteous action you convert
My stern effects. Then what I have to do
40.8ee Ernest Jones. Hamlet and Oedipus (New York: The Norton
Library. 1976). pp.81-103: L.C. Knights. An Approach to
'Hamlet'. pp.64-65: Prosser. pp.195-97: and A.J.A Waldock.
'Hamlet'; A Study in Critical Methpd (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press. 1931). p.58.
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Will want true colour - tears perchance for blood.
111.4.125-30.
The Ghost's mute eloquence matches in its effects that of
Hecuba's fate on the player. and recalls the strain between
the passion of pity and the passion of retribution: Hamlet
actually fears that the Ghost's demeanour will 'convert' his
'stern effects'. turn the punitive bloody deeds he purposes
into 'tears'. The sundering of the moral indignation provoked
by the victim of injustice from retaliative action illustrates
the problematic nature of Hamlet's task in terms of two
contradictory forms of passion: that which is moral but
inactive and that which generates the 'stern effects' which we
have just seen go so disastrously wrong. Thus. the need to
act is again coupled with the certainty that action produces
something akin to moral collapse.
If Hamlet's initial lack of response to the death of
Polonius seems callous. the play subsequently indicates that
he may have grasped the terrible irony of his botched attempt
to act the avenging son:
For this same lord
I do repent; but heaven hath pleas'd it so,
To punish me with this and this with me,
That I must be their scourge and minister.
III.4.174-77.
In these lines, Hamlet does not claim the privilege of
ordaining for others. On the contrary, what he perceives is
his own lack of control. a perception that carries with it the
complementary awareness that it is he that has been made use
of. He begins to feel that he is the instrument of a greater
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plot than his own.41 In this role. Hamlet sees himself as
both punisher and punished. Thus. the death of Polonius. the
outcome of the logic of the revenge ethic. results in the
intimation of providential design. which suggests in turn the
possibility of agency. of a new form of action untainted by
egoism. The scene. however. offers no confirmation of
Hamlet's new perspective on his task. and the suggestion that
he might be able to find a way out of his impasse must be
carefully balanced against this uncertainty.
The murder of Polonius is a major dramatic climax. for it
stimulates the perception of instrumentality that will figure
so prominently in the fifth act. while initiating Laertes's
revenge upon Hamlet. out of which the play's d'nouement will
spring. For the moment. however. Hamlet's sense of
providential purpose does nothing to dispel his confusion over
his appointed task. He departs for England. his duty
unfulfilled. and in his next encounter - with Fortinbras -
returns to the problem of honour. Young Fortinbras's Polish
venture offers Hamlet an example of honourable Alan and dash:
the readiness to face death for a worthless piece of land.
Hamlet reacts by condemning the absurdity of the undertaking.
41.See Fredson Bowers. 'Hamlet as Minister and Scourge'. fHLA.
LXX (1955). 741-49. Bowers argues that Hamlet comes to
understand. at this point in the drama. that having undertaken
a purely private revenge rather than the execution of public
justice required by heaven. he has been punished by killing
the wrong man. Sister Miriam Joseph. in 'Discerning the Ghost
in Hamlet'. similarly interprets Hamlet's task in terms of the
repudiation of private revenge in favour of acting as an
instrument of Providence.
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then by spurning the shame of his own inaction.
Hamlet begins by characterising the Polish campaign as
an acte iratuit. as a manifestation of the unnatural cravings
bred by a surfeit of wealth and peace:
Two thousand souls and twenty thousand ducats
Will not debate the question of this straw!
This is th'impostume of much wealth and peace.
That inward breaks. and shows no cause without
Why the man dies. IV.4.2S-29.
The risking of so much for so little is likened to an internal
abscess. 'an inward swelling full of corrupt matter' .42 The
idea of an appearance of health masking an inner disease
recalls Hamlet's words to Gertrude:
Mother. for love of grace.
Lay not that flattering unction to your soul.
That not your trespass but my madness speaks.
It will but skin and film the ulcerous place.
Whiles rank corruption. mining all within.
Infects unseen. 111.4.146-51.
What these two instances of internal corruption share. not
surprisingly at this stage in our argument. is their basis in
subjectivism. Like Gertrude. young Fortinbras imputes value
to what he 'infectiously affects' (~. 11.2.60) - which is
clearly the opportunity to display his own courage. His
honour. the courage to face death for nothing. emerges as an
expression of appetite.
Yet once Hamlet is alone. his dismissal of honour as
appetite does not satisfy him (just as the promptings of
42.Jenkins. in The Arden Shakespeare; Hamlet. cites Randle
Cotgrave. A Dictionary of the French and Enalish Tonaues.
1611.
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conscience could not satisfy him in the 'To be or not to be'
soliloquy). for not to act (his only alternative to what
Fortinbras is doing) is no improvement on acting absurdly.
Hamlet's soliloquy begins with the question of the point of
human life:
How all occasions do inform against me.
And spur my dull revenge. What is a man
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast. no more.
Sure he that made us with such large discourse.
Looking before and after. gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fust in us unus'd. IV.4.32-39.
A man who does not use his reason - that is. whose reason does
not issue into deeds - cannot be distinguished from the
sub-rational beast. However. the only form of action open to
Hamlet is irrational revenge. as the soliloquy's first
sentence makes plain. Hamlet does not seem to have progressed
one jot: he remains trapped in the contradiction between
reason and revenge. To act is to be irrational and appetitive
like Fortinbras. Yet inaction is proof of moral
impoverishment. which takes two forms in the speech: the
'Bestial oblivion' (IV.4.40) of those who merely 'sleep and
feed'. and the 'craven scruple / Of thinking too precisely on
th'event .... '(IV.4.40-41).
One of the major problems of the soliloquy is the phrase
'craven scruple'. for scruples are concerned not merely with
'th'event' (here death as the outcome of action). but with
'th'event' as it relates to the moral quality of the deed.
As in the 'To be or not to be' soliloquy. conscience makes us
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fear the possibility not of death merely. but of damnation.
To reject such scruples as less wisdom than cowardice
(IV.4.42-43) therefore entails endorsing action regardless of
its nature. It is to make action the basis of virtue. and to
relocate virtue not in the cause. but in the courage. of the
acting subject. Under the impulse of Hamlet's own shame and
guilt. the soliloquy becomes an exaltation of 'divine
ambition' for its own sake:
Witness this army of such mass and charge.
Led by a delicate and tender prince.
Whose spirit. with divine ambition puff'd.
Makes mouths at the invisible event.
Exposing what is mortal and unsure
To all that fortune. death. and danger dare.
Even for an eggshell. IV.4.47-53.
In this formulation. virtue becomes a function of the
self-consistent will.
In this soliloquy. Hamlet. in effect. wants it both ways.
The curious formulation of honour in the speech - the honour
that rejects both bestial oblivion and craven scruple - evokes
the ambiguity of his own duty. For although the prince.
unlike Fortinbras. has a cause - 'a father kill'd. a mother
stain'd' (IV.4.57) - that cause is itself inseparable from the
imperative of private revenge. which the play has shown to be
rooted in an egocentric honour which exalts the self at the
expense of conscience. Thus. if Hamlet acts to overcome
bestial oblivion. he will do so only by scorning scruples as
cowardice. The soliloquy shows Hamlet attempting to reconcile
the two levels of his task. but their incompatibility
expresses itself in the form of two contradictory
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propositions:
Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument.
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
When honour's at the stake. IV.4.53-56.
Capell's reading. that the single negative should be taken in
a double sense ('Is not not to stir') .43 surely deprives the
passage of both its complexity and dramatic consistency. For
Hamlet is here seeking to harmonise the two inseparable but
mutually exclusive aspects of his relationship to action: in
the first. the subject derives his greatness from the
greatness of his cause; in the second. greatness derives
from the subject's determination to act. regardless of the
worth of the cause. when his own honour. or moral substance.
is in question. One formulation associates virtue with
the intrinsic nature of the action. the other equates the
cause with the self and makes the function of action
self-vindication. In short. the one is rational and
objective. the other subjective and passional. Hamlet
declares that his task appeals simultaneously to 'my reason
and my blood' (IV.4.58). yet in the soliloquy. and indeed in
the playas a whole. these two impulses to action are mutually
inimical in the sense that the latter undoes the former. that
is to say. transforms the aspiration to active virtue into a
self-centred passion.
43.Edward Capell. Mr. William Shakespeare, his Comedies.
Histories. and Traiedies. vol.1D (London: 1767-68). Harold
Jenkins. in The Arden Shakespeare: Hamlet. adopts Capell's
reading. as does Philip Edwards. in Hamlet Princ@ pf D@nmark.
The New Cambridge Shakespeare.
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We have argued that this contradiction. in one form or
another. has informed the progress of the play's tragic
conflict. It has shaped Hamlet's soliloquies. manifesting
itself in a self-recriminative delay expressing simultaneously
his belief that he is morally obliged to act and his distance
from the form of action required of him. The play has shown.
moreover. that when Hamlet does manage to generate the passion
necessary to obey the Ghost's directive. the result is an
appalling moral debacle. Confronted with the Fortinbras
soliloquy. one is tempted to conclude that. having been unable
to sustain that pitch of emotional intensity. Hamlet reverts
to the preoccupations that held him before the sight of
Claudius's guilt drove him into action. Yet this final
soliloquy differs from its predecessors in one important
respect: it states explicitly to the audience for the first
time the tragic contradiction in which Hamlet is trapped.
Does this suggest that it is at last rising to the surface of
his consciousness? If so. we can regard it at this stage as
no more than a preliminary tremor which does nothing to
release Hamlet from his predicament. for the speech as a whole
drives on towards its climactic resolution:
O. from this time forth
My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth.
IV.4.65-66.
This is the last we hear from Hamlet until his return from his
sea voyage at the beginning of Act V .
••••••••••••••••••••
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During the prince's temporary absence from Denmark, the
play keeps the nature of revenge honour before our eyes in its
second cycle of revenge. Laertes provides a portrait of
revenge in its simplest terms. For the son of Polonius, the
duty of private vengeance is just that; it has none of the
public or moral implications that complicate Hamlet's task.
His highest imperative is family honour, and his attitude to
the role of avenging son is as lucid as Hamlet's is opaque and
ambiguous.
Laertes, of course, is contrasted with Hamlet not only in
his uncritical attitude to honour, but in the fact that his
role as avenging son is public. Unlike Hamlet, he does not
have to hide his purposes, but can openly identify his enemy,
declare his purposes and invoke the necessary sanctions of
family honour:
That drop of blood that's calm proclaims me
bastard,
Cries cuckold to my father, brands the harlot
Even here between the chaste unsmirched brow
Of my true mother. IV.5.117-20.
To be 'calm' under the kind of provocation he feels he has
received would confirm the dishonour of the entire family
unit. This dishonour would be emphatically public: the verbs
('proclaims', 'cries', 'brands') make family disgrace audible
and visible to the world at large. To take the affront lying
down would be tantamount to a public declaration that he is
not his father's son, a declaration that would convert the
roles of 'son', 'father', 'mother' into roles of social
ignominy: 'bastard', 'cuckold', 'harlot'. The ties of blood
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uniting family members involve Laertes in a role that is
simultaneously private and public. and the revenge honour he
here expresses advocates the translation of private passion -
filial piety. grief. outrage - into public display and action.
Moreover. the family's dignity in the eyes of others is shown
to be indivisible; the dishonour of one family member entails
the dishonour of all. As guardian of familial integrity.
Laertes's revenge is at once a binding obligation and an act
of self-restitution.
To underline Laertes's commitment to revenge honour is not.
of course. to deny either the sincerity of his grief or the
legitimacy of his grievance. He has unquestionably been
wronged. and the impetuous fury with which he forces his way
into the king's presence makes it impossible to interpret his
passion as anything other than genuine. When Ophelia enters
later in the scene. we witness his grief-stricken reaction to
her madness and recognise the extent of the injury he has
suffered. In an earlier scene of leave-taking. the play
encouraged us to see Laertes in his roles as son and brother.
In 1.3. he demonstrated his concern for Ophelia's reputation.
urging her to defend her honour. or chastity. against the
'trifling' of Hamlet's favour (1.3.5) and the stirrings of her
own desire. Though clearly prompted by fraternal affection.
this moral instruction. at once worldly and puritanical.
had a smug and conventional flavour. conveyed in the penchant
for platitudes that Laertes shared with his father:
The chariest maid is prodigal enough
If she unmask her beauty to the moon.
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Virtue itself scapes not calumnious strokes.
1.3.36-38.
And indeed. Ophelia's playful rejoinder. charging Laertes to
heed his own counsel. suggested the shallowness of his
moralising.
We are not altogether surprised. therefore. that Laertes
should now operate entirely within the code of family honour.
This he locates in the blood which constitutes the family
bond. When he declares that even one calm drop of blood
dishonours both his parents and himself. it is impossible to
distinguish natural feelings from honour feelings. It is this
identity of honour and nature which gives to the role of
avenging son its curious combination of impulsiveness and
theatricality. The blood which burns with indignation at an
offence committed against a loved one both expresses natural
feelings of grief and resentment and demands the ritual of
public reparation. Sincerity of emotion coexists with display
of emotion. This demonstration of passion is inevitably
self-regarding. for in vindicating the honour of the group.
Laertes seeks simultaneously to exhibit his own honourable
nature by declaring his refusal to endure the wrong that calls
it into question.
The full implications of Laertes's unquestioning
adherence to the revenge code are clarified in his public
declaration of courage:
To hell. allegiance!
Conscience and grace.
I dare damnation. To
Vows to the blackest devil!
to the profoundest pit!
this point I stand.
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That both the worlds I give to
Let come what comes. only I'll
Most throughly for my father.
negligence.
be reveng'd
IV.S.131-36.
What Laertes proclaims is his contempt for restraints on
action. He will break his faith. ignore the voice of
conscience. and reject the grace upon which man depends for
his salvation. What is extraordinary about these lines is
that they are offered as the measure and criterion of honour
and courage: Laertes is so brave. so devoted to the memory of
his father. so passionately committed to his cause. that he
will dare even damnation. the possibility that he may be
condemned to eternal punishment for an immoral action.
Laertes. of course. is following the logic of revenge
honour. which equates moral worth with retaliatory action and
scruple with cowardice. According to this logic. individual
virtue manifests itself in unprincipled action. That Laertes
is ready to accept it reveals not only a disastrously
uncritical attitude to revenge. but a concern for reputation
that can only be described as obsessional. for the need to
repair a damaged identity clearly blinds Laertes to the
viciousness of the mandate he obeys.
That Laertes is obsessed with his social image is shown by
his response to Hamlet's public apology in Act V:
I am satisfied in nature.
Whose motive in this case should stir me most
To my revenge; but in my terms of honour
I stand aloof. and will no reconcilement
Till by some elder masters of known honour
I have a voice and precedent of peace
To keep my name ungor'd. V.2.240-46.
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Laertes can relinquish the ties of 'nature'. but not the
'terms of honour' that keep his name 'ungor'd'. The phrase
'terms of honour' evokes a formal code of conduct which
regulates interaction between claimants to honour and defines
the terms whereby an individual may avoid loss of prestige.
Laertes's adherence to a code of honour (the intricacies of
which require the specialist interpretation of 'elder
masters') reveals his role as avenging son to be governed by
conventional rules of conduct.
It is Laertes's conventionality that makes him so easy for
Claudius to manipulate. for the conventional man is always
predictable. What Claudius knows about Laertes is that his
readiness to undertake ~ action in the name of honour will
allow him to stoop to ~ crime. Thus. Claudius begins his
manipulation of Laertes by implying that he did not really
love his father. and that his displays of affection are mere
hypocrisy:
Laertes. was your father dear to you?
Or are you like the painting of a sorrow.
A face without a heart? IV.7.106-10B.
This suggestion of dishonour is followed by Claudius's speech
on love as a self-consuming passion that can be translated
into action only with the utmost haste. Hence. the two
explanations of inconstancy that earlier formed the basis of
the player king's speech - the violent and transitory nature
of love and its insincerity - become in Claudius's hands the
arguments for a swift and passionate demonstration that one is
not a dishonourable hypocrite. The identification of honour
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and action leads to the climactic question. with its
implication that the more extreme the deed. the more
honourable Laertes will be seen to be:
what would you undertake
To show yourself in deed your father's son
More than in words? IV.7.123-25.
The appeal to Laertes's most cherished sense of himself is
clearly irresistible. for he replies that he would defy the
law of sanctuary: 'To cut his throat i'th'church.' (IV.7.125).
Yet Laertes's honour. the unrestrained determination to act.
leads headlong into dishonour.44 Far from 'daring all'.
he participates in a plot which requires poison and deception.
and which will protect him from all its shameful or dangerous
consequences: 'And for his death no wind of blame shall
breathe ... '(IV.7.65).
Thus. the episode with Laertes reminds us. in Hamlet's
absence. of exactly what is at stake in the hero's own
implementation of duty. for it exhibits not only the spurious
ethics of private revenge. but the moral blindness and
corruptibility of the avenging son who endorses them
uncritically out of regard for his own honour. The desire to
right a wrong becomes hopelessly entangled in the desire to
affirm the self. This deterioration of honour is further
explored in the graveyard scene. The two clowns' muddled
discussion of Ophelia's death with which it opens makes a
44.See Council. pp.93.95.
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crucial distinction between voluntary and involuntary action:4S
Here lies the water - good. Here stands the man -
good. If the man go to this water and drown
himself. it is. will he nill he. he goes. mark you
that. But if the water come to him and drown him.
he drowns not himself. Argal. he that is not
guilty of his own death shortens not his own life.
V.l.IS-20.
This parody of legal argument stresses that guilt is
determined by whether or not an act is willed. The reference
to unwilled action develops the idea. first mooted by Hamlet
at the end of the closet scene. of action untainted by the
egoistic impulse. The difference between the man who commits
suicide and the man who drowns accidentally is that the former
acts in wilful defiance of divine law. characterised by the
sexton as the wilful seeking of 'salvation' eV.I.2). We are
clearly reminded of the alternative possibility of involuntary
action.
It is the self-aggrandising impulse that is radically
diminished in Hamlet's deliberations on mortality. As the
sexton throws up one skull after another. the sight of these
'traditional motif[s] of moral reflection,46 prompts the prince
to meditate on the transitoriness of worldly ambition. He
considers a series of types: the crafty politician who 'would
circumvent God' (V.I.78): the courtier who uses obsequious
good manners to get what he wants: the lawyer who reaches the
4S.Eleanor Prosser offers an illuminating discussion of this
episode. See pp.219-20.
46.See Jenkins's gloss. in The Arden Shakespeare: Hamlet.
p.380. and his Longer Note. pp.S50-51.
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top of his profession through a mastery of legal sophistry.
These time-servers are self-servers; and it is the self that
death utterly diminishes. as the sexton's unceremonious
shovelling demonstrates <V.1.88). What the skulls represent
to Hamlet is more than mortality; it is the absurdity of a
life centred on the ego:
Is this the fine of his fines and the recovery of
his recoveries. to have his fine pate full of fine
dirt? V.1.104-106.
The one skull endowed with an individual identity. that
of Yorick. the king's jester. takes on the function of the
dead fool. offering a lesson on the vanity of self-importance:
Now get you to my lady's chamber and tell her. let
her paint an inch thick. to this favour she must
come. Make her laugh at that. V.1.186-89.
From here. the prince's deliberations progress to Alexander
and Caesar. the traditional representatives of heroic
ambition. and the certainty of mortality produces. in Hamlet's
doggerel verses. a radical diminution of human pride:
Imperious Caesar. dead and turn'd to clay.
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away.
o that that earth which kept the world in awe
Should patch a wall t'expel the winter's flaw.
V.l.206-209.
The catalogue reaches its climax with the two foremost
examples of the magnification of honour. and ends by linking
honour with the worldly selfishness Hamlet despises.
What is the significance of this process of perception?
In various ways. through Fortinbras and Laertes
straightforwardly. and through Hamlet in his existential
conflicts and confusions. the play. by focussing on the
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special case of vengeance. has established the contradictions
inherent in the operations of honour. which seeks to harness
the self-creating energies of the ego to the service of
virtue. and therefore makes a very thin divide between
moral action and unscrupulous self-regard. That Hamlet should
now perceive the vanity of honour suggests that he has at last
attained the vantage-point of conscious repudiation.
Hamlet's thoughts are cut short by the arrival on stage of
Ophelia's funeral cort~ge. Grief-stricken and incensed at his
sister's fate. Laertes leaps into her grave and curses the man
he holds responsible for her death:
O. treble woe
Fall ten times treble on that cursed head
Whose wicked deed thy most ingenious sense
Depriv'd thee of ...
Now pile your dust upon the quick and dead.
Till of this flat a mountain you have made
T'o'ertop old Pelion or the skyish head
Of blue Olympus. V.l.239-42:244-47.
Laertes's language amplifies both resentment. in the 'treble
woe' multiplied ten times. and sibling love. in the image of
the mountain that touches the sky. His speech and gesture
manifest his characteristic combination of immediacy and
theatricality. recalling his earlier response to the sight of
Ophelia's madness:
o heat. dry up my brains. Tears seven times salt
Burn out the sense and virtue of mine eye.
By heaven. thy madness shall be paid with weight
Till our scale turn the beam. IV.S.lS4-S7.
Love and revenge. or nature and honour. springing from the
same source in shared blood. work together to generate a form
of speech at once genuine and histrionic.
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Hamlet steps forward and accuses Laertes of indulging in
self-referential display. He attacks his grief for its
'emphasis' (V.1.248). the rhetorical term for excessive
language.47 and its 'phrase' (V.l.248). or conventional.
formalised style.48 and proceeds to parody his idiom:49
'Swounds. show me what thou't do.
Woo't weep. woo't fight. woo't fast. woo't tear
thyself .
Woo't drink up eisel. eat a crocodile?
I'll do't. V.1.269-72.
Laertes. Hamlet suggests. is merely acting out a role - a role
which Hamlet can play with equal vigour. His contempt for
Laertes's public demonstration of the honour code. which
externalises private passion into a stock exhibition of
emotion. is patent. Yet he apparently also regards it as an
outrage. when measured against his own love and grief for
Ophelia:
Forty thousand brothers
Could not with all their quantity of love
Make up my sum. V.1.264-66.
The 'bravery' of Laertes's grief. Hamlet later tells
Horatio. put him into a 'tow'ring passion' (V.2.79-80). His
47.Jenkins. in his gloss on this line. quotes Puttenham's
Art of Enilish Poesy. See The Arden Shakespeare: Hamlet.
note. p.390.
48.See Edwards. Hamlet Prince of Denmark. The New Cambridge
Shakespeare. note. p.222.
49.For accounts of Hamlet's parody of Laertes. see Madeleine
Doran. Shakespeare's Dramatic Laniuaie (Madison. Wise.: Univ.
of Wisconsin Press. 1976). pp.44-45. and Maurice Charney.
Style in 'Hamlet' (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
1969). pp.275-80.
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aversion for Laertes's rhetoric reinforces his rejection of
the conventions of the honour code. But if he is right to
detect exhibitionism in Laertes's passion. he is certainly not
justified in dismissing it as insincere. Moreover. his own
affirmation of love for Ophelia seems considerably less than
an adequate response to the charge Laertes has levelled
against him. which. however clamantly expressed. is undeniably
warranted. Perhaps Hamlet is grief-stricken at the discovery
of Ophelia's death. but we never hear him voice regret for the
suffering he caused her. What he clearly does come to regret.
however. is his conduct towards Laertes:
But I am very sorry. good Horatio.
That to Laertes I forgot myself:
For by the image of my cause I see
The portraiture of his. I'll court his favours.
V.2.7S-78.
In these lines. Hamlet recognises that Laertes's cause is the
mirror image of his own and determines to apologise for the
wrong he has done him. The irony. of which Hamlet is unaware.
is obviously that the parallel grievances make Hamlet the
target of Laertes's revenge.
It has perhaps not been sufficiently noticed to what extent
the graveyard scene. which is a sustained dramatic meditation
on death. serves to undermine the claims and pretensions of
self-aggrandising honour. It introduces a new dimension into
the play. perhaps anticipated by Hamlet's philosophical
perspective. but certainly in complete contrast to the way he
has regarded death up to this point. To contemplate suicide
as the only means of opposing a corrupt world is quite
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different from recognising that one is subject to a condition
of mortality that trivialises the self-centred and
self-motivated activities of human beings. among which Hamlet
numbers honour.
Hamlet's colloquy with Horatio that opens the final scene
returns to the subject of unwilled action. Hamlet recounts
the accidental events of his sea journey. and his
uncalculating response to them. and asserts that he perceives
a pattern in them that betrays a providential intent:
Rashly -
And prais'd be rashness for it: let us know
Our indiscretion sometime serves us well
When our deep plots do pall: and that should learn
us
There's a divinity that shapes our ends.
Rough-hew them how we will - V.2.6-11.
He distinguishes between 'rashness'. or acting impulsively.
without premeditation. and 'deep plots'. the carefully planned
schemes which men formulate to achieve their ends. The fact
that rashness can succeed where his own willed and prepared
efforts have failed proves to Hamlet what he intimated at the
close of the closet scene: that events are controlled. but not
by himself. This is a crucial moment in the play. for it
suggests that through what is. in effect. a surrender of will.
Hamlet has been released from the psychology and mechanism of
revenge honour.
To what extent does the play endorse this view? The
d~nouement of the action certainly confirms that 'deep
plots' - notably of Claudius and Laertes - 'do pall'. while
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Hamlet's insouciance. his refusal to protect himself. despite
his misgivings. and to finesse any further against Claudius.
at last delivers his vengeance into his hands. But whether
this implies the hand of providence is not evident. Hamlet's
conversation with Horatio is not straightforward in that
respect. It is significant. moreover. that unpremeditated
action is identified as 'rashness'. for this term does not
suggest the fatalistic patience consonant with a thoroughgoing
providential determinism. and retains disturbing associations
with the impetuous action of the avenging son. Laertes rushes
to his revenge with 'impetuous haste' (IV.5.l00); in his
encounter with Laertes in the graveyard. Hamlet implies that
Polonius's son is 'splenative and rash' (V.l.254); and when
Hamlet stabs Polonius through the arras. the deed is termed
'rash and bloody' (111.4.27).50 On that occasion. Hamlet was
not plotting. but acting on impulse. fresh from the encounter
with the praying king. where he declared his intention to damn
his enemy's soul. During the colloquy with Horatio. we learn
that Hamlet. again acting 'rashly'. has sent Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern to their deaths. 'Not shriving-time allow'd'
(V.2.47). It was after the murder of Polonius that Hamlet
first perceived himself as a powerless agent in a providential
plot; when the revenge ethic reached its disastrous climax. it
appeared to turn into something else. Is criminal rashness
then transmuted into agency? It is possible. But the play.
by insisting on the parallels between the actions of the
50.See Dodsworth. pp.259-60.
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ruthless avenger and the blind instrument. forces us to
recognise the perilously thin line separating the man who
offers to guarantee the damnation of his enemies from the man
who claims to be guided by 'heaven'.
The play does not allow us to dismiss~he fates of
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. It offers no evidence that they
are privy to Claudius's plot against Hamlet's life. which the
king discloses in soliloquy (IV.3.61-71). Moreover. had they
known the contents of Claudius's letter. they would surely not
have troubled to deliver it in Hamlet's absence;51 yet the
prince assumes that they will pass the commission on when they
reach England. This last point calls into question the
assumption that Hamlet believes Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
to be Claudius's accomplices. The passage at the end of the
closet scene where he accuses them of complicity in a plot
to destroy him and determines to 'blow them at the moon'
(111.4.211) grants Hamlet a knowledge he has had no
opportunity of acquiring and places great strain on his
account of the sea journey. where he claims to have discovered
Claudius's murderous designs through a sudden moment of
divinely inspired rashness. The passage does not appear in
the Folio version. and it has been argued that Shakespeare
deleted it when revising the play.52 If this is the case. we
51.See Skulsky. n .• p.86.
52.See Edwards. 'Introduction'. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark.
The New Cambridge Shakespeare. pp.14-19. and Stanley Wells and
Gary Taylor, eds. William Shakespeare. A Textual Companion
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1987). pp.396-402.
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must view Hamlet's punishment of his school friends as an
impulsive act undertaken without prior intimation of their
role in the plot.
Yet we do not need to address the complex textual problems
of the play to see that the colloquy with Horatio does not
invite a simple response to Hamlet's device. Horatio does not
applaud its justice: he says only. 'So Guildenstern and
Rosencrantz go to't.' (V.2.56). Whether or not we sense an
implicit reproach in Horatio's comment. it is clear that
Hamlet feels the need to justify himself:
Why. man. they did make love to this employment.
They are not near my conscience. their defeat
Does by their own insinuation grow.
'Tis dangerous when the baser nature comes
Between the pass and fell incensed points
Of mighty opposites. V.2.S7-62.
Here. if anywhere. we would expect a clear accusation of
complicity. but the speech is curiously imprecise. Hamlet
says in his defence that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 'made
love' to their employment. 'insinuated' their 'baser natures'
between two 'mighty opposites'. The language implies both
their sycophancy and their eager participation: they are
destroyed by the employment which they deliberately sought out
of self-interest. Yet nothing in this explanation points
clearly either to their prior knowledge of the commission or
to their ignorance of it. The invocation of the duel between
'mighty opposites' is equally ambivalent: are they
comtemptible time-servers engulfed in a momentous combat or
willing accessories who got more than they bargained for? The
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speech seems designed not to settle the matter. but to
underline the problematic nature of Hamlet's new conception of
action. We may feel either that the prince is rationalising
his own doubts or that he genuinely believes that. as
Claudius's confederates. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern need not
weigh heavily on his conscience. In any case. the play has
made the refusal of absolution far too loaded an issue for it
to be brushed aside here.
Horatio's role in the colloquy strengthens the impression
of ambivalence. He responds to Hamlet's conviction that there
is 'a divinity that shapes our ends' with a resounding 'That
is most certain.' (V.2.11). Yet he appears uneasy about the
fates of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. However. his response
to the prince's self-justification - 'Why. what a king is
this!' (V.2.62) - does much to focus our attention on
Claudius's defilement of the royal office - the defilement
that imparts to Hamlet's task its critical public dimension.
It is this remark which prompts the prince's all-important
question:
Does it not. think thee. stand me now upon -
He that hath kill'd my king and whor'd my mother.
Popp'd in between th'election and my hopes.
Thrown out his angle for my proper life
And with such coz'nage - is't not perfect
conscience
To quit him with this arm? And is't not to be
damn'd
To let this canker of our nature come
In further evil? V.2.63-70.
It is clear that Hamlet's faith in providential design has
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strengthened rather than decreased his sense of responsibility
for fulfilling his task. The conscience that in the 'To be
or not to be' soliloquy forbad action on the grounds that to
act was to dare damnation now seems to demand it. Now it may
be damnable not to act. not to purge Denmark of a spreading
infection. Now perhaps only inaction will be a manifestation
of self-interest, of the bestial oblivion that avoids the
acceptance of a moral and religious duty.
It is this union of action and morality that Hamlet has
sought throughout the play and that his position within the
revenge ethic has consistently denied him. In the urgent
question that he puts to Horatio. he is looking for a
resolution to his predicament. asking whether killing
Claudius is not an act of 'perfect conscience' that he can
neglect only at the peril of his soul. To this question he
receives no answer. Hamlet is appealing to Horatio for
assurance. but gets only the reminder that Claudius will
shortly learn the 'issue of the business' in England (V.2.72).
It is his personal responsibility for a moral imperative
that concerns Hamlet in these lines. He seems still to be
thinking. despite his graveyard meditations and sea journey.
about willed action. about the honour that sustains commitment
to a virtuous cause. Throughout the play. this inner
mechanism for good has been either paralysed or vitiated by
its relation to a revenge ethic that dictates its decline into
unscrupulous and egoistic action. And the play has offered no
270
hope that Hamlet can be freed from revenge and the disfigured
honour which impels it through his own self-motivated efforts.
The only way out of the impasse is to relinquish honour-driven
action altogether - an alternative which the play has defined
in terms of divinely guided 'rashness'. Hamlet's question is
unanswerable because he poses it in the terms that cannot
solve it. while the 'new' terms of instrumentality and divine
purpose are not only shrouded in uncertainty. but are also. in
Hamlet's own account of his actions on board ship. fraught
with moral problems.
In reply to Horatio's warning that he has only a brief
space of time in which to act. Hamlet declares. 'The interim
is mine.' (V.2.73). But of course the play does not grant him
any time in which to translate his moral and religious duty
into action. Nor does he seem interested in formulating any
plan. for he observes simply that man's life is short - 'And a
man's life's no more than to say "one".' (V.2.74) - and thinks
with regret of his conduct towards Laertes in the graveyard.
When Osric appears with the summons to the fencing match. we
know that Hamlet is walking straight into the trap laid for
him. He senses the danger himself. but refuses to heed his
premonition:
We defy augury. There is special providence in
the fall of a sparrow. If it be now. 'tis not to
come; if it be not to come. it will be now; if it
be not now. yet it will come. The readiness is
all. V.2.21S-18.
Nowhere else do we feel more strongly that Hamlet's
perspective has altered radically. The moral despair of the
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struggle with fortune has given way to belief in a divine
purpose at work in even the most seemingly insignificant
event. It is to this ubiquitous providential design that
Hamlet surrenders himself. There is courage in his
resignation. for he willingly relinquishes self-preservation.
But this courage is very different from honour. for it is
based not in the efficacy of the individual will. capable of
creating stability through its own efforts. but in the
determination to face the consequences of events which are
believed to be governed by a power higher than the self.
Dr. Johnson regretted that in his apology to Laertes Hamlet
should 'shelter himself in falsehood'. and many critics have
followed suit in deploring the prince's disclaimer. 'What 1
have done ... I here proclaim was madness.' (V.2.226.228).53
Others have argued that to the prince of Act V. who has
regained his self-possession. the murder of Polonius must
indeed appear the result of 'a sore distraction' (V.2.225).54
The play has certainly presented it as such. and there signs
even at the end of the closet scene that Hamlet had begun to
grasp the extent of his mental and moral collapse. Whether or
not Hamlet is being economical with the truth (and it would be
53.The Plays of Shakespeare. vol.8. Seymour felt that the
disclaimer was an interpolation. it being too ignoble a device
for the hero to employ (cited in Hamlet. A New Variorum
Edition of Shakespeare. ed. Horace Howard Furness (New York:
Dover Publications Ltd .. 1963). 1.440). De Madariaga calls
the apology 'an admirable example of egotism' (p.28).
54.See Prosser. pp.236-37; Edwards. Hamlet. Prince of Denmark.
The New Cambridge Shakespeare. n .. p.235; Ribner. Patterns in
Shakespearian Traaedy. p.84; and Nigel Alexander. p.192.
272
impossible for him to confess publicly that he killed Polonius
thinking he was Claudius). there is no reason to doubt the
sincerity of his expression of regret. He offers his apology
in explicitly fraternal terms: 'I have shot my arrow o'er the
house / And hurt my brother.' (V.2.239-40). His defence rests
ultimately on a denial of intention to offend. and is
accompanied by a frank public admission of blame: 'Give me
your pardon. sir. I have done you wrong .... ' (V.2.222).
That Hamlet can recognise Laertes as a fellow sufferer and
make a public apology suggests that he is as detached from the
honour code as Laertes is trapped inside it. This
unscrupulous covert avenger declines to accept the apology
until such time as his 'terms of honour' (V.2.342) are made
legally secure. He does not scruple. however. to offer a
provisional reconciliation to the man he is plotting to
murder:
But till that time
I do receive your offer'd love like love
And will not wrong it. V.2.246-48.
Throughout this climactic episode. as his honour collaborates
with hypocrisy and policy. Laertes serves to remind us of the
self-defeating logic of revenge honour. His unquestioning
allegiance to the honour code leads him to act in the most
dishonourable fashion. colluding in a murder plot disguised as
sport. which is designed to shield him from risk and during
which he seems prepared to strike at his opponent when he is
off his guard: 'Have at you now.' (V.2.306). Through an
aside. however. we learn that his honour-driven actions are
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'almost against' his conscience (V.2.300). It is hard not to
feel that Hamlet's courage ('We defy augury') rises as far
above the courage of honour as Laertes's craven scheming sinks
below it.
What this amounts to saying is that the play achieves
resolution only when the claims of honour have been dismissed.
Whether we can say that it underwrites the claims of
providence is far less certain. The climactic scene seems at
pains to stress that through faith the hero has transcended
self-motivated action and so been released from the impasse to
which his agonised conflict over honour condemned him.
'Benetted round with villainies' (V.2.29). with no plan of his
own. Hamlet approaches the fencing match resigned to what he
sees as the beneficent workings of the divine will. It is
after a rapid and dreadful sequence of revelations, which
include his mother's death and the discovery that he has
received his own death-wound. that Hamlet learns of the plot
against him and. acting impulsively. kills the king. The play
suggests that in performing the deed that has so long eluded
him. Hamlet acts as far as possible without vicious and
self-centred motives· that. to use the gravedigger's metaphor
for unwilled action. he did not go to the water, the water
came to him.55
Laertes's comments after the fencing match invite us to see
55.See Prosser. p.238.
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some kind of retributive justice at work as the plotters are
caught in their own traps. As he expresses it after being
stabbed with the poisoned sword: 'I am justly kill'd with mine
own treachery.' (V.2.313). In the same way. Claudius's double
plot against Hamlet's life is served back upon him: Hamlet
stabs him with the envenomed and unbated sword and then forces
him to drink from the poisoned cup. after which Laertes
comments. 'He is justly serv'd.' (V.2.332) .56 Yet the
stratagem that backfires on its authors claims as well the
lives of Gertrude and Hamlet. who. though in different ways
and degrees corrupted by Claudius's original fratricide. did
not initiate the cycle of lies and violence.
Are we then to see the death of Claudius as a victory. as
the accomplishment of a purifying public act sanctioned by a
higher authority? The play does not answer this question. It
strongly suggests that the hero fulfills his task not through
the impetus of revenge honour. but by submitting himself to
what he believes is a supreme and mysterious design in the
world. even if it means giving his own life. which in the
event it does. His reactive impulses during the fencing match
are made part of a pattern of 'deep plots' palling that shows
evil to be self-destructive. even if it also shows others to
be vulnerable. But in Hamlet. this is a temporal pattern. not
a transcendent one. Shakespeare remains rooted in 'this harsh
world' (V.2.353). To put it in Christian terms (which the
56.See Frye. p.268.
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play does not suppress). the fact of original sin is
diagnosed. but the possibility of grace remains a possibility.
a hope. not a certainty. Horatio's optative 'And flights of
angels sing thee to thy rest' (V.2.365) against Hamlet's
indicative 'the rest is silence' (V.2.363). Hamlet's
responsibility as a prince remains towards the world from
which he is about to depart. As he dies. he insists that
Horatio stay behind to tell his story. It matters to Hamlet
that he should not leave 'a wounded name' (V.2.349) behind
him. that the truth about himself and the cause he espoused
should be reported to 'the unsatisfied' (V.2.345). His last
thought is for the succession. as he gives his 'dying voice'
to Fortinbras (V.2.361). freshly arrived from his Polish
conquest.
The military funeral which the play grants its hero seems
to acknowledge the heroic dimensions of his struggle with a
task that appeared at once essential and deeply doubtful. and
to which he willingly surrendered his life. However. the
play's suggestions that Hamlet succeeded. that he found a way
out of his terrible predicament. are qualified in such a way
that the extent of his achievement remains an open question.
Claudius is dead. but Fortinbras takes over. and there is no
denying that the foreign adventurer's accession to the throne
of Denmark is a devastating climax. Hamlet has strived to
restore moral order to a society dominated by ambition and
fortune. but he leaves it in the hands of a man whose
subjective honour represents everything that he has opposed
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and apparently. within himself. transcended. It may be that
Fortinbras's accession should be taken less as a measure of
Hamlet's failure than as the play's judgement that in this
world there are only temporary solutions - purgations rather
than final cures. However. it cannot be denied that although
Horatio accepts the prince's charge to explain events to
'th'yet unknowing world' (V.2.384). the story he tells points
neither to successful completion nor divine sanction:
So shall you hear
Of carnal. bloody. and unnatural acts.
Of accidental judgements. casual slaughters.
Of deaths put on by cunning and forc'd cause.
And. in this upshot. purposes mistook
Fall'n on th'inventors' heads. V.2.385-90.
We need not align this account too strictly with the
particular events of the play to see that Horatio makes no
allusion to justice restored or even to order won at great
cost. He speaks of 'accidental judgements' and 'casual
slaughters'. of plots recoiling on their inventors. but there
is no sure indication that what is apparently random and
fortuitous in fact represents the hidden workings of
providence. When the English ambassadors arrive with the news
that 'Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead' (V.2.376). the
play reminds us of the questionable fate meted out to these
two unfortunate time-servers by a hero who felt himself to be
acting as God's instrument. If we want assurances that Hamlet
really did become the agent of an inscrutable providential
playwright ordering events in this world. the play refuses
either to deny or confirm this: and it recognises his courage
and self-sacrifice without losing sight of the intractable
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moral problems and uncertainties that have surrounded his
attempt to transform a dubiously righteous deed into a
redemptive act of 'perfect conscience'. Whatever our
conclusions about Hamlet's achievement. the play has
demonstrated that the secular virtue which it calls honour
cannot rise above the medium of corruption that gives birth to
it and which it seeks to purify. It shows that honour - the
power for virtue within the individual will - can only
perpetuate the disorder it opposes. that insofar as it can be
transcended. it is only at the cost of life itself. and that
even then it cannot be exorcised from the world.
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CHAPTER 4
JULIUS CAESAR AND CORIOLANUS:
THE SOCIAL TRAGEDY OF PUBLIC SERVICE.
The two Roman plays considered in this chapter are both
inspired by Shakespeare's close reading of Plutarch. and give
dramatic form to an ethos quite different from that which
characterises Henry V and Hamlet. The action of Julius Caesar
(1599) and Coriolanus (1608) unfolds within the context of a
pre-Christian era in which virtue is ultimately a social
rather than a metaphysical concept. This is equally the case
in Troilus and Cressida. where the absence of a power for good
higher than honour is shown to lead to moral and social
disintegration. In the Roman tragedies of public service.
Shakespeare offers a critique of the pagan conception of
social virtue by making it the basis of a tragic contradiction
which exposes the flaws in a moral system founded upon honour.
The social conception of virtue which characterised
antiquity descended to the Stoic philosophers from Aristotle's
classic formulation in the Nicomachean Ethics. It rests on
the idea that human beings are naturally social animals and
that society therefore forms the basis of natural order. It
follows from this that the central ethical relationship is
that between a man and his fellow men and that the highest
form of virtue consists in deeds that benefit the social unit.
Individual virtue thus becomes largely a question of actions
which sacrifice selfish private interests for the sake of
the group. Such actions are considered to manifest the higher
nature of man which resides in fidelity to reason. the
authoritative and defining human faculty. Deeds performed
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through the rational principle are voluntary. and hence
provide a clear indication of the inner moral quality of the
man who performs them. The man who is controlled by reason
casts aside the irrational passions and appetites that
dominate most men. directing them to seek their own private
advantage through. for example. the pursuit of pleasure.
wealth. comfort and material honours. It is this power within
the self that makes possible the performance of deeds of
public service. Although Aristotle perceived this internal
faculty as the obedience of passion to reason. Stoicism
identified it more closely with the suppression of the
emotional life.
Public service is the traditional sphere of the aristocracy
which. by virtue of its capacity to discharge this public
function. lays claim to moral superiority. The individual
nobleman's ability to rise to its demands is bound up with his
sense of personal honour. Yet this honour which is internal
to the self is logically dependent on what is outside the
self. that is. on the community presupposed in the idea of
service. The social conception of virtue envisages this
relationship between the self and society as the basis of
moral order. However. its roots in aristocratic distinction
render this relationship chronically unstable. The classical
formulations of public service represent in large part the
attempt to control the agonistic and self-assertive impulses
which sustain the individual drive for excellence. Both
Aristotelian honour - the rational desire to attain nobility -
281
and the Stoic conception of heroic self-conquest seek to
socialise the self-regarding will. to harness its energies to
social ends. Yet this rational stand~rd of honour remains an
instance of moral superiority. even acquiring. on the strength
of its lofty ethical character. a degree of moral autonomy.
Classical moral philosophy was thus unable to regularize the
connection between the superior individual and the society he
serves. It is the persistent tension in honour - between
service and the self-assertive will - that Shakespeare
explores in Julius Caesar and Coriolanus. Both plays find
tragic meaning in a social conception of virtue which. in
making honour the foundation of natural order. endangers that
which it aims to maintain .
•••••••• ** •••• *** •••
When Brutus tells Cassius that if 'it be aught toward
the general good'. he will set 'honour in one eye. and death
i'th'other' and 'look on both indifferently' (1.2.84-86).1
his lines associate the honour of the public servant with the
capacity to overcome the instinct for self-preservation in
the fulfilment of public duty. As the force within the self
that stimulates public virtue. honour is the moral cornerstone
of Roman society in Julius Caesar. the internal mechanism that
enables the patrician class to execute its allotted public
1.All quotations from Julius Caesar are taken from The Arden
Shakespeare: Julius Caesar. ed. T.S. Dorsch (London and New
York: Methuen. 1955).
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function. However. although Rome depends on honour. the play
dramatises in Caesar's rise to power the strains in this
patrician ethic which destabilise the social order it is
designed to preserve.
Like Brutus. Caesar envisages his own exceptional public
virtue as deriving from a complete subjugation of instinct:
I rather tell thee what is to be fear'd
Than what I fear: for always I am Caesar.
1.2.208-209.
What honour generates and sustains is a higher public self.
devoid of ordinary human fears. capable of assuming the burden
of public service or of undertaking dangerous and glorious
exploits on behalf of Rome. Caesar here claims identity with
a public role of superhuman stature. Honour thus emerges as
the power within the self to construct and remain constant to
the ideal public role: 'for always 1 am Caesar'.
Although achievement of this public identity is confined to
male patricians. in the character of Portia the play gives
voice to female resentment in the face of exclusion from the
public domain. When Brutus is preoccupied with public cares.
Portia insists that the 'right and virtue' of her place
(11.1.269) pertains not merely to Brutus's private existence.
but to the totality of his experience. To deny her access to
his public affairs is therefore to dishonour her:
Am 1 your self
But. as it were. in sort or limitation.
To keep with you at meals. comfort your bed.
And talk to you sometimes? Dwell 1 but in the
suburbs
Of your good pleasure? If it be no more.
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Portia is Brutus' harlot. not his wife.
11.1.282-87.
Portia claims for herself the same capacity for public virtue
that constitutes masculine honour: she too has overcome
natural inclination. giving herself 'a voluntary wound / Here.
in the thigh' (11.1.300-301).
However. Portia's claim to honour rests on her ability to
be exceptional. to exceed her sex:
1 grant I am a woman; but withal
A woman that Lord Brutus took to wife;
I grant I am a woman; but withal
A woman well reputed. Cato's daughter.
11.1.292-95.
This implied tension between her public aspirations and the
limitations imposed by gender shapes her response to Brutus's
confidences; for having entered the public life through his
revelations. she copes with the role she has assumed with only
partial success. her 'man's mind' undermined by her 'woman's
might' (11.4.8). A similar strain informs the account of her
suicide. which represents less the deliberate conquest of the
fear of death than an act of private anguish: unable to endure
either Brutus's absence or the news of his enemies' strength.
she 'fell distract' and 'swallow'd fire' (IV.3.154-55). Thus.
the play's sensitivity to women's impatience with their
domestic function is qualified by its portrayal of a conflict
between female ambition and natural disposition.
The play conveys the integral link between honour and
role-playing through the patrician characters' tendency to
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refer to themselves in the third person.2 This linguistic
device creates the effect of the divided self; it suggests
both the gap between the self and the role and the effort to
identify the self completely with the role. It therefore
demonstrates at once the pre-eminence of the public life in
the patrician ethic and its artificiality. the fact that it
demands the repression of a part of the self for the sake of
the public performance:3
But I fear him not:
Yet if my name were liable to fear.
I do not know the man I should avoid
So soon as that spare Cassius. 1.2.195-98.
In these lines. Caesar asserts the absoluteness of the name.
of the public self.4 The unity of being to which Caesar here
lays claim constitutes the goal of honour. Yet the lines
which show honour to reside in the absolute public self
simultaneously betray the illusory quality of the quest for
singleness of being. The passage exhibits the duality of self
2.This linguistic feature of the play is frequently commented
upon. See. for example. R.A. Foakes. 'An Approach to Julius
Caesar'. £Q. V (1954). pp.264-68: Maurice Charney.
Shakespeare's Roman Plays. The Function of Imaiery in
the Drama (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1961).
p.70; and Edward Dowden. Shakespeare; A Critical Study of His
Mind and Art (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd .. 1875).
p.285.
3.A.D. Nuttall comments on the tension between the role and
the man. with particular reference to Stoicism. in Shakespeare
and the Representation of Reality (London and New York:
Methuen and Co. Ltd .• 1983). p.10s.
4.0n the name as an ideal self-concept. see J.L. Simmons.
Shakespeare's Paian World. The Roman Tr'aedies
(Charlottesville. Va.: The Univ. Press of Virginia. 1973).
p.79. and Madeleine Doran. Shakespeare's Dramatic Lanauaie
(Madison. Wise: The Univ. of Wisconsin Press. 1976).
pp.132-34.143.
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involved in role-playing: it sets up an opposition between
will and nature. between the name and the ordinary man. that
clarifies the impossibility of being solely the public self.
Yet honour's austere virtue remains elusive not only
because it demands an extraordinary degree of self-
suppression. but also because it involves a passionate
self-relationship. When Caesar asserts unity with his
near-legendary name. we sense the man's commitment to his own
greatness. We have seen repeatedly that this kind of elated
self-involvement is an essential ingredient of honour which.
based as it is on the pursuit of moral excellence. generates
competitive self-assertion.5 In Caesar's case. pride in
pre-eminence leads him to transform himself into an
aristocracy of one:
Yet in the number I do know but one
That unassailable holds on his rank.
Unshak'd of motion. . II1.1.68 -70.
The 'Northern Star' speech lays claim to singularity. to the
uniqueness born of perfect constancy. Caesar's insistence on
the autonomous will of the great man thus engenders an
incipient tyranny. The honour that exalts him above his
fellow patricians rests on a contradictory blend of self-
conquest and self-celebration.
5.Plutarch writes of Caesar's striving spirit: 'This humor of
his was no other but an emulation with him selfe as with an
other man. See 'The Life of Julius Caesar'. Plutarch's
Lives of the Npble Grecians and Romanes. trans. Sir Thomas
North. V.335.
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The play reveals Caesarism to be an integral aspect of
Roman society. an expression of the cult of the Roman martial
hero dramatised in the play's opening scene. in which the
relationship between Pompey and the people of Rome is depicted
in terms of the private loyalty owed to the unique individual.
Pompey is presented as a kind of father-figure deserving of
a personal devotion which transfers a public relationship to
the private level. The tribunes therefore condemn the
plebeians' switch of allegiance from Pompey to Caesar as the
betrayal of a natural bond. The public and the private. will
and nature. are again shown to be inseparable aspects of an
ethic of public virtue founded on the renunciation of the
private instinctual life.
The play depicts the friction between Republicanism and
Caesarism as an ideological conflict that has its roots in
aristocratic honour. Caesar's rise to power endangers two
things simultaneously: the Republic and the honour of his
fellow patricians. who enjoy as a society of co-equals a
relative parity of worth and rank threatened by his claim to
superiority. Their alarm at Caesar's assumption of
unconstitutional power is inseparable both from their anger at
being diminished by his greatness and from envy of his
supremacy:
Why. man. he doth bestride the narrow world
Like a Colossus. and we petty men
Walk under his huge legs. and peep about
To find ourselves dishonourable graves.
1.2.133-36.
The emulation latent in honour is thus unleashed by the
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emergence of the pre-eminent hero. Of course. the play makes
it clear that factionalism and private grudges also playa
part in generating hostility to Caesar: Caius Ligarius has
fallen foul of Caesar by 'speaking well of Pompey' (ILL 216).
and Cassius's own intense animosity stems at least in part
from the fact that he is unlikely to prosper under Caesar's
rule: 'Caesar doth bear me hard .... ' (I.2.310). But in his
role as the instigator of the assassination. Cassius always
appeals to honour. to the combination of abstract political
principle and personal pride that constitutes aristocratic
Republicanism:
But life. being weary of these worldly bars.
Never lacks power to dismiss itself.
If I know this. know all the world besides.
That part of tyranny that I do bear
I can shake off at pleasure. I.3.96-100.
Cassius's incitement of Casca conflates the hatred of tyranny
with the refusal to endure dishonour. At the same time. it
clarifies the integral connection between self-assertion and
the energy to which honour appeals. for suicide. the ultimate
renunciation of the fear of death. here emerges as the
qUintessential act of self-affirmation.
If honour gives rise to Caesarism and hero worship in the
Rome of Julius Caesar. it also sustains the Republican ideal
of public service. This version of social virtue is embodied
in Brutus. for whom devotion to the higher public good demands
the repudiation of natural instinct:
If it be aught toward the general good.
Set honour in one eye. and death i'th'other.
And I will look on both indifferently:
For let the gods so speed me as I love
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The name of honour more than I fear death.
1.2.84-88.
When Brutus refers to himself as the 'son of Rome' (1.2.171).
he conceives of the social order as the embodiment of nature
and public service as the highest of natural bonds. The
connection between the individual and society is expressed as
a family relationship. and the private sphere is transmuted
into the public realm. This means that the instinctual ties
of the family are sacrificed for the natural ties of the
state. and the state in turn becomes a natural organism which
begets the unnnatural public self that secures its prosperity.
This ethic of public service makes the 'higher' public self
the sole reality. and by means of the mechanism of honour
locks the individual into the social. In Julius Caesar. it is
inextricably bound up with Republicanism. To serve Rome is to
serve the Republic: to fail to do so is to forfeit honour:
Brutus had rather be a villager
Than to repute himself a son of Rome
Under these hard conditions as this time
Is like to lay upon us. 1.2.170-73.
The honour of the public servant requires that he overcome
the appeal of nature out of a disinterested concern for the
public welfare. It therefore demands the equal suppression of
instinct and self-interest: he must be simultaneously
unnatural and impersonal. When Brutus first confesses to
Cassius that he loves Caesar and that he fears he will be made
king (1.2.81). we perceive in his conflict the struggle to
realise this selfless public virtue. At the same time.
however. the scene evokes the tensions in Brutus that counter
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it: not only the inner division that exhibits his sensitivity
to the claims of nature. but also the passion which informs
his honour.
When Cassius attempts to incite Brutus against Caesar.
he does so through an appeal to honour that combines solid
republican sentiments - 'When could they say. till now. that
talk'd of Rome. / That her wide walks encompass'd but one
man?' (I.2.152-53) - with a warm commendation of Brutus's
virtue:
I have heard.
Where many of the best respect in Rome
(Except immortal Caesar). speaking of Brutus.
And groaning underneath this age's yoke.
Have wish'd that noble Brutus had his eyes.
I.2.57-61.
Although Brutus detects the provocation lurking beneath this
praise. Cassius's technique nonetheless serves to highlight
the duality in Brutus's honour: the dedication to the common
good that is the measure of his virtue has as its logical
concomitant an ardent identification with that virtue. Thus.
when Brutus declares that he loves the 'name of honour' more
than he fears death. his words betray the self-love which
impels public virtue. To be great is to love one's greatness.
particularly the name which proclaims one's pre-eminence.
Brutus's name is furnished with a mythology every bit as
potent as Caesar's: he is an alchemist who can turn offence
into virtue (I.3.157-60). an exorcist capable of conjuring up
men's mortified spirits (II.1.321-26). Like Caesar. his
characteristic use of the third person reflects his own
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investment in the name that represents his extraordinary
virtue: 'Brutus had rather be a villager .... '
On this level. the competition which Cassius sets up
between the names of Brutus and Caesar ('Why should that name
be sounded more than yours?' I.2.141) is more than crude
flattery. for the two men ~ rivals insofar as Brutus
represents the summit of the republican virtue affronted by
Caesar. Brutus is like the other conspirators in that Caesar
cannot threaten the political order without also threatening
his honour. However. Brutus differs from his fellow
patricians in that the honour endangered by one man's claim to
distinction itself makes a claim to distinction. albeit a
republican one. The play places the two 'seduction' scenes
side by side in part to stress Cassius's flexible technique:
with Casca. he also invokes honour. but without recourse to
flattery. It is Brutus's excellence that renders him
partially vulnerable to Cassius's insinuations. This is not
to say that Brutus envies Caesar with the virulent sense of
personal diminishment of Cassius and the other conspirators.
just that it is impossible to disentangle his devotion to the
Republic from his sense of himself as the embodiment of
republican virtue.
The play couples Brutus's inner division - the struggle
with the rival claims of friendship and the Republic that
clearly antedates the attempted seduction - with Cassius's
solicitations and incitements in order to suggest that Brutus
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is neither simply immune to such blandishments nor simply
seduced. The letter thrown in at his window. 'tending to the
great opinion / That Rome holds of his name' (1.2.315-16).
confirms rather than initiates his resolution. but its role in
Brutus's decision to undertake the assassination of his friend
points to the confusion of his own motives. the intermingling
of the personal and the impersonal that lies at the heart of
honour. Brutus's public role is thus placed under a double
strain: by the repressed natural inclinations of the private
man, and by the pride which is at once inseparable from and
incompatible with his ideal self.
The contradictory nature of honour dictates its collapse.
with consequences extending beyond the individual to society
itself. which is plunged into a constitutional crisis.
political assassination and civil war. The play gives these
individual and social tensions dramatic form by placing Brutus
between policy and nature. for his decision to obliterate the
claims of his friendship with Caesar involves him at once in
conspiracy and political scheming. The conspiracy needs
Brutus specifically because he will convert policy into
honour:
O. he sits high in all the people's hearts:
And that which would appear offence in us.
His countenance. like richest alchemy.
Will change to virtue and to worthiness.
I.3.157-60.
Brutus's reputation for honour invests him with transformative
power. As the 'soul of Rome' (11.1.321). the embodiment of
the honour of the public servant. Brutus possesses a moral
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authority that will cleanse the conspiracy of the taint of
political opportunism in the eyes of the people.
However. if policy needs honour's powerful appeal. honour
can preserve itself only by refusing policy. The main
political strategies advocated by Cassius. the oath and the
plan to kill Antony. call into question the 'even virtue' of
the enterprise (II.1.133) by implying that the conspirators
are motivated not by a disinterested regard for the public
good. but by malice and envy ('Like wrath in death and envy
afterwards .... ' II.1.164). Leaving aside for the moment
the question of Brutus's friendship with Caesar. his decision
to spare Antony and to let him speak at Caesar's funeral
dramatises the struggle of honour to avoid the contamination
of political self-interest. to maintain the deed as an
impersonal sacrifice of the spirit of Caesarism. Policy and
honour. however. are simultaneously irreconcilable and
inseparable. for if honour must reject political expediency.
the necessity to do so threatens with destruction the Republic
Brutus seeks to safeguard. The assassination fails
politically precisely because honour refuses to silence the
voice of nature in the form of Antony's appeal to personal
loyalty.
It is no accident that honour's repudiation of political
expediency should entail an accommodation of private
affection. for what Brutus rejects as dishonourable in his
fellow conspirators is the personal malice towards Caesar that
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makes the deed an expression of selfish private interests
rather than selfless public virtue. Moreover. the private
passions that Brutus detects lurking beneath the surface of
policy are to a real extent the passions within honour: the
anger and envy of men so slighted by another's superiority
that they will embrace dishonourable means to restore their
dignity. This is certainly how Artemidorus interprets the
conspirators' motives:
My heart laments that virtue cannot live
Out of the teeth of emulation. 11.3.11-12.
If policy constitutes the methods to which honour stoops.
honour's reliance on nature grows out of its own instability:
because its motives are not simply impersonal. it can sustain
its claim to integrity only by appealing to its antithesis.
Yet this alliance with nature is a strategy not only to
protect honour from itself. but also to protect Brutus from
the disturbing implications of his denial of private ties:
We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar.
And in the spirit of men there is no blood.
11.1.167-68.
The aspiration to public virtue contains a need to suppress
the realities of murder and the butchered corpse of his
friend - realities that rapidly resurface in grotesque form:
'Let's carve him as a dish fit for the gods.
(II.1.173). Brutus's repeated affirmation of the private
level of love - 'I. that did love Caesar when I struck him'
(111.1.182): 'Not that I loved Caesar less. but that I loved
Rome more.' (111.2.22-23) - demonstrates his desperate attempt
294
to reconcile his public and private selves in order to confirm
both that his motives were irreproachable and that he did not
betray his friend. His honour lays claim to a higher public
self unsullied by selfish passions and compatible with nature.
By trying to abolish the tensions between the man and the
role. he seeks to achieve a flawless public being without
having to pay the price.
Yet the play makes clear the limits of honour's
transformative power. Indeed. the very fact that the deed
requires transformation underlines its inherently
dishonourable nature; and if the reference to alchemical
potency suggests honour's magical properties. it also
hints at the impossibility of changing a base enterprise into
a pure one. Brutus refuses policy because it casts doubt upon
the conspirators' motives. yet he is unable finally to avoid
its methods. His involvement in policy reflects the
constraint of political necessity at the same time that it
suggests his affinity to his fellow conspirators. impelled.
like him. to kill 'the foremost man in all this world'
(IV.3.22). The play shows Brutus's struggle to transform
political scheming through the language of honour:6
Let not our looks put on our purposes.
But bear it as our Roman actors do.
With untir'd spirits and formal constancy.
ILL 225 -27.
The lines ironically equate constancy to a role based on
6.See Brents Stirling. '"Or Else This Were A Savage
Spectacle"'. £MLA. LXVI (1951). p.769.
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hypocrisy with the constancy to the role of public honour.
The decline of the public servant's unity of being into the
duality of the dissembler exhibits honour literally undoing
itself. Moreover. honour's complicity in policy involves
a commensurate surrender of private ties. for the conspiracy
rests not on friendship. but on personal treachery and the
pretence of friendship. In reply to Ceasar's invitation to
proceed 'like friends' to the Capitol (11.2.127). Brutus
comments:
That every like is not the same. 0 Caesarl
The heart of Brutus earns to think upon.
11.2.128-29.
Brutus's aside calls into question his attempted
reconciliation of honour and nature. for how can one claim to
be the friend of the man one is plotting to kill? On this
level. Brutus is. like his fellow conspirators. a false
friend. and without the bulwark of private affection. honour
is consumed in policy and nature in treachery.
Brutus's relationship to Rome thus involves him in a
hopeless contradiction. Honour is connected to both policy
and nature but defeats and is defeated by both. The honour
of the public servant demands the subjugation of private
attachments and self-interest. because honour derives from the
sacrifice of what is private and instinctual for the good
order of society as a whole. However. the internal
inconsistencies in honour dictate that he can detach himself
from personal passions only by harmonising public and private
bonds. Thus. paradoxically. honour becomes the reconciliation
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of the public and private selves invoked by Brutus in his
oration: 'I slew my best lover for the good of Rome'
(111.2.42). Insofar as he can legitimately make this claim to
selfless public virtue. he unleashes Antony's voice of nature.
with its horrifying disregard for the good of the
commonwealth. Insofar as his honour is partially false. it is
challenged by Antony. who asserts that the man who stabbed
Caesar with 'the most unkindest cut of all' (111.2.185) out of
'private griefs' (111.2.215) betrayed a natural bond for
selfish reasons. Antony's censure of Brutus presents an
important half-truth. clarifying the hero's personal motives
and the impossibility of harmonising the conflicting
imperatives of public and private life. This Brutus's
conscience also repeatedly tells him: in his attempts to
distance himself from the ulterior motives in which he is
implicated. in his desperate desire to unify honour and
private affection. in his awareness of the personal treachery
involved in dissembling. and later in the play in the
appearance of Caesar's ghost - friend turned into 'evil
spirit' (IV.3.281). In all these we recognise the dark shadow
cast in this play by the concept of honour.
Thus, in Antony's oration, the epithet 'honourable' is
withdrawn from Brutus. This denial of the 'name of honour' is
just, because it is the selfish interest for which he betrayed
friendship, and unjust, because unlike Antony, who has no
concern for the common good. he has aspired to serve the
state. If honour tragically entangles the public and the
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personal. nature is devoid of a sense of public responsibility
and blithely plunges the city into civil war: 'Mischief. thou
art afoot. / Take thou what course thou wiltl' (111.2.262-63).
Yet the nature of honour requires that the assassination
should fail both morally and politically: that the deed.
undertaken in accordance with the terms of the social
conception of virtue. which makes the renunciation of selfish
private interests the source of both individual virtue and
social cohesion. should finally prove neither morally
honourable nor socially beneficial. The frustration of its
exalted aims clarifies the self-contradictory nature of an
ethic rooted in an egocentric impulse that at once stimulates
and impedes its progress towards the higher public self. The
tensions in the service ethic are exhibited on every level of
the drama: within the self. trapped between policy and nature
in its quest for singleness of being. and in the city.
simultaneously dependent on honour and engulfed in its
internal contradictions. Brutus is left with the impossible
task of trying to overcome and to accommodate nature in his
pursuit of an honour that is inevitably consumed on the one
hand in self-interest and on the other in civil war.
It is only when nature has triumphed and the ruthless
political mechanism of Octavius been instituted that the 'name
of honour' is returned to Brutus on the grounds that he alone
acted out of disinterested regard for the good of Rome.
Antony's eulogy affirms the honour of the public servant at
the same time that it maintains the reconciliation of public
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duty with private loyalty; it suggests that. because Brutus's
motives were impersonal. he did in fact love Caesar as he
struck him. On one level. of course. this is true; yet on
another. the play has shown this flawless honour and
integrated selfhood to be impossible. There remains. then.
considerable irony in the play's apparently conclusive
judgement. The tensions it has dramatised are so deep-rooted
that they can be resolved only when the public servant and the
Republic he struggled to preserve have both been destroyed .
••••••••••••••••••••
The depiction of honour in Julius Caesar effectively
establishes the terms in which the concept is explored in
Coriolanus. The later play also presents the ethic of public
service as a political tragedy arising out of the social
conception of virtue. which locates the welfare of the natural
order in a concept riddled with internal contradictions. Yet
in Coriolanus. the instability of honour is dramatised as
a tragic relationship between society. conceived of as the
foundation of nature. and the unnatural public self on which
it depends for its survival.
Coriolanus presents the Roman republic in an early stage of
its development. when Rome was a small city-state constantly
at war with its neighbours. In this primitive ethos. virtue
is necessarily social. consisting in deeds which ensure the
city's survival. particularly deeds of valour. logically
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considered the highest form of public service:
It is held
That valour is the chiefest virtue and
Most dignifies the haver.. 11.2.83-85.7
Social virtue is the preserve of the patrician class. whose
function it is to serve the state. both politically in the
Senate and militarily on the battlefield. Consequently.
honour is also a property of nobility. for it refers both to
deeds of public virtue and to the social respect and material
honours which reward them. Thus. the play's first act shows
us the martial deeds of Caius Martius. followed by the
honouring of them. initially on the field of battle - the
horse. the garland. the new name - and then in the city:
Know. Rome. that all alone Martius did fight
Within Corioles gates: where he hath won.
With fame. a name to Martius Caius. These
In honour follows Coriolanus.
Welcome to Rome. renowned Coriolanus I
11.1.161-65.
Honour. here again. defines the relationship between the
warrior and the community he defends. The relationship itself
is based on mutual obligation - of the warrior to serve the
state through deeds in war against Rome's enemies. and of the
state to requite that service. Martius owes the Senate his
'life and services' (11.2.134) and Rome owes him recognition
of his deeds:
To gratify his noble service that
Hath thus stood for his country. 11.2.40-41.
However. as in Julius Caesar. this apparently straightforward
relationship is given a tragic meaning arising out of the
7.All quotations are from The Arden Shakespeare: Coriolanus.
ed. Philip Brockbank (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd .• 1976).
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contradictory nature of honour.
The deeds of public service that constitute the patrician
function are those which benefit the wider community at the
expense of the individual. In the fable of the belly.
Menenius characterises the political service of the Senate:
for examine
Their counsels and their cares. digest things
rightly
Touching the weal o'th'common. you shall find
No public benefit which you receive
But it proceeds or comes from them to you.
And no way from yourselves. 1.1.148-53.
In this view. the Senators provide public benefits at great
cost to themselves. Cominius later speaks of the nature of
military service to the state:
I have been consul. and can show for Rome
Her enemies' marks upon me. 111.3.110-11.
Cominius's scars are emblematic of the warrior's willingness
to risk his own life for the good of his country. This.
understandably. is conceived of as the epitome of public
virtue:
Hear me profess sincerely: had I a dozen sons.
each in my love alike. and none less dear than
thine and my good Martius. I had rather had eleven
die nobly for their country. than one voluptuously
surfeit out of action. I.3.21-25.
Volumnia claims to prefer the noble deaths of numerous sons to
the ignoble life of one because in the patrician service ethic
to lay down one's life for one's country is the greatest
sacrifice a man can make and hence evidence of the highest
virtue.
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Volumnia envisages only one alternative to a noble life of
public service: not to serve is to 'voluptuously surfeit out
of action'. Her lines. like those of Menenius and Cominius.
implicitly claim a prerogative stemming from patrician service
of Rome: the burden of public responsibility differentiates
the patrician class from other elements of Roman society and
allows the nobility to see themselves as inherently superior
to those classes that are not endowed with a public role. In
the fable of the belly. Menenius claims that the public
benefits which the patricians provide at great personal cost
naturally render them the most important class in Rome.
Because the state depends on the servants of the state. the
patricians are accounted 'good' citizens. the plebeians 'poor'
(1.1.14-15).
Behind this belief in aristocratic moral superiority lies
the social concept of virtue. with its equilibration of
individual virtue and the capacity to transcend natural human
inclinations. Because society is the greatest good - because
it is the natural order on which depends the collective
well-being of its members - the highest virtue resides in the
willingness to sacrifice what is merely private and
self-centred for the sake of the common good. We have seen
repeatedly that the public function of the nobility rests on
this fundamental distinction between public and private life.
between will and nature. between the higher constructed self
and the innate self governed by spontaneous impulse. or what
we have termed 'instinct'. Plutarch points to this opposition
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of will and instinct in 'The Life of Caius Martius
Coriolanus' :
Yet
was
howe
men marveling much at his constancy. that he
never overcome with pleasure. nor money. and
he would endure easely all manner of paynes &
8travailles.
Plutarch defines as 'constancy' the subdual of private
advantage on which service depends; the hero's ability to
master the potent appeals of pleasure and wealth is what
enables him to endure the hardships and dangers of military
service. Plutarch's observation implies the preference of one
way of life over another; the love of what is noble over the
love of what is merely natural or advantageous. It therefore
suggests the essential feature of patrician virtue in
Coriolanus: the effort of the will to secure the higher self.
Thus. when Titus Lartius vows to fight against the Volsces in
spite of his physical injuries. Menenius hails him as
'true-bred' (1.1.242); Titus Lartius is a true patrician
because his determination to serve. to sacrifice his own
comfort. endows him with exceptional powers of endurance.
It is according to this conception of virtue that the play
demonstrates the logic underlying the aristocratic conviction
of superiority. for insofar as the patrician class embodies
a higher form of existence. it constitutes a moral as well as
a power elite. The patrician vocabulary so important in
Coriplanus - 'noble'. 'gentle'. 'virtue'. 'deed'. 'name',
8.'The Life of Caius Martius Coriolanus', in Plutarch's Lives
of the Noble Grecians and Romanes Translated by Sir Thomas
~. 11.172.
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'honour'. 'power,g - makes authority the logical consequence
of service and the moral superiority that service implies:
the honour'd number
Who lack not virtue. no. nor power. but that
Which they have given to beggars. 111.1.71-73.
On this level. the honour of the class consists in its social
and moral differentiation from other classes.
It is on this basis that the play presents the patricians'
contempt for the common people of Rome. whom they see as their
moral opposites. abandoned to the promptings and propensities
of natural instinct. Plebeian cowardice in battle and in
civil life attains an almost proverbial status in the
patrician world of the play:
For though abundantly they lack discretion.
Yet are they passing cowardly. 1.1.201-202.
and
Methinks I see him stamp thus.
'Come on you cowards. you were
Though you were born in Rome.'
and call thus:
got in fear
1.3.32-34.
Governed by timidity. fear and self-protection. the plebeians
are incapable of constancy in adversity. If nobility is
characterised by the stable will. the common people are
associated with mutability;10 the multitude wavers and changes.
plucked one way and then another by ignorance and sensation:
not that our heads are some brown. some black.
some abram. some bald. but that our wits are so
diversely coloured .... II.3.18-21.
9.See Brockbank, 'Introduction'. Th. Arden Shake'p.lr.;
Coriolanus. p.70.
10.For an account of Renaissance attittudes to the populace.
see C.A. Patrides. 'The Beast with Many Heads: Renaissance
Views of the Multitude'. SQ. XVI (1965). 241-46.
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The pervasive animal imagery of the play relates the patrician
perception of their relationship to the plebeians to natural
hierarchy:
He that trusts to you.
Where he should find you lions. finds you hares;
Where foxes. geese .... 1.1.169-71.
and
. . . which will in time
Break ope the locks o'th'senate. and bring in
The crows to peck the eagles. 111.1.136-38.
When Volumnia characterises life without service as
'voluptuously surfeiting out of action'. she makes indulgence
of appetite the only alternative to honourable activity. This
contrast between the self-sacrifice of those who serve and
the self-indulgence of those who don't explains the
paradoxical attribution of asceticism to a class which is rich
and powerful and of appetite to a class which is poor and
hungry.ll When Martius mocks the people's want:
They said they were an-hungry. sigh'd forth
proverbs -
That hunger broke stone walls; that dogs must eat;
That meat was made for mouths.
1.1.204-206. ,
the lines bear witness to a patrician abhorrence of
self-interest that transforms the desire for the most basic
human necessity into weakness and self-seeking. For Martius,
who will invite the hardship of lingering 'But with a grain a
11.See Maurice Charney. Shakespeare's Roman Plays. The
Function of Imaaery in the Drama. Charney discusses the
association of the people with appetite (p.IS0) and the
ascetic strain in patrician values (p.1S4).
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day' (111.3.90). the plebeians. in their desire for bread. are
the literal embodiment of appetite. of the lower instinctual
life.
However. the play illuminates the ethical assumptions
underpinning such attitudes without obscuring their
partiality. When the play opens with the city in famine. we
see a ruling class that ~ wealthy and privileged and a
citizenry that ~ starving. and Menenius's defence of the
aristocracy in the belly fable invites a sceptical response
from the spectator even if it satisfies his plebeian audience.
Although the fable is designed to vindicate the nobles'
distribution of public benefits. it inadvertently condemns the
governing class which has been systematically 'cupboarding the
viand' (1.1.99).12 Moreover. in justifying the Senate to the
group of mutinous citizens. Menenius is concerned to establish
not the interdependence of classes required by his body
politic metaphor. but the pre-eminence of a social 'lite to
which the people are at once beholden and subordinate and
which receives no adequate acknowledgement of its public
burden:
'Yet 1 can make my audit up. that all
From me do back receive the flour of all.
And leave me but the bran.' 1.1.143-45.
The sophistry of the belly fable culminates naturally in the
characteristically patrician judgement that concludes
Menenius's lesson:
12.Anne Barton. 'Livy. Machiavelli. and Shakespeare's
Coriolanus. SS. 38 (1985). p.117.
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Rome and her rats are at the point of battle;
The one side must have bale. 1.1.161-62.
The servants of the state are transformed into the state
itself. the people into its rats.
This partisan spirit is made equally apparent in patrician
attitudes to the people. who are shown to play an important
role in the campaign against the Volsces. even if war is not
their function. They capture Corioles when they join Martius
in the second assault on the town. and in the field are roused
by the hero to a pitch of battle ardour which makes each of
them worth 'four Volsces' (1.6.78). Although Martius has a
selective memory and later recalls only their delay in
entering the enemy town (111.1.121-23). the battle scenes of
the first act alert us to the patricians' dependence on the
contributions which the common people make to the city's
survival. 13
Yet the play also makes it clear that the patrician
conviction of superiority coexists with a perception of the
city as an integrated whole comprising patricians and
plebeians. without which the public function of the nobility
would simply not exist. Thus Cominius. after his army's
retreat. expresses fellowship with his common soldiers and
pays tribute to their conduct in battle:
Breathe you. my friends; well fought: we are come
off
Like Romans. neither foolish in our stands
Nor cowardly in retire. 1.6.1-3.
13.1bid .• pp.120-21.
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The interdependence that constitutes a social organisation is
evoked in the opening scene in terms of political compromise:
the patricians' assent to the institution of the tribunate
manifests the necessity of accommodating plebeian demands in
order to quell the civil disorder that threatens to engulf the
city. Like any power elite. the patricians are fiercely
resistant to social innovation. which invariably means a
reduction in their authority. and it takes a popular uprising
to force them into social reform. But their grudging
compromise reflects their recognition that they must adapt
themselves to social change if the city on which they depend
for their vocation and prosperity is to survive. On this
level. the Rome of Coriolanus is shown to be a society in
flux. and the social evolution which brings the people an
improved legal position at the same time places a certain
strain on the pure heroic ideal that interprets valour as 'the
chiefest virtue':
if it be.
The man I speak of cannot in the world
Be singly counter-pois'd. 11.2.85-87.
Cominius's cautious 'if it be' suggests that Rome may be in
the first stages of transition from a simple heroic past.14
With the exception of the play's hero. the patrician
characters are shown to move with relative ease between the
two contradictory social perspectives contained in their class
14.1bid .. pp.115-16. I am indebted to Prof. Barton for this
account of the patrician response to developments in the
structure of Roman society.
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role. Cominius's battlefield praise of his soldiers is
followed by the more sectional tone of his speech to Martius:
'the dull tribunes. / That with the fusty plebeians hate thine
honours .... ' (1.9.6-7). Menenius. in similar fashion. can
discourse on friendly terms with the aggrieved plebeians
before presenting the fallacious elitism of the belly fable.
The patricians are socialised; they know how to adapt their
speech and conduct to social ends. If there is no reason to
doubt the sincerity of Cominius's comradely sentiments (even
Martius displays fellowship when the rank and file are eager
for the fray). patrician sociality more often than not amounts
to dissimulation; it is policy which mediates between the
claims of the city and those of the class. In the Rome of
Coriolanus. therefore. the social system functions by virtue
of compromise. requiring of the patrician an adaptability that
is inseparable from inconsistency and hypocrisy. It is
because Coriolanus refuses to compromise, insists on absolute
constancy to the class ideal, that his actions disclose the
contradiction at the heart of Roman society. The play
exhibits this contradiction most fully in the honour on which
the city bases its well-being.
The 'sovereignty of nature' (IV.7.35) which the patricians
claim makes them the 'natural' rulers of Rome arises, as we
have seen, from the subjugation of certain natural
inclinations. On one level. then. deeds of public service
evince a quality of unnaturalness implicit in the
subordination of a part of the self. particularly of that part
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concerned with its own immediate interests. But insofar as
such deeds are a manifestation of the higher nature which
serves the natural order of society. service becomes a
'natural' function. Cominius's statement of his relationship
to Rome makes clear the duality of patrician service:
I do love
My country's good with a respect more tender.
More holy and profound. than mine own life.
My dear wife's estimate. her womb's increase
And treasure of my loins. .. 111.3.111-15.
In these lines. Cominius boasts of putting his country before
his most precious private attachments and. at the same time.
conceives of his relationship to Rome as the most tender and
sacred of natural bonds. The lines contain an implicit
contrast between the private and the public life which the
play exhibits more fully in the contrast between Virgilia and
Volumnia.
However. the relationship between the servant and the state
lies not only in deeds of social virtue. but also in the
response of the community to those deeds. Indeed. it is
presupposed in the concept of service that a man's virtue
exists not independently of. but in conjunction with. the gaze
of the community. for without a public there can be no
public-spirited acts. In the service ethic. therefore.
external honour is an essential concomitant of virtue. Hence.
if Rome depends on the servants of the state for its
well-being. those servants equally depend on Rome for the
confirmation of their virtue. The superior class establishes
its superiority only in relation to the inferior class.
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When Volumnia upholds the values of service to her
daughter-in-law. her vision encompasses deed and social
response. the servant and the community:
When yet he was but tender-bodied. and the only
son of my womb: when youth with comeliness plucked
all gaze his way: when for a day of kings'
entreaties. a mother should not sell him an hour
from her beholding; I. considering how honour
would become such a person - that it was no better
than picture-like to hang by th'wall. if renown
made it not stir - was pleased to let him seek
danger where he was like to find fame. 1.3.5-14.
Volumnia envisages public honour as both the motive and reward
for valour. providing the initial incentive to action and the
subsequent proof of virtue. In making the honour achieved by
the self dependent on the honour conferred by society. the
lines testify to the patricians' dependence on the community
they serve.
The passage also confirms the cost of honour. Volumnia
shares with Cominius a sense of pride in having overcome
natural inclinations in training her son to internalise
the martial code. Her three opening clauses. with their
stress on the moment when the bond between the mother and her
child is at its strongest. serve to underline the prematurity
of Volumnia's separation from Martius. the fact that his
leaving of the nest was no natural evolutionary process.
Rather. ordinary maternal instincts - private. jealous and
protective - were sacrificed so that Martius could fulfil the
higher nature that lies not in the private life. but in the
public. active life of danger. and without which men are no
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better than pictures. lacking form and substance. Volumnia's
'I'. coming after the heartfelt evocation of maternal
affection. resounds with the confident selfhood of a woman who
conquered nature by sheer force of will.
The man capable of honourable deeds achieves a new self out
of the defeat of the old instinctual self. This new being is
associated with blood rather than milk:
The breasts of Hecuba
When she did suckle Hector. look'd not lovelier
Than Hector's forehead when it spit forth blood
At Grecian sword contemning. 1.3.40-43.
Shocking as it is. this image is not merely brutal. as some
critics have asserted.1S For Volumnia. the blood which
generates honour is no less fecund than the milk which
nourished the infant. As an index of sacrifice. blood creates
value. Similarly. the honours that society bestows on its
warriors are endowed with life-giving properties:
To a cruel war I sent him. from whence he
returned. his brows bound with oak. 1 tell thee.
daughter. I sprang not more in joy at first
hearing he was a man-child. than now in first
seeing he had proved himself a man. 1.3.14-18.
The oaken garland. the symbol of the recognition of Martius's
deeds. becomes the indispensable proof of virtue. As such. it
confers new life upon the recipient: the winning of honour.
1S.Derek Traversi characterises Volumnia's speech as
'a glorification of bloodshed more fantastic and inhuman
than all that has gone before .... ' See An Approach to
Shakespeare (London: Hollis and Carter. 1969). 11,238. Norman
Rabkin sees in the passage the shadow of Lady Macbeth. See
'Coriolanus: The Tragedy of Politics'. SQ. 17 (1966). p.198.
Kenneth Burke. in 'Coriolanus and the Delights of Faction'.
~. XIX (1966-67). p.191. calls Volumnia a 'pugnacious
virago' .
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which is initiation into manhood. is like a second birth: just
as the honour conferred on Martius by his new name is like a
fresh baptism:16
My gentle Martius. worthy Caius, and
By deed-achieving honour newly nam'd -
What is it? - Coriolanus, must I call thee?
11.1.171-73.
So powerful are the life-giving properties of valour and
honour in the patrician service ethic that the commonplace
idea that a man's fame survives his death is invested with
a new intensity. If to give one's life for one's country is
the most honourable of acts, then death logically loses its
negative connotations. and a nobleman's reputation. his
existence in the eyes of others. acquires a substantial value
that lives on after death. Consequently, in response to
Virgilia's enquiry, 'But had he died in the business, madam,
how then?' (I.3.19). Volumnia makes the name the man:
Then his good report should have been my son. I
therein would have found issue. 1.3.20-21.
It seems. then, that the relationship of the public servant
to the city he serves is perceived by the patricians as
a profoundly natural one, in which a man is re-born and
re-named and lives on after death in the memory of the
community. To be sure, in this transfiguration of the family
relationship from a private into a public concept - a motif
already noticed in Julius Caesar - the play suggests the
16.D.J. Gordon, 'Name and Fame: Shakespeare's Coriolanus', in
Papers Mainly Shakespearian, ed. G.I. Duthie (London: Oliver
and Boyd, 1964), p.51.
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extent of repression of natural impulses. and of sublimation
into moral transcendence. that the honour ethic demands. Yet
it also makes it clear that in this ethic the state is
regarded as a natural organism. The patrician concept of
service links the aristocracy to Rome as a child is linked to
its family. That this is more than a metaphor is evident from
the fact that the values of service are transmitted and
preserved through the institution of the patrician family.
Although critics who simply condemn Volumnia's enthusiasm
for valour lose sight of what it reveals about the patrician
concept of service. her association of war with maternity and
childhood is indeed disturbing. in part because it conveys the
violence of her own self-suppression. Moreover. in her ardent
identification with honour. the play exhibits the public
energies struggling to find expression within the narrow scope
of the traditional female role. Volumnia's forcible
repression of her maternal instincts is arguably her only
means of sharing in honour; it therefore suggests the extent
of her own frustrated public ambitions. which. restricted as
they are by her gender role. she can channel only through her
son. Throughout the play. Volumnia participates fervently in
the public life. but she does so solely through her maternal
role and. until the fifth act. chiefly from the relative
seclusion of the domestic sphere. Her 'unfeminine' interests
and demeanour gain her a reputation for eccentricity
remarkably similar to that she has acquired from some modern
scholars. When the tribunes have the misfortune to encounter
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her after Martius's banishment. Sicinius asks. 'Are you
mankind?' (IV.2.16). suggesting not only that she is mad.
but that she is 'masculine. virago-like,.17 Volumnia is
unquestionably an extreme personality. but the play
accommodates the implication that her fierce involvement in
her son's honour grows out of her own thwarted desire for
self-realisation.
Yet in her notion of the relationship between Rome and
patrician virtue there is a deep-seated ambivalence. for it
comprises two contradictory conceptions of what it is to be a
Roman. Her idea of patrician virtue entails. as we have seen.
the resolute subjugation of nature in the interests of a
higher self. and the valorization of noble constancy against
the instability of vulgar instinct. This higher identity. for
all that it is a social concept. can only be achieved by
individual determination and energy. That is to say. virtue
comes from the self.
However. this view coexists in Volumnia with a radically
different notion of the connection between the self and
society. When she asserts that without renown a man is no
better than a picture. she equates identity with a man's
existence in the eyes of others. It is society that creates
the higher self and confirms it through the symbols that
'prove' a man's worth. This concept of the relationship
17.QEU. s.v.a.2: a.1B3.
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between aristocratic virtue and the community comprehends the
dependence of the nobility on the society they serve: without
the city as the foundation of natural order. the aristocratic
function would not exist. and without the response of the
community. the nobleman's public-spirited deeds would have no
meaning. Virtue. then. comes from society.
In Volumnia's speech to Virgilia. we find a telling
expression of the play's tragic contradiction. The passage
demonstrates that a social conception of virtue is radically
flawed because based on two ideas of nature and selfhood that.
if they are fundamentally opposed. are at the same time
inseparable. The duality of Volumnia's account of service is
a measure of the interdependence of self and society that
forms the basis of a social conception of virtue: society does
rely on the nobleman for its preservation. and the nobleman
does in turn rely on society for the realisation of his
se1fhood. But this interdependence is also logically
impossible. for the continuation of society demands the
creation of an unnnatural and therefore potentially asocial
self. while the constructed self depends for its existence on
the unstable nature that it must necessarily repudiate.
The conflict. then, is between will and nature or, viewed
in different terms. between the honour of the self and the
class. and the honour the city bestows on its servant. The
play makes clear that these two levels of honour are
inseparable. Yet at the same time. an honour that is based
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on the stable will and intrinsic to the self can be
accommodated to an honour that is based on an unstable society
and extrinsic to the self only by compromise. This. of
course. is understood by the other patrician characters. But
for Martius. absolutely loyal to the principles of his
training. compromise is seen as the antithesis of an honour
based on constancy and hence as a logical impossibility.
The play's tragic contradiction - that the self and society
can neither be divorced nor harmonised - is exhibited in the
complex relationship which the play sets up between Caius
Martius and Rome. a relationship that involves society's
creation of an asocial hero who is thus detached from the city
to which he is at the same time irrevocably tied. In order
to understand this paradoxical dramatic situation. it is
necessary to explore the education in patrician virtue that
Volumnia gives her son. Before tackling that subject.
however. we must devote a few words to Virgilia. the character
through whom the play proclaims a counter-truth to the service
ethic.
Virgilia exists on the very private level that the service
ethic claims to transcend. It is not surprising. therefore.
that Volumnia sees her daughter-in-Iaw's attitudes as
fundamentally opposed to patrician values. For Virgilia. war
is where men get killed. not where they find new life. and
blood is a token. not of the highest virtue. but of pain and
suffering. Her vision of life places the highest value on
317
private affection and makes the safety and well-being of loved
ones the paramount concern: 'Heavens bless my lord from fell
Aufidiusl' (1.3.45).
Yet if Virgilia cannot. like her mother-in-law. find
'solace' in Martius's 'hazards' (IV.l.28). she does provide
a corrective to the patrician assumption that life without
service can have no value. In her silent presence. the play
affirms the values of the quiet life. and shows that man's
'lower' nature may encompass virtues. such as love and
solicitude. that cannot adequately be characterised as
indulgence of appetite. Moreover. as the episode with Valeria
reveals. the private can be as constant as the public to its
ruling principle: considerably more constant. in fact. than
Volumnia and the other patricians. who attempt to divide their
loyalties between the class and the city .
••••••••••• ** •• ** •••
The tensions which we noted in Volumnia's speeches to
Virgilia have profound implications for the upbringing of her
son. As the representative of public service. Volumnia
embodies both Rome and the patrician class. She sent her son
while he was 'tender-bodied' to a 'cruel war' in order that
he might grow up a 'true-bred' (1.1.242) patrician whose
relationship to Rome is the highest of natural bonds. The
play traces the educational process through which patrician
values are inculcated. Martius himself tells US a great deal
318
about the training he received from his mother:
I muse my mother
Does not approve me further. who was wont
To call them woollen vassals. things created
To buy and sell with groats. to show bare heads
In congregations. to yawn. be still. and wonder.
When one but of my ordinance stood up
To speak of peace or war. 111.2.7-13.
In raising her son to be noble. Volumnia taught him the
essential differentiation of the patrician class from the
plebeian. of the class which renounces the private level in
order to serve in 'peace or war' from that which exists on the
private level of commercial transactions. The lines inform us
how successfully Volumnia imparted the separatist values of
the aristocracy to her son: the values that confine virtue to
the class with a public role and make power and authority the
logical consequence of moral superiority. Coriolanus has
learned that the patricians rule Rome through a sovereignty of
nature that makes them the natural masters. and the people.
who lack human value. the natural slaves.
The irony of these lines relates to Martius and to Volumnia
and. through Volumnia. to Rome itself. Volumnia's two roles.
as the spokesman of Rome and of the patrician class. are
clearly incompatible. for here the demands of one exclude the
other: class solidarity prohibits any relationship with the
rest of the city beyond that of masters to slaves. volumnia
has indoctrinated her son in a theory of aristocratic
superiority which is an essential part of public service. but
which cannot accommodate an association with the common people
of Rome. The irony for Rome. then. lies in the fact that the
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education which guarantees its own survival becomes. in the
case of Coriolanus. the instrument that forbids the service
relationship. Volumnia has provided a tutelage so effective
that it amounts to a kind of conditioning. which produces an
asocial being. uncritically dedicated to the principles of his
training. However. if Martius points in these lines to his
mother's inconsistency. his own anxiousness for her approval
reveals equally his dependence on her and. through her. on
Rome. for his own sense of identity; the self comes from
society. the ascendant will from nature.
As he goes into exile from the city of his birth. Martius
enlarges the picture of his education:
You were us'd
To say. extremities was the trier of spirits;
That common chances common men could bear.
That when the sea was calm all boats alike
Show'd mastership in floating: fortune's blows.
When most struck home. being gentle wounded.
craves
A noble cunning. You were us'd to load me
With precepts that would make invincible
The heart that conn'd them. IV.l.3-11.
The passage. itself a series of precepts. provides a vivid
account of the way in which patrician values are passed on.
Through aphoristic instruction. Martius has learned that the
proof of patrician moral superiority lies in constancy in
the face of adversity. Thus. the essential quality of
aristocratic virtue. the power of the will to overcome the
instability of nature. can be tested only in moments of
extremity. when great men are distinguished from the common
herd. The passage is reminiscent of Agamemnon's and Nestor's
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speeches in the Greek council scene of Troi1us and Cressida.
which similarly portray aristocratic virtue in terms of the
'distinction' which adversity provides between 'the bold and
coward' (~. 1.3.23). the 'shallow bauble boat' and that 'of
nobler bulk' (~. 1.3.35.37). Thus. it is in the encounter
with hardship that the nobleman manifests a moral superiority
that is measured by the inferiority of others: to be excellent
is to excel over one's fellow men. The passage points to the
competitive principle that is an intrinsic part of honour.
The motivation impelling the nobleman's construction of the
constant self is the aspiration to singularity. the desire to
demonstrate a unique. unrivalled capacity for virtue.
The formulation of honour that emerges from Martius's
speech involves the passionate relationship between a man and
his own virtue which forms an essential part of an ethic which
locates moral conduct in the appeal to the self. Yet the
glimpse into Martius's education which the passage affords
shows that his training has granted a priority to this
self-relationship that renders its connection to the state it
is intended to serve intensely problematic. The conception of
honour which Volumnia imparts to her son is focussed entirely
on the self in its pursuit of greatness. It envisages the end
of honour not as social stability. but as self-assertion.
Moreover. the stress on differentiation makes honour an
absolute. for one is either constant in adversity or
inconstant. noble or base. Thus. to be honourable is to be
immovably self-consistent. what Aufidius describes as his
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rival's determination 'Not to be other than one thing'
(IV.7.42). This also encourages the conviction of self-
sufficiency. for it assumes that the sole guarantee of
stability is the strength of the individual will. Thus. the
self-regarding will is implicitly severed from its traditional
reliance on social esteem and made complete in and of itself.
Volumnia has bestowed upon her son a conception of honour
based on the superior individual who is unique. inflexible and
morally independent. The logical outcome of her training is
egoism - the fervent self-involvement that. in Martius's case.
comes to exclude all other considerations.
However. in accordance with the play's tragic logic. the
assertion of the absolute and autonomous self simultaneously
betrays its dependence on others. Coriolanus learns self-
sufficiency. but in owing his self-sufficiency to his
education. he clearly loses his claim to be self-sufficient.
Moreover. the emphasis on differentiation. which on one level
is a measure of the unbridgeable gap between will and nature.
is on another proof that Martius's honour is not self-
existent. but conditioned by reference to his social and moral
inferiors. Yet the dramatic action shows clearly that
Coriolanus is unaware of these divisions. having been
subjected to a training so efficient that it made his heart
'invincible'. He is consistent in a way which the other
patrician characters are not because he pursUes the logic of
an education that. in equating the consistency of the will
with the honour of the class and the self. prohibits
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reflection and self-questioning. Rome produces a warrior who
is quite unable to compromise the twin ideals of class pride
and individual autonomy bequeathed to him by his mother. His
rigid devotion to the ethic of the superior individual is
simultaneously the measure of his detachment from Rome and of
his dependence on the city which created him.
In Martius's military career. we witness the enactment
of the principles of his training. Cominius's formal encomium
attaches great significance to the hero's youthful valour:
At sixteen years.
When Tarquin made a head for Rome. he fought
Beyond the mark of others: our then dictator.
Whom with all praise I point at. saw him fight.
When with his Amazonian chin he drove
The bristled lips before him: he bestrid
An o'erpress'd Roman. and i'th'consul's view
Slew three opposers: Tarquin's self he met
And struck him on his knee. In that day's feats.
When he might act the woman in the scene.
He prov'd best man i'th'field. and for his meed
Was brow-bound with the oak. II.2.87-98.
The mother's suppression of maternal instinct in sending her
young son to war finds its reflection in the boy who fights
like a man, actually exceeding other men in his valour. As
the lines enumerate the feats of the boy-hero - actively
seeking danger. unsparing of his life - the effort to conquer
instinct becomes prodigious. The acting metaphor suggests the
deliberate overcoming of natural inclinations. while the
rhythms of the verse show us Martius growing into his
occupation like a great natural force:18
lS.See Reuben A. Brower. Hero and Saint: Shakespeare and the
Graeco-Roman Tradition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1971).
p.357.
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His pupil age
Man-enter'd thus. he waxed like a sea.
And in the brunt of seventeen battles since
He lurch'd all swords of the garland.
II.2.98-lQl.
The subordination of the lower nature secures a higher one:
in the effort to be unnatural. Martius finds his nature -
a nature which. because it is based on the conquest of a part
of the self. is simultaneously unnatural and superhuman. The
transcendence of instinct creates an inner strength likened to
the physical power of the natural world. In conquering
natural proclivity. Martius becomes unconquerable:
as weeds before
A vessel under sail. so men obey'd
And fell below his stem: his sword. death's stamp.
Where it did mark. it took: from face to foot
He was a thing of blood. whose every motion
Was tim'd with dying cries .... 1I.2.105-10.
The images of remorseless and irresistible motion associated
with Martius's valour point to the awesome power of the
constructed self. The man of flesh and blood is transformed
into a machine of war. wielding his sword arm with the
impersonal power of a god.19
On one level. the encomium is a verse portrait of Martius's
self-creation. of the will's construction of the higher self.
It depicts the passion for pre-eminence that inspires his
deeds. Cominius comes back repeatedly to the idea of
ascendancy: Martius fought 'beyond the mark' of other men: he
proved 'best man i'th'field': he 'lurch'd all swords of the
garland'. That climactic verb tellingly conveys the violence
19.Ibid .• pp.357-60. See also Traversi. pp.240-42.
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of Martius's urge for singularity.
This same love of the higher self characterises an earlier
Shakespearean portrayal of absolute valour - Young Clifford's
battle speech in Henry VI, Part Two:
Let no soldier fly.
He that is truly dedicate to war
Hath no self-love: nor he that loves himself
Hath not essentially. but by circumstance.
The name of valour. ~. V.2.36-40.20
The overcoming of instinct that makes Martius an absolute
warrior is here defined as the rejection of self-love. of the
natural desire for self-preservation that is incompatible with
total self-sacrifice. Yet Clifford's speech does not feel
like a negation of the self. Rather. it reveals self-
sacrifice to be a form of self-assertion - the means whereby
the hero demonstrates his moral supremacy. The contrast
between essence and circumstance stresses again the
'distinction' which extremity affords between the great man
who incarnates nobility and the common run of men incapable of
perfect virtue.
It is this love of the higher self. with its desire for
absolute superiority. that is dramatised in the battle scenes
of the first act. Martius's solitary assault on the enemy
town demonstrates in vivid theatrical terms the quality of
essential valour: the refusal to guard one's life. the active
20.All quotations are from The Arden Shakespeare: The Second
Part of Kin& Henry VI. ed. Andrew S. Cairncross (London:
Methuen and Co. Ltd .. 1957).
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seeking of danger and almost certain death which manifest
a martial virtue untouched by the lower nature. In this pure
heroic commitment. Martius is sharply distinguished from both
his patrician comrades. who 'retire to win our purpose'
(1.6.50). and the common soldiers. who view Martius's
all-or-nothing brand of heroism as 'Foolhardiness' (1.4.46).
As in the encomium in Act II. the conquest of nature
becomes the source of the hero's invincibility. The higher
nature again rivals the power of the natural world: Martius's
valour is likened to earthquakes:
Thou wast a soldier
Even to Cato's wish. not fierce and terrible
Only in strokes. but with thy grim looks and
The thunder-like percussion of thy sounds
Thou mad'st thine enemies shake. as if the world
Were feverous and did tremble. 1.4.56-61 ..
and his voice to thunder:
The shepherd knows not thunder from a tabor.
More than I know the sound of Martius' tongue
From every meaner man. 1.6.25-27.
The portrayal of the hero's valour in terms of natural power.
encompassing speech and countenance. voice and motion.
evokes a total warrior whose aspiration to transcend instinct
creates a courage stronger than steel:
Oh noble fellow!
Who sensibly outdares his senseless sword.
And when it bows. stand'st up. 1.4.52-54.
The juxtaposition of 'sensibly' and 'senseless' stresses
what is involved in transforming a body into a sword.
Titus Lartius's tribute to his comrade - 'Here is the
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steed. we the caparison. , (1.9.12) - gives expression
to the contrast between essence and circumstance. Martius
embodies valour in a way which his patrician comrades do not
because the higher self is the focus of his reality.
Moreover. these battle scenes underline his drive for
uniqueness. The striving spirit that impelled him in his
first encounters to lurch 'all swords of the garland' leads
him also to relish the war with the Volsces as the opportunity
to confront his rival. Aufidius. Martius views his adversary
as a kind of mirror image of himself:
And were I anything but what I am.
I would wish me only he. 1.1.230-31.
He sees Aufidius as 'a lion / That I am proud to hunt.'
(1.1.234-35). and is inevitably drawn towards the only man
whose valour he considers to rival his own. When he stands
before Aufidius and boasts of his deeds. he is asserting his
uniqueness before the only man capable of challenging it:
Within these three hours. Tullus.
Alone I fought in your Corioles walls.
And made what work I pleas'd: 'tis not my blood
Wherein thou seest me mask'd. I.S.7-10.
The play makes it clear that competitive singularity and
the good of Rome are potentially conflicting motives:
Were half to half the world by th'ears. and he
Upon my party. I'd revolt to make
Only my wars with him. 1.1.232-34.
This vision of a world at war in which the soldier betrays his
allegiance in order to pursue his ideal of perfect valour
clarifies the denial of community underlying Martius's pursuit
of the higher self. In the play's complex portrayal of
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patrician honour. we are offered a cluster of related notions.
each expressive of the solipsistic and autonomous 'I':
self-creation. self-sufficiency. integrity. singleness of
being. singularity. The repudiation of an unstable nature
generates a superior self which will come to see itself as
independent of everything else.
We inevitably return to the tragic contradiction that
informs every aspect of Coriolanus. The play's depictions of
Martius's self-creation in valour are also portraits of
society's creation of an asocial citizen. While Martius is
shown to be completely dependent on nature for his selfhood -
dependent on society through the mother who trained him and
through the social and moral inferiors who alone give his
superiority meaning - Rome is revealed as the creative force
that begets a warrior whose education has rendered him
incapable of participating in the natural bond of public
service.
Volumnia's tutelage manifests itself not only in deeds. but
also in words. The play establishes a clear connection
between Martius's upbringing and a certain kind of language:
he has been bred i'th'wars
Since a could draw a sword. and is ill school'd
In bolted language. . 111.1.317-19.
Martius's training renders him incapable of using language in
a certain way. He is. according to his fellow patricians.
ignorant of the refinements of speech that enable men with
conflicting social interests to get on together. to express
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themselves in ways that avoid offence and foster social ties.
This connection between the hero's education and his
unsociability Shakespeare found in Plutarch:
for lacke of education. he was so
chollericke and impacient. that he would yeld to
no living creature: which made him churlishe.
uncivill. and altogether unfit for any mans
conversation.21
The play takes Plutarch's suggestion of a hero whose education
(or lack of it) has rendered him incapable of 'conversation'.
or social interaction. and makes Coriolanus's mode of speech
an analogue of his valour:
As for my country I have shed my blood.
Not fearing outward force. so shall my lungs
Coin words till their decay. against those measles
Which we disdain should tetter us. yet sought
The very way to catch them. III.1.75-79.
The lines draw a parallel between. on the one hand. the
refusal to dissemble and the warrior's self-sacrifice and. on
the other. the language of policy and the lower nature. The
constant will that impels Martius's deeds and that constitutes
his 'truth' (III.1.121) is translated into a language of
absolute truth; while the civil speech that allows the
patricians to negotiate with the common people is associated
in his mind with the instability of nature manifested in the
inconsistency of a class that simultaneously 'disdains' and
'seeks' contact with their social inferiors. Martius's
language is as much a function of his asociality as his deeds.
Will expresses itself verbally in the stability of truth:
21.Plutarch's Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romanes. 11.172.
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nature. in the form of the city of Rome. in the instability of
lies.
Coriolanus's 'truth'. then. consists essentially in the
moral superiority of the patrician class and the heroic
individual who embodies its values. Through invective.
the language of abuse. he gives voice to the contempt of
the higher for the lower nature. whether in the form of
cowardice:
You souls of geese.
That bear the shapes of men. how have you run
From slaves that apes would beatl 1.4.34-36 ..
or of mutability:
With every minute you do change a mind.
And call him noble that was now your hate.
Him vile that was your garland. 1.1.181-83.
Shunning the refinements and evasions of polite interaction.
he is abrupt to the point of rudeness. even with his patrician
comrades: 'Come I too late?' (1.6.24.27) and 'I will go wash'
(1.9.66). As a member of a ruling class. Coriolanus is at
home using the language of command. the mode of speech based
on the only association of nobility and baseness compatible
with his inflexible idea of patrician honour:
You herd of - boils and plagues
Plaster you o'er. that you may be abhorr'd
Farther than seen. and one infect another
Against the wind a milel .... Pluto and helll
All hurt behind. backs red. and faces pale
With flight and agued fear! Mend and charge home.
Or. by the fires of heaven. I'll leave the foe
And make my wars on you. Look to't.
1.4.31-34: 36-40.
The language of command is the opposite of the 'soothing'
language of policy and. as an absolute mode of speech. is
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emphatically denied the tribunes:
Shall remain!
Hear you this Triton of the minnows? Mark you
His absolute 'shall'? 111.1.87-89.
As an aristocrat with a public role. Martius is equally
comfortable with the balanced cadences of military rhetoric:
If any such be here -
As it were sin to doubt - that love this painting
Wherein you see me smear'd; if any fear
Lesser his person than an ill report;
If any think brave death outweighs bad life.
1.6.67-71. .
and its civil analogue. political rhetoric:
If he have power.
Then vail your ignorance; if none. awake
Your dangerous lenity. If you are learn'd
Be not as common fools; if you are not.
Let them have cushions by you. 111.1.96-100.22
As public. functional speech. rhetoric is again fundamentally
opposed to the 'soft way' (111.2.82) of civil speech .
•••• ** •••••••• ** ••••
In Shakespeare's dramatic portrayal of Coriolanus. the
hero's unity of being is conveyed jointly through words and
deeds. As this unity is fundamentally asocial. so the
language that expresses it is asocial; while. on the other
hand. social language must be false as it gives voice to the
notion of interdependence which for Martius is a monstrous
lie. Here. of course. we are dealing with the two ideas of
selfhood that form the basis of the play's tragic
22.S.S. Hussey. in The Literary Lanauaae of Shakespeare
(London: Longman Group Ltd .. 1982). p.173. remarks on the
structural similarity of these two passages.
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contradiction and that involve two levels of honour that are
at once mutually exclusive and inseparable. When Coriolanus
must seek the honour of the city. the two aspects of honour.
internal and external. meet head on. An honour based on the
integrity of the self confronts an honour based on the
dependence of the self on society. and the collision produces
the play's central dramatic crisis. This crisis is explored
in terms of the conflicting modes of speech and motion that
characterise the two conceptions of the relationship between
society and the self.
Civic honour is an essentially social type of language. As
the praise of a man's deeds. it confirms active virtue in the
response of the community and hence assumes the dependence of
the individual on society. It is not surprising. therefore.
that Martius condemns the acclaim of the army as false:
May these same instruments. which you profane.
Never sound morel When drums and trumpets shall
I'th'field prove flatterers. let courts and cities
be
Made all of false-fac'd soothing I When steel
grows
Soft as the parasite's silk. let him be made
An ovator for th'warsl 1.9.41-46.
This speech makes it clear that as far as Coriolanus is
concerned there can be no such thing as true praise. because
praise by its very nature asserts the social basis of his
deeds - an idea which for Martius constitutes a violation of
the 'truth'. This. of course. is the reason why Martius
despises the honour not only of the common people. but also of
the army and his patrician peers. If praise is false. then it
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must be flattery. the 'false-fac'd soothing' that for Martius
characterises all civil speech and which he sees here as
polluting martial values. The hero regards the army's tribute
as a profanation of a truth he holds sacred: the truth
embodied in the life of valour. symbolised by the drums and
trumpets of the battlefield. which suggest Martius's own mode
of speech. and the steel of his sword. which conjures his own
invincible bearing in battle. The speech and motion that
reflect the integrity of the higher self are transformed into
the attributes of the lower nature. of a parasite who is a
fundamentally social creature. with soft ways and no deeds.
In offering Martius flattering acclamation. the army
inadvertently accuses him of vanity - an imputation Martius
strenuously denies:
For that I have not wash'd my nose that bled.
Or foil'd some debile wretch. which without note
Here's many else have done. you shout me forth
In acclamations hyperbolical.
As if I lov'd my little should be dieted
In praises sauc'd with lies. 1.9.47-52.
The hero's belittling of his deeds can hardly be taken as a
sign of humility. Rather. it is a logical expression of his
obsession with the higher self. which cannot bear to owe
anything to anyone else. and which public honour threatens to
transform into its opposite: the vanity of the man who has no
existence outside the gaze of the community. During the scene
in the Capitol (11.2), Coriolanus speaks of words as if they
destroy his deeds; not all words, but those that 'soothe'
(11.2.73), that offer a false commendation which makes his
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deeds expressions not of a self-sufficient will. but of an
unstable nature that relies for its identity on external
reference. Accordingly. when Martius refuses to 'idly sit /
To hear my nothings monster'd' (11.2.76-77). his diminishment
of his deeds demonstrates his contempt for the dependence of
'parasites' and the instability of the monstrous 'many-headed
multitude' (11.3.16-17). As flatterer or as the worthless.
vain recipient of flattery. he perceives in the social
relationship established by external honour the destruction
of the internal honour of the self.
Martius's internalisation of the two principles of his
training - patrician superiority and individual integrity -
dictates that he must repudiate the language of external
honour as false. If the play leaves us in no doubt that the
army's approbation is not spurious but sincere. it nonetheless
demonstrates the validity of Coriolanus's judgement with
regards to the city itself. It shows that within Rome the
honour relationship must be based on patrician flattery and
plebeian reception of flattery because there honour. in the
form of public office. is requested by a proud and privileged
class of a multitude which it holds in contempt. The
patricians are therefore compelled to hide their scorn under
the soothing language of policy. The contradictory pressures
of public service necessitate that they compromise their
nobility in the act of confirming it.
The play's exploration of civic honour as the interplay
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of patrician flattery and plebeian instability shapes the
interlude with the two officers in the Capitol. The second
officer observes:
'Faith. there
flattered the
there be many
wherefore ...
hath been many great men that have
people. who ne'er loved them; and
that they have loved. they know not
11.2.7-10.
Civic honour appears here as the union of flattery and
ignorance. Thus. Coriolanus. like Brutus. is caught between
policy and nature: the public servant overcomes the lower
nature only to confront the necessity of accommodating it.
The second officer goes on to contrast Coriolanus with
patrician flatterers:
He hath deserved worthily of his country; and his
ascent is not by such easy degrees as those who.
having been supple and courteous to the people.
bonneted. without any further deed to have them at
all into their estimation and report; but he hath
so planted his honours in their eyes and his
actions in their hearts. that for their tongues to
be silent and not confess so much were a kind of
ingrateful injury. (11.2.24-32).
The honour won by flattery derives from deceptive appearances;
from the supple motion and courteous speech of hypocrites who
have no deeds and hence no inherent worth. The contamination
of internal honour by civic honour is again depicted in terms
of opposing modes of speech and movement. Martius. the
absolute warrior who moves with remorseless power and always
says what he thinks will. if he seeks the city's honour. have
to become a parasite who bends his body to the people and
tells them soothing lies.
Martius bows reluctantly to the custom granting the
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plebeians the right to ratify his election to the consulship.
But when he stands in the marketplace. he requests the
people's voices with such contempt that the tribunes are able
to incite the citizenry to withdraw their endorsement. In
response. he unleashes a tirade against the 'double worship'
of mixed government (111.1.141) which upsets the fragile
equilibrium of the social order and plunges Rome into tumult.
Martius's fellow patricians implore him to compromise with the
people. 'Unless by not so doing. our good city / Cleave in the
midst. and perish.' (111.2.27-28). Yet in the great central
scene of the play. when Martius is confronted by the patrician
conviction that honour and policy 'do grow together'
(111.2.43). we discover the proleptic irony of his earlier
battlefield vision of the false-faced parasite. for in order
to be social he must say what he doesn't mean:
with such words that are but roted in
Your tongue. though but bastards and syllables
Of no allowance to your bosom's truth.
111.2.55-57.
and bend his body to the people:
I prithee now. my son.
Go to them. with this bonnet in thy hand.
And thus far having stretch'd it - here be with
them -
Thy knee bussing the stones ... 111.2.72-75.
Coriolanus. then. can compromise with the people only by
detaching speech and gesture from their source in the self.
Volumnia assures him that he can tell lies and act basely
while preserving his nobility. his 'bosom's truth' intact
within himself. Yet for Coriolanus. this is clearly
impossible. for he would lose his unity of being and betray
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the absolute self-consistency required by his ideal of honour.
Therefore. when Martius agrees to speak to the people. he
bids farewell to his disposition:
Away my disposition. and possess me
Some harlot's spirit! My throat of war be turn'd.
Which choired with my drum. into a pipe
Small as an eunuch. or the virgin voice
That babies lull asleep! The smiles of knaves
Tent in my cheeks. and schoolboys' tears take up
The glasses of my sight I A beggar's tongue
Make motion through my lips. and my arm'd knees
Who bow'd but in my stirrup. bend like his
That hath receiv'd an alms! 111.2.111-20.
The speech is a lament for a lost higher nature. The verse
takes its impetus from the clash of patrician and plebeian
values in which Coriolanus sees himself transformed and
debased. His 'bosom's truth' degenerates into dissembling.
The 'throat of war' that represents both his essential valour
and the speech that mirrors it is weakened and unmanned. The
verb 'tent'. used in conjunction with the 'smiles of knaves'.
evokes the sense of the perversion of a way of life by policy.
The man of steel loses his strength. his voice and his bearing
and speaks and grovels like a beggar.
It is this prospect - that a nobleman who is inherently
superior should prove inherently base - that momentarily stops
Coriolanus in his tracks:
I will not do't.
Lest I surcease to honour mine own truth.
And by my body's action teach my mind
A most inherent baseness. 111.2.120-23.
At this point. Coriolanus understands that to play the role
endorsed by his mother and his patrician comrades will be to
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destroy himself.23 This destruction of the self is a failure
of internal honour. conceived in terms of a betrayal of
the unity of the self which renders it liable to moral
contamination.
Patrician inconsistency is fully exhibited throughout the
third act of the play. as the nobles simultaneously affirm
Coriolanus's absoluteness as the essence of nobility and
betray that absoluteness by attempting to incorporate it into
the unity of the state:
You are too absolute.
Though therein you can never be too noble.
But when extremities speak. III.2.39-41.
The anomalies of the patrician position could not be more
clearly displayed. Volumnia. who taught her son that
absoluteness in extremity is the proof of nobility, now
insists that extremity demands compromise. In recommending
policy to her son as an honourable course, Volumnia in effect
betrays the essential nature of patrician virtue:
I would dissemble with my nature where
My fortunes and my friends at stake requir'd
I should do so in honour. I am in this
Your wife, your son, these senators.
the nobles. . .. 111.2.62-65.
Here, the mother who inculcated the patrician ideal of honour
as the transcendence of the private, natural level advocates
the primacy of instinct: of self-interest and the private
attachments of family, friends and class. An honour based on
will is asked to surrender to one based on nature. The fact
23.See Gordon, pp.SO-51.
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that the patrician class is now associated not with the
higher but with the lower nature signals the hero's separation
from his caste to which the play has consistently looked
forward.
Patrician inconsistency is. of course. the inevitable
consequence of the tensions built into a service ethic that.
in seeking to fuse society and the unnatural self. acquires
a highly problematic character which the play encapsulates in
the relationship between Coriolanus and Volumnia. As the
representative of both Rome and patrician virtue. Volumnia
must create honour only to endorse nature. Yet if Volumnia is
profoundly contradictory in asking her son to betray the
nature she herself taught him. her position as mother and
teacher clarifies Martius's dependence on her and. through
her. on Rome. On this level. the play once again reveals the
impossibility and the unnaturalness of Coriolanus's ideal of
self-sufficiency. Even Martius's great affirmation of
fidelity to his own 'truth' is an unconscious testimony to
the education that 'taught' him a nobility he conceives of as
inherent (111.2.120-23). Society. the creative force that
shapes individual virtue and gives it meaning. becomes the
very embodiment of nature. a feature which the play dramatises
in the patricians' vision of service as a 'natural' function.
It is within the context of such service that individual will
can be seen as part of the natural order. Hence. Coriolanus's
conviction of self-sufficiency constitutes a denial of society
that is equally a denial of nature - the nature that
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encompasses both the private level of instinct and the public
level of national duty.
Throughout the third act. when he is faced with the moral
contamination of compromise. Coriolanus desperately and
repeatedly asserts what he is. and he does so in terms of
the patrician ideal of constancy in the face of danger. of
fearless self-sacrifice:
Let them pull all about my ears. present me
Death on the wheel. or at wild horses' heels.
Or pile ten hills on the Tarpeian rock.
That the precipitation might down stretch
Below the beam of sight: yet will I still
Be thus to them. 111.2.1-6 ..
and
Well. I will do't:
Yet were there but this single plot to lose.
This mould of Martius. they to dust should grind
it
And throw't against the wind. 111.2.101-104.
Yet what is Coriolanus sacrificing himself for? Under the
circumstances. these affirmations of the patrician function
become assertions of the autonomy of the self. In offering to
face annihilation rather than compromise with the people.
Coriolanus conquers nature in order to preserve his own
singularity at any price. Martius. it would seem. repudiates
the vanity of the lower self only to embrace the monstrous
egoism of the constructed self. In the climactic banishment
scene. Martius's cry of 'I banish youl' (III.3.123) assumes
a power for the self that encompasses and subsumes the very
power of the state. and his denial of the city that made him
what he is will prove ultimately to be a denial of all human
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relationships. As Coriolanus rejects and is rejected by the
city of his birth. we are confronted with the consequences of
the contradiction that has driven the action of this play from
the start.
• •••• *** •••••••• ** ••
Coriolanus. however. cannot 'banish' Rome. for the self
cannot be greater than the community. In his pride. Martius
overestimates his own value. not least because he owes it to
Rome. However self-sufficient he feels himself to be. he
cannot exorcise his dependence on society. When he dismisses
the people with the declaration. 'Who deserves greatness. /
Deserves your hate. . . .' (I. 1.175 -76). he unwittingly
testifies to his reliance on them: his virtue is confirmed by
the hatred of the people who are by nature his opposite.
Analogously. Coriolanus's superiority depends upon the hatred
of his rival. Aufidius. Martius is eager to learn Aufidius's
opinion of him because he finds therein corroboration of his
own uniqueness:
How often he had met you. sword to sword:
That of all things upon the earth he hated
Your person most: that he would pawn his fortunes
To hopeless restitution. so he might
Be call'd your vanquisher. III.1.13-17.
For Coriolanus. honour derives from the hatred of his social
inferiors and of his rival in valour.
Perhaps the name at the centre of this play best
illustrates the interdependence of the two levels of honour.
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After the battle with the Volsces. the hero is honoured for
a unique valour. and if he refuses the words of praise that
affirm the social foundation of his deeds. he nonetheless
accepts the honours that capture his singularity: the garland.
the horse and. most particularly. the new name. The third
name. the cOinomen. is a mark of individuality:
The third. was some addition geven. either for
some acte or notable service. or for some marke on
their face. or of some shape of their bodie. or
els for some speciall vertue they had. 24
The name 'Coriolanus' represents the hero's distinctive
virtue. but it is a name that the city gave him.25 His
singularity exists only in relation to society.
Martius's exile from the city of his birth continues to
explore the interrelation of the honour of the self and the
honour of the city. Having claimed autonomy for the self.
Coriolanus turns his back on Rome and promises his mother that
he will 'exceed the common' (1V.l.32). depending still on the
distance between himself and ordinary men as the measure of
his worth. He sees himself existing outside the city. like a
mythical beast that threatens the state:
though I go alone.
Like to a lonely dragon that his fen
Makes fear'd and talk'd of more than seen.
1V.1.29-31.
But even from that vision of a solitary. antisocial self. he
cannot eradicate the voices of the community. the response of
24.Plutarch's Liyes of the Noble Grecians and Rpmanes. 11.184.
2S.See Gordon. p.52.
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the city to his deeds. The warrior who found a relationship
with the people of Rome through mutual hatred will consummate
his dependence on the city through the bond of revenge. Yet
in order to do that. he must go to another city:
A goodly city is this Antium. City.
'Tis I that made thy widows: many an heir
Of these fair edifices 'fore my wars
Have I heard groan. and drop. IV.4.1-4.
Martius's proud assertion of the effect of 'my wars' can be
made only in reference to the city. Whether as ally or
opponent. the self can have meaning solely in a social
context. More particularly. Coriolanus seeks out Aufidius.
the rival in whose hatred he sees a reflection of his own
virtue. When. muffled and disguised. he meets Aufidius. and
the question 'What's thy name?' resounds. the name he gives
represents both his unique selfhood and its relation to
society:
My name is Caius Martius. who hath done
To thee particularly. and to all the Volsces.
Great hurt and mischief: thereto witness may
My surname. Coriolanus. The painful service.
The extreme dangers. and the drops of blood
Shed for my thankless country. are requited
But with that surname. . . . IV.5.66-72.
The impossibility of transcending the social is exhibited
with equal clarity in the depiction of Martius as avenger.
He regards his attack on Rome as the repudiation of the bonds
that once tied him to the city of his birth. However. revenge
is not a negation of relationship. It is based on the
requital of injury. hence the traditional idea of revenge as
the vindication of honour. When Coriolanus complains to
343
Aufidius of his treatment at the hands of Rome. he speaks the
language of public honour. presenting himself as dishonoured
by Rome's ingratitude. In so doing. he unconsciously endorses
the notion of service as a contract of mutual obligation
between the public servant and his community:
So if he tell us his noble deeds. we must also
tell him our noble acceptance of them.
Ingratitude is monstrous. . . . 11.3.8-10.
The dramatic irony illuminates in Martius's ostensible
rejection of society the strength of the bond tying him to
Rome. What he desires is gratitude. remembrance. reward for
his deeds - all the manifestations of the city's honour he
refused as poisonous of his integrity. Martius. who earlier
smarted to hear his wounds remembered and longed for the
people to forget his deeds. now blames the city for its
ingratitude and injustice. His service. which once made
wounds 'physical' (1.5.18). or therapeutic. and scars
'unaching' (11.2.148). now appears as dangerous and painful.
What this means. of course. is that Coriolanus cannot finally
conquer nature and finally sustain the higher self. His
attack on Rome is an unconscious attempt to reclaim the social
meaning he has lost:
He was a kind of nothing. titleless.
Till he had forg'd himself a name o'th'fire
Of burning Rome. V.l.13-lS.
However. if Martius's revenge on Rome clarifies the
interdependence of the honour of the self and the honour of
society. it also exhibits the irreconcilability of the hero
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and Rome. The play charts the inevitable progression of an
ideal of patrician virtue into a destructive. even
apocalyptic. force which the suppression of nature has made
solipsistic. The essential link between the defender of Rome
in Act I and its destroyer in Acts IV and V is emphasised
through a continuity of imagery and symbol. The 'thing of
blood' who killed Rome's enemies with the remorseless power of
the god he serves re-emerges. when he turns against Rome. as
'a thing / Made by some other deity than nature' (IV.6.91-92).
Coriolanus retains his association with irresistible motion.
He moves 'like an engine and the ground shrinks before his
treading.' (V.4.19-20). He leads his army like a god. and his
soldiers follow him 'with no less confidence / Than boys
pursuing summer butterflies' (IV.6.94-95) - an image
unforgettably associated with the nurture of the boy-warrior
(1.3.57-65). These are representations of the inflexible
constructed self. moving inexorably towards the violation of
its natural function. When Menenius observes. 'There is
differency between a grub and a butterfly; yet your butterfly
was a grub.' (V.4.11-12). he bears witness to the
inevitability of Martius's metamorphosis from defender to
attacker. from 'man to dragon' (V.4.13). His 'natural' idiom
connects this process to the play's tragic logic: that
society. the foundation of nature. creates the unnatural force
that threatens it. But of the contradiction he embodies.
Coriolanus remains. as a condition of being locked in the
integrity of the self. completely unconscious. He attempts to
follow his training to its logical conclusion. which means
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repudiating everything external to the self - both the natural
bonds of city:
he does sit in gold. his eye
Red as 'twould burn Rome. .. V.l.63-64 ..
and family:
I'll never
Be such a gosling to obey instinct. but stand
As if a man were author of himself
And knew no other kin. V.3.34-37.
Coriolanus's claim to be self-created entails a total
rejection of nature in favour of will. Yet if his desire to
be 'author of himself' is the logical conclusion of his
upbringing. it is also the reductio ad absurdum of the ideal
of self-sufficiency.
This hopeless contradiction is most fully exhibited in the
hero's final encounter with his family and neighbour. where it
takes the form of a bold and simple opposition. As Coriolanus
confronts Rome in its most poignant form. the contradictory
elements of honour - the self versus the community. the
principle versus the natural organism - are divided into two.
By means of this polarity. the play moves towards tragic
resolution. Volumnia appears in this scene as the
representative of nature. in the form of the family and of
Rome itself. As in the central scene of the play. she is
profoundly inconsistent. In her joint maternal and national
role. she refutes her son's assertions of a self-generated
existence:
Thou art my warrior:
I holp to frame thee. V.3.62-63.
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But there is great irony in these lines, for the speeches
through which Volumnia affirms Rome's claims on her son are
necessarily appeals to the very nature which she trained him
to overcome in the quest for superiority. She has to unmake
the son she made. The tensions in the service ethic dictate
that when Volumnia assumes the public role she has hitherto
played only vicariously. she must oppose the egoistic honour
she created in favour of the values of family. community and
service - the private and public worlds encompassed within the
natural social order.26
When Volumnia kneels to her son:
I kneel before thee. and unproperly
Show duty as mistaken all this while
Between the child and parent. V.3.S4-S6 .•
she presents the inversion of natural order manifest in
Coriolanus's attack on Rome. an inversion Martius finds
instinctively abhorrent:
Then let the mutinous winds
Strike the proud cedars 'gainst the fiery sun.
Murd'ring impossibility. to make
What cannot be. slight workl V.3.S9-62.
Coriolanus'S vision of unnaturalness contains an implicit
self-criticism. The images of natural power recall Martius's
own valour. born of a suppression of instinct through which
the hero sought to 'murder impossibility' - to be
self-sufficient. to be author of himself. That Martius
26.Anne Barton points out that the presence of Valeria in this
scene stresses that the family and the community are
inseparable in this play, that the women's victory is not
simply that of private over public values. See 'Livy.
Machiavelli. and Shakespeare's Coriolanus'. pp.126-27.
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endorses on an intuitive level the moral imperative of nature
indicates the powerful pressure exerted on him by what he
denies.
When Volumnia seeks to impress upon her son what it means
to destroy Rome. she gives voice to the ideal of service as
a natural function. But this ideal can no longer accommodate
the unnatural self. Throughout her speeches. Volumnia
associates the bond between Martius and Rome with the natural
ties of the family: the public and the private are
indissolubly joined within the order of nature. To assault
Rome will be to destroy not only his mother. wife and child.
but the city. 'our dear nurse' (V.3 .110). This destruction
involves a reversal of the life-giving properties of service
which a man earns through the defeat of the instinctual self:
the sources of creative life. childbirth. baptism.
immortality. To attack Rome is to strike at the city that
nurtured him. to tread 'on thy mother's womb / That brought
thee to this world.' (V.3.124-25). to destroy the wife and son
who will keep his name 'Living to time' (V.3.127). and to
obliterate the noble reputation that allows a man's virtue to
live on in the memory of the community:
if thou conquer Rome. the benefit
Which thou shalt thereby reap is such a name
Whose repetition will be dogg'd with curses.
Whose chronicle thus writ: 'The man was noble.
But with his last attempt he wip'd it out.
Destroy'd his country. and his name remains
To th'insuing age abhorr'd.' V.3.142-48.
What this means. of course. is that the manifestations of
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the higher self that a man secures through the repudiation of
nature are now denied Coriolanus on the grounds that he is
repudiating nature. This is inconsistent, but it is also
just, for what Volumnia forces Coriolanus to recognise is that
he is dependent on Rome for his virtue. In her speeches, the
state and the family are united in a bond of natural affection
through which individual identity is created and sustained.
Outside of the ties of nature, selfhood is lost:
This fellow had a Volscian to his mother:
His wife is in Corioles, and his child
Like him by chance. V.3.17S-S0.
In this scene, the mother who indoctrinated her son in
the ethic of the will as the source of national duty and
individual virtue advocates nature as the essence of selfhood
and of the social relationship. Her inconsistency is that of
a society which embodies nature and seeks to reconcile natural
instability with the immovable constancy of the will. This
Volumnia asks her son to do (V.3.136) and, as in the play's
central scene, the vision she presents of the happy
consequences of compromise is a desperate. albeit an
unconscious. lie. The contradictory pressures of public
service dictate that Martius really cannot win: in constancy
or compromise, he will destroy himself. for he can neither be
separated from nor reconciled to the city that created his
singular virtue only to ask him to betray it.
This Coriolanus comes fully to understand. His mother's
powerful appeal makes it impossible for him to sustain his
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solipsism. He bows to what created him. and spares Rome. Yet
it is. tragically. too late for this to constitute a real
reconciliation with the city of his birth. He knows that he
can spare Rome only at the cost of his own life:
o mother. mother!
What have you done? Behold. the heavens do ope.
The gods look down. and this unnatural scene
They laugh at. 0 my mother. mother! 01
You have won a happy victory to Rome;
But for your son. believe it. O. believe it.
Most dangerously you have with him prevail'd.
If not most mortal to him. But let it come.
V.3.182-89.
The lines show us a man who has moved from preoccupation with
the self to an awareness of how he appears to others. In
yielding to Rome. Coriolanus loses unity of being and with it
the unconsciousness of egoism. He has become socialised. and
for the first time in the play can see himself from the
outside. What he sees is the contradiction that he and his
mother have embodied. In his vision of the laughter of the
gods. there is a recognition of the terrible irony of his
situation. The unnaturalness of the scene consists not merely
in the mother bowing to the son.27 but in the mother's
destruction of the son to which the lines look forward.
Coriolanus is fully aware both that the appeal to nature is
imperative and that his surrender to it will prove literally
fatal - that the conflict between Rome and its hero can be
resolved only in the hero's death. Volumnia too has to pay
for the contradiction. for she can reclaim her son only by
losing him. But as she returns to her Roman triumph (V.S).
27.See Brockbank. The Arden Shakespeare: Coriolanus. pp.58.
296.
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there is no sign that she has risen to self-awareness.
Coriolanus achieves consciousness only after the complex
history of his relations with Rome has made it impossible for
him to enter the community whose claims he has belatedly
recognised. He is under obligation to the Volscians. whose
interests he has now betrayed; and he can preserve his
self-respect only by returning to confront the fate that he
knows awaits him at their hands. In a sense. Coriolanus. by
sparing Rome and therefore acknowledging his dependence on the
city. really does become a self without a society. With the
Volscians. he attempts to be conciliatory. but is easily
provoked by Aufidius to an outburst that literally invites the
destruction that his rival has contrived for him:
Cut me to pieces. Volsces. men and lads.
Stain all your edges on me. Boy! False hound I
If you have writ your annals true. 'tis there.
That like an eagle in a dove-cote. I
Flutter'd your Volscians in Corioles.
Alone I did it. V.6.111-16.
In these lines. Coriolanus lays claim to a singular valour
undiminished by compromise. but the pure heroic ideal he dies
affirming is one that neither he nor Rome has been able to
sustain. But although we feel by the end of the play that
Rome's evolution has rendered its hero a disruptive
anachronism. we also recognise the extent to which his extreme
honour has only brought to the surface the tensions latent in
a service ethic based on co-operation between the state and
the self-assertive will. Both Julius Caesar and Coriolanus
encourage us to ponder the value of a concept of social virtue
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which is so profoundly contradictory that it can be resolved
only in death. The plays' portrayal of the self-defeating
nature of the pagan ideal of public service identifies the
secular morality of antiquity as tragically flawed. Yet. in
Coriolanus in particular. this tragic vision provides a ritual
solace in the satisfaction that is derived from a dramatic
problem exhaustively explored.
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CONCLUSION
In its analysis of Shakespeare's treatment of honour in
a selection of his major plays. this thesis has made two
methodological assumptions that may serve to justify whatever
claims to originality it can sustain. The first is that
honour is an historical concept. the content of which is
affected by its historicity. This means that all attempts to
study the subject that have not taken this on board have
suffered from the oversimplifications which attend the view
that honour is a fixed. unitary notion. which can be
understood by perspectives limited solely to the sixteenth
century. Indeed. the relationship between the first chapter.
which begins with the ~. and the subsequent discussion of
Shakespeare's plays may be open to misconstruction. The
introductory survey is not designed to argue for direct
influences on Shakespeare. nor is it in any way meant to
contribute to the question of his reading. Rather. its
purpose is to show that the idea of honour was more complex
and dynamic in Shakespeare's time than is commonly recognised.
on the assumption that it was his extraordinary responsiveness
to the life of his period that made him return again and
again. and from such a variety of points of view. to the
psychological. social and moral implications of the problem.
If this is so. then it becomes essential to achieve an
adequate sense of the place of honour in the thought of his
age. The usual synchronic method has to be supplemented by
a diachronic perspective if it is not to produce altogether
too categorical conclusions.
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The emphasis that this thesis has placed on honour as
a legacy from the past has served to highlight two of honour's
major characteristics: its secularity. and its instability.
It has also shown that the three distinct formulations it
acquired in the course of its historical development - the
classical. the Christian and the chivalric - descended to the
sixteenth century. producing a unique Renaissance
configuration that reflects an age of rival ethical
allegiances. The idea that honour may contain problematic
tensions was already present in classical antiquity; its
secularity took on an entirely new meaning with the rise of
Christianity; this yielded to a chivalric accommodation. which
was in turn challenged by the Calvinist return to an
Augustinian otherworldliness. What was novel about the
Reniassance was the degree to which these traditions
coexisted. and coexisted necessarily in a state of tension.
even of conflict. Classical humanism collided with a
Christian repudiation of the possibility of secular virtue:
aristocratic pride and competitiveness both served and
undermined the chivalric compromises of the Christian state.
In general terms. honour in the Renaissance was the focus of
the central tension between the period's secular and spiritual
legacies and of the debate on the extent of man's capacity for
good which that diverse heritage engendered. Under such
conditions. it became quite impossible for comprehensively
receptive minds to take honour for granted. Controversy
breeds consciousness. turns convictions into questions, and
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converts habits into ideas.
The second methodological assumption made by this thesis
arises out of the first. As will have become apparent. it
examines the plays in terms of their treatment of ideas. Of
course. a play is an enactment of conflicting human interests
which no interpretation that claims to be critical can ignore.
But these interests may be construed in different ways -
psychological. sociological. dramaturgical. to name but a few.
But it is also legitimate to approach them intellectually.
Such an approach can have nothing to do with philosophical
argument as such. or with the deployment of abstract 'themes'.
for the integrity of an artistic medium defined by interaction
has to be respected. But it is perfectly compatible with what
could be called the interplay of concepts. This does not
presuppose that Shakespeare's ideas can be deduced from
the views of his characters. even of his protagonists.
Rather. what it assumes is that these views have to be taken
seriously - that is to say. that they have to be questioned.
as they come into conflict with other views. as they reflect
personal prejudice. or as their limitations are betrayed in
the forms of expression into which they fall - in the belief
that together they form an aggregate or pattern from which
a diagnostic coherence will emerge. On this basis.
Shakespeare's position becomes the product of the playas
a whole.
This thesis has argued that Shakespeare's examination of
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the concept of honour. as inhabiting the fault-lines of the
sixteenth century's complex ethical inheritance. drove him
into the problematic coherence of tragedy. This is not to
say. of course. that the tragic vision is the only possible
contemporary response to the ethical phenomenon of honour.
Don Quixote. not to mention Henry IV. Part One. demonstrates
the opportunities for comedy available to an age which was
evolving new forms of consciousness and a new synthesis out of
its complicated heritage. But Shakespeare was particularly
alert. as Henry V makes plain. to the inadequacies. and even
the dishonesties. of the compromise tradition. In fact. his
imagination was most deeply engaged. at least in relation to
what has been the subject of this thesis. by contradictions
and incompatibilities. And. as I have sought to show through
my discussion of Troilus and Cressida. Hamlet. Julius Caesar
and Coriplanus. he found these contradictions installed within
the very structure of honour itself.
In The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. Jacob
Burckhardt describes honour as an 'enigmatic mixture of
conscience and egoism,.1 Perhaps 'conscience' is not quite
the right word. for it lacks the social connotations central
to a concept grounded in the public role of the aristocracy.
Nevertheless. insofar as Burckhardt links the individual's
sense of his moral being to self-exaltation. his definition
I.Jacob Burckhardt. The Civilization pf the Renaissance in
~. trans. S.G.C. Middlemore (New York. Hagerstown. San
Francisco and London: Harper Colophon Books. 1958). 11.428.
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succeeds in capturing the essential instability of honour.
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that Shakespeare
perceived the tragic meaning of an idea of secular virtue
that locates the power for good in the ascendant will of the
superior individual and so makes virtue inseparable from
pride. from a relationship between a man and his own greatness
which ends up excluding considerations of morality and
community. In the final analysis. it seems clear that
Shakespeare's plays present a sustained critique of honour.
But this critique is not simply moral. as numerous scholars
have concluded. To be sure. Shakespeare consistently shows
honour to have pernicious consequences. In the plays in which
no greater moral imperative exists. it conspicuously fails to
sustain its claim to generate moral and social stability: and
Hamlet. which offers the possibility of a moral power in the
world higher than honour. leads us to hope that its self-
destructive mechanism can be transcended. But the chronic
collapse which Shakespeare portrays cannot be characterised as
his repudiation of a 'bad' honour. based on pride. in favour
of a 'good' honour. based on service. for the plays make clear
that it is the result not of moral viciousness. but of an
aspiration to virtue that is hopelessly entangled with
self-regard. Moreover. although Shakespeare dramatises
honour's self-defeating logic with great insight and
complexity. he is also fully attentive to the exceptional
courage and constancy produced by its self-creating energy.
Shakespeare's honour plays are finally tragic rather than
merely judgemental. for they demonstrate that it is out of
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its very energy and strength that honour precipitates its
own disintegration. If virtue itself is implicated in its
opposite, then Burckhardt's 'mixture' is more than
'enigmatic': it becomes a source of pity and fear.
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